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
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
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
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ADMIRAL TOGO.

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GENERAL NOGI.

M. 376.

THE (SIEGE OF PORT ARTHUR)

RECORDS OF AN EYE-WITNESS

BY

DAVID H. JAMES

SPECIAL WAR CORRESPONDENT OF THE "DAILY TELEGRAPH"
WITH THE THIRD JAPANESE ARMY


WITH MAPS AND PLANS AND SEVENTEEN ILLUSTRATIONS

LONDON

T. FISHER UNWIN

PATERNOSTER SQUARE

1905



V

PREFACE

It is my object, in the following pages, to treat exclusively of the Siege of Port Arthur, and, free from the disadvantages of dependence upon official information for my facts, to record my impressions as an eye-witness of the Siege. Apart from maintaining a continuous narrative of the Siege operations—from the landing of the besieging Army to the departure into captivity of the surrendered garrison—I have carefully entered into the details—humanly, no less than strategically—of the assaults, attacks, and plans of the Japanese, and the reiterated sorties and defensive methods of the garrison. Moreover, I shall have failed in my object if I do not convey to the reader some idea of the peculiarly sentimental aspect of the siege operations of the Japanese, and the wonderful pathos of the tragedy enacted, as the fortress continued to hold out despite the impetuous sacrifice of

battalions—martyred to satisfy the national desire that Port Arthur should be captured from Russia by storm and not by siege. Again, from a more material standpoint, I have attempted to emphasise clearly the fact that the scientific construction of modern fortifications renders them shell-proof against the fire of the heaviest known mobile cannon, and that forts of modern construction must not be impetuously but cautiously attacked. Their exterior defences must be destroyed by dynamite, and their moat defences by laborious and skilful mining, before it is possible to cross their moats; and only after this tedious process is it at all feasible to attempt to dislodge their garrisons by the free use of the bayonet—a weapon which is by no means obsolete, but is as important a factor in the offensive and defensive operations of siege warfare as the mining of the sapper or the concentrated fire of the siege artillery. And as the science of fortification defence continues to keep pace with the science of fortification attack, the scales will be held in an even balance that only superior moral and animal courage can disturb.

It has been generally considered that, apart from their impetuosity, there were no blunders

on the part of the Japanese attacking Port Arthur, but this conclusion is not borne out by the facts of the case. There were many blunders committed, and the greatest of these was under-estimation, based on a lack of knowledge of the strength of the position attacked. And the subsequent process of obtaining this information was appallingly crude and wasteful of life, as, for instance, the attack of the 30th of October. On this particular occasion an objective had been selected, and an artificial basis of attack created by siege parallels. The objective was subjected to a continual and heavy bombardment for four days and three nights by the entire siege park, yet after a terrific culminating bombardment the general assault was developed, by less than 5000 infantry out of an available force of not less than 70,000 bayonets. After lasting an hour or so without being further developed, and without gaining any advantage, the assault was summarily ordered to cease, and reduced itself into a costly *en masse* reconnaissance of the eastern sector of forts. This reconnaissance cost the Japanese not less than £30,000 in ammunition, and 2000 fruitless casualties.

The Japanese have won their battles by methods peculiarly their own, which have


proved wonderfully successful against the stubborn but unlearned Muscovites, yet it always appeared to me that the Japanese determined the importance of an engagement by the number of killed and wounded rather than by its strategical benefits. Public opinion—as we understand it—does not exist in Japan. The Commanders, although often unduly blamed for trivial reverses, are never questioned or condemned for the methods of their success, and that 203 Metre Hill cost 8000 casualties, and the capture of Port Arthur 70,000, is held to magnify the achievements. It is all part of the national sacrifice, and what the military sacrifice amounts to is of secondary, if any, importance.

And yet, for all their outward seeming indifference, if you can lift the veil of this concealment you will find that it is superficial, and, like actors on the stage, they are but posing before the nations of the West, whose civilisation they have imitated but not assimilated; and they are, after all, but part of the human race, with their emotions as deeply ingrained in them as they are in us, only they are taught from childhood to conceal them as unworthy of their traditions.

But I must not allow general remarks to

anticipate my narrative, and will only add that the material used in the compilation of this book is from my personal notebook, and that if there is much that differs from the official reports, these statements of mine are but the simple words of an eye-witness.

D. H. J.



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THE SIEGE OF PORT ARTHUR

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The situation on the Quang-tung peninsula after the battle of Nanshan—The events leading up to the formation of the Third Japanese Army under General Baron Nogi, and its disposition after the defeat of the Russian army under General Stackleberg at Tei-le-ssu, June 15, 1904.

ON November 30, 1895, Japan, having destroyed many of the defences of Port Arthur, restored it to China, together with the adjoining territory, which had been ceded to her by China in perpetuity and full sovereignty by the Treaty of Shimonoseki, April 17, 1895. Japan was compelled to restore this territory by hostile demonstrations on the part of Russia, France, and Germany, which were made to back up their representations that "the possession of the ceded territory by

the Emperor of Japan would be detrimental to the lasting peace of the Orient." With bitter humiliation Japan yielded to the pressure, but nursed the insult of their interference, and with mortification watched the development of the conspiracy which ended in the occupation of Kiao-chiao by Germany and Port Arthur by Russia.

Then the whole nation was consumed with a devouring spirit of revenge, which, carefully nurtured in the succeeding years, grew into a national sentiment, concentrated upon one object—the expulsion of Russia from Port Arthur. An alliance was made with England to guard against a repetition of the events of 1895, and every nerve strained to the utmost to prepare the country for the struggle for the mastery of the Pacific. Russia's duplicity after the Boxer campaign gave Japan the *causus belli* she needed, and the negotiations were only prolonged until the hour that all preparations were completed for the declaration of war. Not a moment was wasted, and the whole nation threw itself into the struggle heart and soul. To one who has lived among the Japanese through these years of preparation, as I have, and then has followed the fortunes of the army destined to reverse the

humiliating indignity heaped upon the nation ten years before, the dramatic and human side of the siege of Port Arthur appeals in all its unmasked intensity of purpose.

The suddenness and success of the torpedo attack on the Russian fleet anchored in reckless security in the outer roadstead, which opened the war, marked for Russia the beginning of irretrievable disaster, and was the first blow struck for the honour of Japan; and ever afterwards, when they met, the flag of Russia went down before the banner of Japan, on land and on the sea. Russians heard the dismal tale of that first encounter on the Yalu with rankling bitterness born of defeat at the hands of a despised foe, and they little thought that because a Russian army had been forced to retreat, it had been thoroughly beaten by the skill and courage of Japanese troops; for they had a dream of military supremacy woven around vast armies that were to drive the insolent foe into the seas, and the adverse issue of that first engagement could not dispel this dream. But afield, the effect of this first overthrow of Russian arms was most disastrous in its consequences.

The retreating force could but remember that it was not merely by the cleverness of

military discipline that they had been beaten, it was something more; and such is the Slav nature, their moods touched by the extremes of elation and depression, that this "something" was more terrible to face than the deluge of shell and shrapnel from modern arms.

They could understand, and did appreciate, the superiority of the Japanese artillery practice, but they could not understand that patriotic devotion to their country and calling that impelled the Japanese ever onward, the willing offerings of a national sacrifice. It was this libation of slaughter that unnerved them, for they themselves fought automatically, incited by nothing more than the idea of self-preservation, and how it was possible to withstand the Japanese onslaughts was beyond the comprehension of their untutored brains. To know that they were not inferior physically was but to add shame to their terror, for they knew that they had not that desire to fight that so animated their foes, making them their superiors even when at close quarters with the bayonet. The moral effect of this upon these unlearned Muscovites must not be lost sight of, for we have to bear in mind its probable effect on similar classes of men, cut off from

the world and fighting in restricted territory, and no less to remark the extreme opposite effect on the victorious troops; for herein lies the explanation of recklessly daring assaults and events anticipated.

In May there was added to the Yalu *débâcle* the demoralising defeat at Nanshan, which, fought at the close of the month, was confirmatory of the already existing fear which the former reverse had created. The Russians were again on the defensive, and in a carefully prepared position, but were driven from it by combined naval and military operations, which demonstrated that the Russians were opposed to superiors; and this superiority being attained by a combination of self-sacrifice, with all that science has yielded to ensure victory, swept away all notions of fanaticism; and it was evident that not only had an equality of morale to be restored, but a tuition in the school of modern warfare was urgently required if Russians were not always to turn their backs on their enemy.

The full purport of what the Nanshan defeat involved was soon clear to the Russian commander, for, with the southward movement of the Japanese on the 27th of May, coincidentally Dalny, the Queen City of the Russian

East, had to be evacuated, and the retrograde movement on Port Arthur commenced.

Driven from Dalny—forced to occupy a fifteen-mile line of hills—the Russians were aware, yet unable to oppose the landing at Kerr Bay on the last day of May, of the army destined to capture Port Arthur. Free from hindrance at its landing, and covered by the ample screen of the victorious first division of the Second Japanese Army, the eleventh division was soon spreading its battalions over the country, and closing upon the Russian force so ably held in check by the heroes of Nanshan.

This Russian force, available after Nanshan for the defence of the fortified district of Quang-tung, has been estimated at 40,000 infantry, exclusive of the fortress garrison of Port Arthur, and, if this latter force be included, the army confronting the Japanese would be not less than 50,000 men of all arms. Under the command of General Nogi were two divisions (first and eleventh) of infantry, and taking these at full strength, there were but 30,000 men with which to assume the offensive. But this numerical disparity was more apparent than real, for a great reduction of the Russian force was caused by a withdrawal of men for creating defences in and about Port Arthur.

This disgraceful state of affairs at Port Arthur was the result of apathy on the part of General Stoessel and others, allowing Saka-roff, the Prefect of Dalny, to complete works at Dalny and wilfully neglect the fortifications of vital defensive importance to the citadel. And we now find, in consequence of this, battalions of infantry striving to do in time of war, with unskilled hands, work that ought to have been done months before by skilful labourers. Not only did this prevent Stoessel from utilising all his men to hinder the southward march of his enemy, but it also prevented him from attempting to break through the thin line of Japanese then drawn across the peninsula.

There was also in another direction a further drainage weakening Stoessel. Thousands of men were being actively employed in the preparation of "a first line of defence," which, considerably over fifteen miles in extent, ran from coast to coast over a rugged country, and entailed an enormous amount of trench work.

With these facts before us, it will be readily conceded that the numerical superiority of the Russian commander was not an advantage that could be immediately utilised, and it will be safe to assume that not more than

25,000 men were available for the task of harassing the Japanese advance.

Unfortunately for the Japanese, no reinforcements could be diverted to General Nogi, for at this juncture a movement of greater importance was afoot. General Oku, with the third and fourth divisions of the Second Army, was rapidly counter-marching up the peninsula against the force under General Stackleberg detached by Kuropatkin, and sent by order of the Tzar to the relief of the Port Arthur garrison.

The sixth division of the Japanese army was landed at Lushu-tun (opposite to Dalny), and rushed up country to brace Oku for the impending battle. Stores, munitions of war, railway material, locomotives, labourers, and these troops taxing to the utmost the capacity and ability of the transport department, were landed in systematic confusion at Dalny and Lushu-tun. The gauge of the railway was altered, bridges repaired and reconstructed, locomotives and trucks pieced together, and the Russian rolling stock, that everywhere blocked the line, side-tracked or bundled away, and soon, on the railway, commissariat for the two armies was handled. During the first days of June, Dalny and Lushu-tun throbbed

with ceaseless activity, but all this excitement was for Oku.

The dangerous task of clearing the adjacent waters of mines progressed very slowly, making the movement of transports a matter of grave anxiety to all concerned, and this strenuous time proved the perfect application of the Japanese system of careful preparation to military undertakings, a system which proved as capable of meeting every emergency as it was efficient and drastic in its consequences.

On the 15th of June, Stackleberg with his routed army was in full retreat, and the battle of Tei-le-ssu again demonstrated the grim superiority of the Japanese over the proud but ignorant Muscovites. The energies of the Japanese were now free to be concentrated on the army of General Nogi, who, by reconnaissance of the Russian position, disclosed the fact that the forced inactivity of the Japanese had been of signal importance to the invested garrison. They had been enabled to strongly intrench and prepare from shore to shore a mask-defence in front of their first line of defence. And the position they occupied on these heights was strong, offering great advantage to even a small force against assailing

masses. We therefore find the month of June half spent, and the extremely difficult task set the Third Japanese Army becoming complicated.

General Nogi was now confronted by an almost equal force in an intrenched position spread over an extensive front, and this force had a double advantage over him, for they possessed a second line of intrenchments (parallel to this advanced position) on which to fall back when pressed at any point. It would therefore appear that the Japanese operations were irresolute at the most critical stage after Nanshan, and that an enormous advantage had been gained by the Russians ; but it will be observed that it was a consequential advantage, gained by that order of the Tzar, compelling General Kuropatkin to divide his main army, and send a section to the relief of the garrison. The value of this southward movement was not realised or appreciated at the time by the Russians, because it failed in its primary object ; but the respite it gave to Stoessel, and the inactivity it forced on Nogi, by the diverting of troops and munitions of war from him to Oku, proved of great moment to the sequel of events.

But there was a still greater loss to Nogi's army during June. This occurred on the day

after the Tei-le-ssu victory, when the *Hitachi Maru* was sunk by the Vladivostok squadron in the straits of Tsu-shima. On board the *Hitachi* had been placed the heavy siege train (with the exception of the mountings of the 28-centimetre howitzers, which were on board the *Sado Maru*, that narrowly escaped a similar fate). Eighteen 28-centimetre howitzers were lost in the *Hitachi*, and neither the 15-centimetre howitzers used at the Yalu, and sent from General Hasegawa, or the 4.7 naval guns, made up for this serious deficiency.

It was the second rift within the lute, and, like the simultaneous loss of the battleships *Yashima*, *Hatsuse* and cruiser *Yoshino*, was but the fortune of war.

The loss of those guns to General Nogi cannot be too much dwelt upon, for they were part of the prearranged plan to capture Port Arthur by assault after a terrific bombardment, and, three batteries of the heaviest guns ever employed at any time by an army assuming the offensive, would have materially altered the feasibility of the scheme of escalade.

CHAPTER II

THE ADVANCE DOWN THE PENINSULA

The advance down the Quang-tung peninsula during the months of June and July—The retirement of the garrison into the line of permanent fortifications at Port Arthur on July 30, 1904.

SOUTH of the Nan-kuan-ling range, and a couple of miles from the Nan-kuan-ling junction on the Port Arthur-Dalny section of the railway, a plain of some three miles wide sweeping across the country separates the Nan-kuan-lings from an uneven range of interlocked hills spreading over the Quang-tung peninsula south and west of Dalny. It was in these latter hills that the belligerents confronted each other after Nanshan.

The line held by the Russians extended from Shaio-ping-tao—a point about 10 miles south-south-west of Dalny—on the east coast, irregularly over the hills to Anshi-shan, on the west coast—a hill about 18 miles from Port Arthur as the crow flies. The extension of the Russian line was over 15 miles, and General*

Nogi held an almost parallel line of not less than 12 miles (from An-tzu-shan, on the west coast, to Dai-shi-shan, on the east coast, some five miles south-west of Dalny), and scarcely two miles distant from the Russian line.


General Nogi's position for attack was no less favourable than that of his enemies for defence. The interwoven hills afforded excellent cover for his artillery, and enabled him to screen the movements of his infantry, thus effectively concealing his plan of attack from the Russians until the last moment. On the other hand, the disposition of his enemy was as effectively masked by the jumble of hills they occupied, and the ground between being on view from the respective observation points, nothing but small skirmishes occurred until nearing the close of the month. A little activity was then displayed by the Russian left, where the 5th and 28th Regiments of Sharpshooters were stationed, who on several occasions carried out a reconnaissance in force against the right wing of the Japanese. The Port Arthur squadron then made a sortie from the harbour (23rd of June), but, meeting the blockading squadron in force, retired and anchored outside the harbour off Liao-teah-shan. During the night they were attacked by the

combined torpedo flotillas of the Japanese, but escaping disaster, safely re-entered the harbour during the morning of the 24th.

Until the sortie of the fleet on the 23rd of June, it had been considered by the Japanese naval authorities that the blockading efforts of the 3rd of May had accomplished the desired end, and the harbour entrance sealed; and that the fleet—as far as craft larger than gunboats was concerned—was securely bottled up. The reappearance of the battleships *Cæsarevitch* and *Retvisan* in the battle line also disconcerted the Japanese, as these two vessels were supposed to have been placed *hors de combat* on the night of the 9th of February and irreparably damaged.

In view of this sortie of the fleet, it became necessary to redouble the vigilance of the blockading squadron to prevent ammunition and supplies from entering the invested town, and many blockade-runners were captured and taken to Japan.

On the 26th of June it was deemed necessary by the Japanese commander to attack the enemy's right wing and dislodge his outposts from two commanding heights named Witi-tou-shan and Prominent Peak. From the summits of these peaks (800 and 1000 feet)



THE ADVANCE


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THE THIRD JAPANESE ARMY AFTER NANSHAN

— To —

AUGUST 16th 1904

- Legend —
- Railway
 - Battle
 - Forts and batteries
 - Trenches
 - Russian first line of defense. June 1904
 - Russian first line of defense. July 1904
 - Russian line of defense. August 16-1904
 - Japanese line of advance. June 1st to August 16th
 - Japanese Position. June 15. 1904
 - " " June 26. 1904
 - " " July 29. 1904
 - " " July 31. 1904
 - " " August 16. 1904.



Dalny and Port Arthur are visible with the naked eye, and the retention of these hills enabled the Russian commander to obtain an excellent view of the movements of Japanese transports, disembarkation of troops, artillery, etc., at Dalny, and afforded him a means of gauging his opponents' strength.

And it was important that they should be kept Russian, for in Japanese hands the movements of the fleet sheltering in the harbour would no longer be free from observation.

Early on the morning of the 26th of June the left wing of the investing force (eleventh division) moved south in three columns.

The 44th Regiment were detached, and ordered to clear Wai-tou-shan. Quickly rolling-in the small patrols, they closed in on this height, and with excellent spirit courageously scaled the eminence, assaulted the garrison with a furious bayonet charge, forced down a feeble resistance, and were immediately in possession, planting their colours on the height at 9 a.m.

The other columns vigorously attacking the ground to the east and west of Wai-tou-shan occupied a series of subordinate outposts, and secured the position on the flanks. The 44th then deployed from the captured position,

and worked around toward Prominent Peak, which was held by a couple of battalions of infantry with two 6-centimetre quick-firers and several machine guns. However, before the attack could be developed against Prominent Peak, a flotilla of Russian gunboats and torpedo craft appeared off Shaio-ping-tao and opened a quick fire upon the Japanese left wing.

This naval co-operation dislocating the Japanese plan of attack, aided the defenders of Prominent Peak in holding the 44th in comparative check until the appearance of a superior Japanese naval force compelled the retirement of the Russian flotilla. The 44th then pressed their attack against the hill, and set about scaling up its rocky sides in the face of a withering rifle and machine-gun fire from the defenders. A battery of Japanese mountain guns were quickly in action, and speedily checked this fire, effectively keeping it down until the assaulters were within pistol-shot of the garrison; then opening up with a salvo of shrapnel, peppered every yard of the summit with lead until the infantry were breathed and re-formed for the bayonet charge that carried them over the last few yards. The position was carried at the point of the bayonet, and securely held

by five o'clock. Prominent Peak, or Kenshan, as it was afterwards named by the Japanese, affords a striking example of effective frontal attacking when the position to be taken has much dead ground and the infantry can be breathed under cover before having to cross bayonets with the garrison. The hilly nature of the country through which the Japanese advanced afforded ample opportunity for the effective use of the bayonet, and much of the subsequent fighting was solely of this nature. The Japanese losses on the 26th were less than 200 killed and wounded, while the Russians left close on 100 bodies on the field.

The capture of Kenshan, enabling the Japanese left wing to close in, forced the Russians to abandon part of the general line they held before the attack, and fall back a couple of miles on the east coast, to the line of first defence; the left wing, however, maintained its position, retaining the western portion of the original mask line.

General Stoessel is said to have strongly censured his subordinates for the loss of the two observation points, and immediately ordered preparations to be made to resume the original line and reoccupy Kenshan and Wai-tou-shan.

A week later, on 3rd July, the Russians assumed the offensive. The general attack was ordered to be centred on the left wing and centre of the Japanese position, while a sustained demonstration along the entire line was to support the movement. The object was to recapture the lost observation points, and if possible break sufficient ground to enable his artillery shell the Japanese commissary, etc., at Dalny.

Shortly after daylight on the 3rd the Russian plans were set in motion by the appearance of a strong scouting party on the central heights, opposite the left wing of the Japanese. Later in the morning these were reinforced by a couple of companies of infantry, supported by a machine-gun section, and this force assumed the offensive against the Japanese outposts. The attack was well supported, and a full battalion was brought into action against the Japanese position in a feint attack. This attack was delivered for the purpose of screening the movements of the main body and to cover the placing of a couple of field batteries.

In the afternoon the attack was further developed by additional supports, which, making an effective advance, broke up the advance guards of the Japanese, but were in turn smartly held in check by the main Japanese

force, and at 7 p.m., unable to make further headway, the main body of Russians retired to the line held by the artillery placed during the day. An hour later a couple of battalions advanced in close formation to the martial strains of a military band, but were immediately counter-attacked in this formation, thrown into hopeless confusion, and forced to retire precipitately into the line of their artillery.

Dawn of the 4th was ushered in by a smart artillery duel, and the Russian gunners having the best of matters, their infantry, now four battalions strong, skirmished against the Japanese position in three columns, keeping up a ding-dong fight with the Japanese outposts all morning, but making little impression on the main position. In the afternoon the attack was supported by an addition of three battalions in the firing line, and this force immediately converged on Kenshan. Another Russian detachment, about a regiment strong, co-operated at the same time on the flanks, and the attack progressed sufficiently to allow of a frontal attack being delivered on Kenshan. The attacks all round were, however, easily held by the Japanese, and the Russians compelled to retire. At four o'clock a fresh attempt was made to recapture Kenshan by

a force of not less than ten battalions. This attempt was well supported by shell and shrapnel fire from four field batteries and a strong naval support off shore, and for a time progressed very favourably for the Russians. A full company of Russian infantry succeeded in gaining the summit of Kenshan, and others smartly following, engaged the garrison in a desperate encounter with rocks and bayonets. The garrison, outnumbered, fought stubbornly, but, forced to break ground, were on the point of retiring when reinforcements reached them, and the tide, slowly and desperately stemmed, was turned in their favour. At this critical juncture three batteries of siege artillery took up a position on the flanks of the hill, and, aided by a couple of batteries of mountain guns and a naval Long Tom restored the equality of artillery fire, and crushed the attack.

By nightfall the Russians were beaten off the claws of the hill, while reinforcements on the flanks securely held the position for the Japanese.

Under cover of darkness the Russians returned to the attack and restormed Kenshan with redoubled fury, again reaching the summit, and engaging in a desperate hand-to-hand encounter with the garrison until dawn, and,

then, being aided by a clever concentrated artillery support, they were with great difficulty prevented from recapturing the position. But the reiterated assaults were all to no purpose, and at 9 a.m. on the 5th the attempt to break through was abandoned, and the baffled Muscovites forced to retire under a withering artillery fire that accelerated their movements. But the retirement being covered by a Russian naval support off shore, no attempt was made by the Japanese infantry to follow the retreat. This attempt of the garrison to break through was made by at least fourteen battalions of infantry supported by four batteries of field guns, with some machine guns and pom-poms. Losses were heavy on the Russian side, and were estimated at not less than 800 killed and wounded, while the Japanese loss was about 450.

General Stoessel now drew in his advanced left and fell back upon his prepared line of first defence, while Japanese patrols stole into the vacated trenches.

Freedom from observation was now afforded the Japanese movements at Dalny and in the mine-swept bay. Arms and ammunition of every description and battalions of infantry streamed into Dalny, and were transported

to the Third Army. The rainy season was now upon the belligerents, and General Nogi's force suffered considerable loss from the ravages of beri-beri (which resulted from the fermentation of rice after the intermittent rainstorms which soaked through the rice bags during transportation, etc.).

However, by the middle of July General Nogi had fully 60,000 bayonets under his command, made up of the following units. First, ninth, eleventh divisions of infantry, and two independent brigades of 2nd Reserves (each brigade 9000 men), besides a naval brigade and an independent brigade of mixed artillery, including 15-centimetre howitzers sent from the First Army corps.

Northward General Oku, continuing his successes, occupied Kaiping on the 9th of July, and on the 24th forced Stackleberg to evacuate Ta-shih-chiao, thereby putting at an end any immediate menace to the Third Army from Kuropatkin. So, with sufficient force at his disposal, there remained no reason why General Nogi should not attack the Russian first line of defence, and drive the enemy out of the hills into the line of permanent fortifications at Port Arthur. His task was no easy one, for the heights held by the Russians were

for the most part precipitous, with summits of out-cropping rocks that afforded natural cover for infantry, if doubtful immunity from artillery fire. And the Russians had made good use of their time, for the several particular heights were laced together and made interdependent by an enormous amount of trench work, and this prevented in no small degree the capture of a dominating position by the reduction of a subordinate hill. But there were two important weaknesses in this Russian line of first defence. First, its great length; and secondly, a valley on the west, flanking the position.

This valley divides the main range of the peninsula hills from the west coast ranges, and, triangular in shape, widens from a scant mile at Shwang-tai-kou (extreme right of the Japanese), to over six miles near Feng-hwang-shan. The railway traverses this valley, which is seven miles long, between Shwang-tai-kou and Feng-hwang-shan.

It was therefore essential that this valley should be strongly held to frustrate any envelopment of the Russian left wing, which rested on a precipitous jumble of hills named O-gi-ki-shan. The centre of the Russian position was the hills known as An-tzu-ling, midway

between the coast-lines, while the right wing held the high ground to the south of Shaio-ping-tao.

Scarcely more than a mile separates these two positions, and the intervening country is wild in the extreme. Seamed with creeks and watercourses, short abrupt valleys and sunken roads, the country was well-nigh impassable during the rainy season that was then upon them. But the necessity of clearing the Russians out from the hills was so urgent that an attack was planned for the 26th of July.

Before daylight on that day the entire Japanese line was in movement, and stealthily advancing, crumbled in the little opposition offered by the Russian outposts. The advance was made in three columns, formed as follows: The first and ninth divisions under Generals Matsumura and Oshima, the right wing.

The independent brigades, the centre, and the eleventh division under General Tsuchiya, the left wing.

The first division was to attack the enemy in the neighbourhood of Shwang-tai-kou and the railway, while the ninth division, co-operating with them, to dislodge the Russians holding O-gi-ki-shan and the western hills. The two

independent brigades (six regiments) were to cement the wings and assist the eleventh division clear the east coast hills. The general plan of attack was to attempt to turn the position on the west before delivering frontal attacks on O-gi-ki-shan and An-tzu-ling.

The artillery, evenly distributed and hidden away in the foot-hills, unmasked at dawn, but a heavy mist that hung over the Russian line compelled indifferent practice, and after a short while rain commenced to descend in torrents, and put a stop to the artillery fire before any impression could be made on the Russian position.

Despite the failure of the artillery, the infantry attacks were pressed home along the line of the original plan, and a frontal attack was delivered by the ninth division on O-gi-ki-shan, but proved a costly failure. Elsewhere the attacks were repulsed with considerable loss, and the advance was perforce abandoned pending a lull in the storm, which had now assumed disconcerting proportions.

Afternoon found the weather clearing and the artillery making attempts to shell the Russian position before the mist cleared. By evening it had cleared sufficiently to allow of a general fire being opened up, under cover

of which the infantry resumed the attack. O-gi-ki-shan was again stormed, but, despite every effort, the Russians could not be dislodged, and morning of the 27th found the position unchanged.

The Japanese then concentrated their artillery fire on the Russian left, especially the hill O-gi-ki, and when the hill presented the appearance of an active volcano, the infantry were let loose against the defenders. The lower rifle pits on the glacis were rushed at the point of the bayonet; but, contrary to expectations, the Russians refused to retire, and stubbornly contested every inch of the ground, and in this they were aided by the natural difficulties that the hill offered. Its sides bristling with jagged rocks made it a steep and dangerous climb, and fighting from rock to rock, the Russians were only forced to evacuate the claws of the hill by sunset, after a cruel fight with rocks and bayonets. An even more difficult task now lay ahead of the Japanese, for, rocky, with scarce foothold for mountain sheep, the route to the summit was sufficient to daunt the stoutest heart.

In the meantime, the eleventh division were making no headway, for during the afternoon the cruiser *Bayan* and a flotilla of mosquito

craft bombarded them from off shore and effectively checked their operations against the Russian right. A night attack was determined on, and delivered simultaneously along the entire line. Some brilliant work on the part of a detachment of the eleventh division placed the Russian right in danger, but no impression could be made on the centre.

But it was on the Russian left that the fiercest fighting took place. Despite unexampled courage, the crest of O-gi-ki-shan could not be captured, and the Russians in this part of the field fought with all their traditional doggedness when in a defensive position, contesting with gallant bravery every inch of the position. At O-gi-ki-shan the fighting was fiercest on the 27th, and, owing to the nature of the ground, scores of wounded were hurled over 500 feet down to the valley beneath, and many others crushed to pulp by great rolling boulders. At times the Japanese were obliged to fire their rifles perpendicularly at their enemy, and so severe was the fighting that several battalions were rendered officerless and had their non-commissioned ranks thinned to two-thirds. The Russians displayed unflinching bravery when forced to retire from their rifle pits, deliberately carrying away their

wounded under fire, and were able to claim the heights of O-gi-ki-shan on the morning of the 28th.

But the success on the east seriously compromised the Russian position, and Stoessel decided to withdraw his force to prevent a possible outflank that was immediately threatening on the west by the first division.

At 9 a.m. on the 28th a general retirement was ordered, and, orderly and well-executed, the movement was a success. A feint was made on the east by a small party which succeeded in drawing a force of Japanese to cut off its retreat. The Russians had, however, arranged to escape by means of junks, and succeeded in outwitting the envelopers. A strong rear-guard ably covered the retirement of the artillery and main force, and it was dusk before the Japanese, advancing in extended order, occupied a line from Chang-ling-tsu (a station on the railway nine miles from Port Arthur) to Hai-e-tun, on the east coast. The Japanese casualties for the three days were very heavy, amounting to over 4000, while the Russian loss was not less than a quarter of this amount. Only a couple of fieldpieces, three quick-firers, and three machine guns were captured by the Japanese; and when it is

considered that over ten batteries were being employed by the Russians on the 28th, the skill shown in the retirement will be appreciated. The Japanese rested on the 29th and waited for ammunition and artillery to be brought up. Meanwhile scouts reported the Russians holding the hills near Louisa Bay, the range Feng-hwang-shan, and the Ta-ku-shan hills to the sea. It was decided to make a surprise attack the next morning, and long before daylight the first and ninth divisions were on the move.

Surrounding the surprised outposts, they were quickly upon the main force holding Feng-hwang-shan. Altogether unprepared to offer organised resistance, the Russians retired in disorder from those hills. Following up their success, the eleventh division sought to swing in on Ta-ku-shan, but, meeting with opposition, General Nogi ordered the operations to cease, well contented with the result of the attack. For all practical purposes, the enemy had been driven into their permanent lines; the drive, that had occupied two months, was accomplished and the garrison besieged.

These operations on the Quang-tung peninsula covered a country of the greatest natural difficulty, and augmented with strong artificial

obstacles and artillery, the position from which the Russians were driven was cheaply purchased by the Japanese. Overmatched in artillery, nevertheless Stoessel was easily forced out of the hills, which should have been safely held against even quadruple force. There is no doubt that the brilliant Japanese infantry charges could have been held had it not been for the continuity of the superior artillery fire, with its terribly accurate effect; and again, the simultaneous attacks prevented Stoessel from massing troops at particular points; but to have been driven from his first line of defence, on which he had expended two months' labour, after sustaining a bare 1000 casualties and inflicting only a total of 5000 on his enemy, does not show that he carried out a clever retreating campaign with the material at his disposal. His troops had fully recovered from the Nanshan defeat, and fought splendidly, having fully regained their morale. This was no doubt due to the first inactivity of the Japanese, and the splendid defensive positions they were able to occupy. A fact remains, and must be commented upon, that they displayed qualities on the 27th of July that they did not appear to have at the battle of Nanshan.

CHAPTER III

PRELIMINARY OPERATIONS

Capture of Ta-ku-shan and Shaio-ku-shan on August 9, 1904—
Closing in for the first assault—The Mikado's message to
the garrison—General Stoessel refuses to surrender.

THE retention of Port Arthur (by a large force) after the commencement of war has been condemned in some quarters as a strategical blunder, insomuch as it divided the available Russian army in the east, and lessened the striking power of the commander-in-chief when Japanese battalions were still over seas. However, with a knowledge of the influencing conditions, and a clear understanding of what the retention of Port Arthur by an efficient garrison entailed on the Russian and Japanese plan of campaign, and its effect on the principal issue at stake, it may be that this opinion will bear correction.

- A careful analysis of the conditions existing at the seat of war on the outbreak of hostilities forces me to regard Port Arthur as of extreme strategical importance to the Russians, and

to find no blunder in maintaining a large force to defend the citadel from hostile attacks on the land side. Built close to the sea, and surrounded by it on three sides, Port Arthur is impregnable, save by the combined operations of a superior hostile fleet and hostile army; and, although known to have been surrounded by fortifications of extraordinary ingenuity and strength, with many dominating works, Port Arthur without troops to man these works would have offered no obstacle to the operations of a hostile army. The suddenness of the Japanese attack precluded the immediate carrying out of any offensive plan, the fleet's action being paralysed for the time being by the first attack of the Japanese torpedo flotilla, when three formidable units were placed *hors de combat*. Yet without command of the sea the Russians could not hope for ultimate victory, and to have abandoned the naval base, and left the crippled fleet to work out its own salvation, would have condemned it to almost immediate destruction. Even had this naval base been an island, withdrawing the garrison would have soon forced upon the "fleet in being" an engagement with the enemy to avoid destruction from their land forces, that they would have

endeavoured to have landed (prior to the destruction of the fleet) in sufficient numbers out of the effective range of this fleet, and marched practically unopposed to reduce the citadel. But the risk was greater, as the landing of a hostile force on the Quang-tung peninsula would have immediately followed the first torpedo attack, had the Japanese only known that an inefficient garrison then defended the forts; but of this they were unfortunately not aware, and, before the true state of affairs could be ascertained, a large garrison had been collected, and the opportunity lost of reducing the citadel by surprise, as even General Stoessel admitted was possible during the first week of February 1904. The fleet thus relied largely on an efficient garrison for immunity from destruction, while actively engaged attempting to obtain command of the sea, which was the superior strategical factor, and soundly appreciated by the Japanese and Russians, even if the appreciation of the latter did not go to the extent of being prepared for torpedo attacks. On the other hand, whether the gain to Kuropatkin of 50,000 troops would have enabled him to resist the advance of the Japanese is highly problematical, but that the retention of Port Arthur

by this force did assist him in staving off annihilation was clearly demonstrated by the result of the protracted battle of Liaoyang. And it is certain that these Russians could not have been more profitably employed than they were at Port Arthur, but on the other hand, an army of equal numbers (more were available) under General Nogi would have been more profitably engaged by the Japanese in the greater struggle. Subsequent events proved to the hilt that the retention of Port Arthur dislocated the Japanese plan of campaign, and that the resistance opposed to General Nogi was of the deepest importance to Kuropatkin; for if reinforcements would have been of importance to him, they were of vital importance to Oyama, on whom devolved the onerous task of assuming the offensive, and 50,000 (later 100,000) men, with all that heavy artillery he so needed, would have doubly reinforced Oyama, and tremendously increased his power of offence against the Russian defences. So, briefly stated, the division of forces was a simple division of reinforcements with a Japanese disadvantage of two to one. And when we consider the superiority of their defensive position over any that they might have obtained in un-


restricted territory, the Russian advantage is even more marked, and it may now be conceded that the retention of Port Arthur was at least justified by the resulting benefits.

But I qualify this statement and make it clear that I do not contend that the surrender of Port Arthur under the existing circumstances was justifiable, and maintain that General Stoessel did not fulfil his obligations to Kuropatkin, and in consequence the advantages obtained by the Russians were spoiled by his disgraceful and premature surrender. And in order to estimate the full importance to Kuropatkin of any extension of this defence, we must steadily keep in mind the ratio of importance that these Japanese reinforcements bore to the armies confronting each other before Mukden, when the surrender released 100,000 men to swell the roll of Oyama, and condemned the garrison to be made prisoners of war. Fighting for delay, if not for victory, Stoessel's defence was exerting and did exert a profound influence on the Manchurian campaign, and aided Kuropatkin in postponing the day of definite issue in the wilder fields of unrestricted territory.

We have already seen how two months were needed to drive the garrison into the line of permanent works, and before treating

in detail the siege operations, it will be advisable to sketch the country wherein the operations that preceded the first assault took place.

Those to whom Russia is indebted for planning the fortifications of the district of Port Arthur, are responsible to Russia for a grave blunder in the scheme of the defence, the overlooking of the real natural line of first defence. Four miles east of Port Arthur, close to the water's edge, there rises a short but rugged spur of hills now familiarly known as the Ta-ku-shan range. North-west of Ta-ku-shan, a couple of small valleys separate this spur of hills from a run of interwoven hills of varying height, named the Feng-hwang-shans. The range Feng-hwang-shan sweeps westward across the peninsula, and about two miles from the west coast, and half a mile north of Louisa Bay, the range is broken by a narrow valley separating it from the coast hills north of Louisa Bay. Thus, from coast to coast—save for these two breaks—there is a girdle of hills nine miles in extent, affording excellent ground for the construction of semi-permanent fortifications. The position is furthermore well adapted for the employment of artillery, and the many suitable places for enfilade fire would have made the line formidably strong



PANORAMIC VIEW OF THE VALLEY (EXTENDING FROM THE FENGHWANG-SHANS TO SHWANGTAI-KOU) USED BY THE JAPANESE AS THEIR BASE OF OPERATIONS DURING THE SIEGE. THE CAMPS IN THE FOREGROUND ARE THOSE OF THE GENERAL RESERVES.

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by the use of a dozen batteries, and passage through this cordon made extremely risky, as the defiles are exposed to a raking fire from the ridges. Moreover, the valley in front of the Feng-hwang-shans affords no basis for the operations of a hostile force, as the entire plain is exposed to and dominated by these heights. Farther east there is more feasible ground for the operations of an invader, but here again the hills are so mingled together that had the Russians selected the commanding heights and fortified them, they could have presented sufficient obstruction to have rendered the entire line one of extreme difficulty of capture by direct assault ; and as the reverse slopes are covered by the dominating fire of the permanent works, the turning of any position on the flanks would have been fraught with the possibilities of grave results for the attackers. And it is certain that had the time and labour expended on the other first line been spent in fortifying this line instead, there would have been an extended tenure of the Russian lease of the district of Port Arthur. These very hills, and this identical line of discarded heights, were used as the basis of the Japanese operations during the entire siege, and from the peaks of Feng-hwang-

shan, serving as observation points, the fire of the siege park was directed, and behind the hills grew a mushroom city of Japanese ammunition and commissary depôts.

An expanse of swelling plain under cultivation, varying from a mile to three miles across, cut up in every direction by water-courses and ravines, intervened between the line of hills I have mentioned and those heights and hills selected by the Russians for their permanent works. The perimeter of this permanent line, including subsidiary outworks of vital importance, is about 12 miles. A valley (the Sueishi) divides the position into two well-defined sections. These sections lay east and west of the town, it being granted that the coast hills, including Liao-teah-shan, are south-east and south-west of Port Arthur.

After retiring on the 30th July, the Russians retained the Ta-ku-shan range and the ground that intervenes between the Feng-hwang-shans and their permanent lines. Scattering patrols took in all the small villages westward to the coast near Louisa Bay. A line of some 11 miles was thus lightly held in front of the actual fortifications. Ta-ku-shan, held by close on a battalion, was the only serious obstacle (outside the permanent line) left for the Japanese to overcome.

It was necessary for the Japanese to capture Ta-ku-shan to complete their lines of investment, for this position prevented the left wing from closing to the east coast and completing the chain from coast to coast, over the line of hills discarded by the Russians, of which I have made mention.

Rising some 600 feet, with precipitous bare slopes, studded with overhanging rocks, Ta-ku-shan well deserves its name of the Great Orphan, for it stands in isolated grandeur among the lesser hills that nestle at its foot. Razor-backed, its summit is so narrow that a battery of field guns could scarcely find decent emplacement, and the infantry trenches were crowded over on the exposed front. In no sense was it a fort, as it has so often been described, and its isolated position rendered it easily turned on its northern flank. South of Ta-ku-shan, and forming part of the range, is a lesser and more rounded hill, named Shaio-ku-shan, the Lesser Orphan. Shaio-ku-shan slopes away to the shore of Take Bay, and was held by a small force to support the infantry holding Ta-ku-shan. Both positions were covered by the direct fire of the eastern permanent forts, and derived much of their importance from this fact. Had the hills north-westward

been held in force, the position would have offered a more serious problem, but, as it was, the Japanese found no difficulty in clearing the ground to the north-west and arranging for the attack on the hill. It fell to the lot of the hard-working and efficient eleventh division to attack, and arrangements were completed on the 6th of August. The entire division, under General Tsuchiya, was ordered to operate and occupy a line from Hu-chia-tun to the east coast, near Shaio-ku-shan. Beside the divisional artillery the attack was supported by a battery of mountain guns, three batteries of 4.7 shrapnel guns, and four batteries of 3-inch howitzers from the siege park, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Takikara.

On the 6th the following orders were issued :—

“ Order for plan of attack on 7th of August.

“ The general attack will be made in two columns. The 22nd and 44th Regiments to form the right column. The 44th Regiment will work west from their present headquarters and occupy a line from Hu-chia-tun to Hwanh-chia-tun (a little side station on the railway in the railway-gap of the Feng-hwang-shans). The 22nd Regiment will deploy south-east of the 44th, and, keeping close connection, swing into the northern slopes of Ta-ku-shan.

"The 12th and 43rd Regiments (less one battalion acting general reserves) to form the left column. The 12th Regiment will advance toward Ta-ku-shan from the east, keeping in touch with the 43rd working along the east coast roads, and together converge on Ta-ku-shan from the east and south, etc."

On the afternoon of the 7th the Regiments advanced on the lines ordered, and at 4.30 the artillery opened fire on Ta-ku-shan from the east and north-west. The eastern forts replied, and commenced searching in the foothills for the Japanese artillery, and locating the mountain battery to the east of Ta-ku-shan, concentrated upon it. Meanwhile the 44th had swung in down the railway-gap, and the other regiments worked up to the roots of the hill. The artillery on Ta-ku-shan was easily silenced, and the left column advance pushed on. The companies were then re-formed for attacking Ta-ku-shan. Unfortunately, at this time, rain and mist interfered with the Japanese artillery, and compelled it to cease fire about sunset, at the critical moment of the advance.

The infantry developed their attack in a perfect deluge, and despite the slippery ground the ~~men~~ of the 22nd and 12th Regiments delivered a spirited night attack on Ta-ku-shan.

Aided by a continuous fire from the fortress guns, the garrison of Ta-ku-shan repelled the main attack, but parties of Japanese skirmishers being detached, scaled up the sides unnoticed, and engaged the defenders in a short, sharp hand-to-hand encounter, but, being hopelessly outnumbered, were driven off with heavy casualties. The Japanese then retired to the foot of the hill and intrenched. Here in shallow trenches they passed the night, under a perfect hail of shell and shrapnel from the eastern forts, while a free use was made of star-shells and the fort searchlights, and they were pelted unmercifully from the hill-top. In this hopeless condition, weltering in slush and drenched by the pouring rain, they waited for daylight. The battalion of reserves were sent to reinforce the 43rd, and at 8.30 a.m. the Japanese gunners reopened on the hill, and the shivering infantry were opened out for attack.

Everything was progressing favourably until an unexpected element entered into the contest—a flotilla of Russian gunboats and torpedo craft appeared off Shaio-ku-shan and commenced the usual quick-fire bombardment of the left wing. This fire quickly forced the mountain battery to retire, and dislodged the 12th Regiment from an advantageous position

in the east. The advance was at a standstill, the rest of the troops holding their ground with difficulty. Detaching the 3-inch howitzers, the artillery commander despatched them to the east coast hills, where they commenced a rapid high-angle fire that speedily forced the flotilla to retire, and enabled the infantry to resume its lines of attack. About this time General Nogi came to the headquarters of the eleventh division and held a consultation with the divisional commander. The artillery was ordered to reopen a concentrated fire at 4.30 p.m., and the regiment commanders to select the psychological moment in the artillery fire for assaulting the position. But when the artillery opened fire it elicited no reply from the summit of the hill, and General Tsuchiya ordered a general assault to be made at 7 p.m. The 44th had turned the position in the north, and with the 22nd Regiment stormed the hill, and encountering little opposition were masters of the position at 9 p.m., the Russians having practically retired in good order to Shaio-ku-shan at 8 o'clock.

The 12th and 43rd Regiments then attacked Shaio-ku-shan, but meeting with organised resistance made little headway, and it was not until early morning of the 9th of August,

after hard fighting, that the Russians were dislodged and driven into the villages in the neighbourhood of the hill. These operations against Ta-ku-shan lasted 36 hours and enabled the eleventh division to resume the line ordered. The Japanese casualties exceeded 1500 killed and wounded; the Russian loss was not reported.

During the afternoon the Russians, about five or six companies strong, counter-attacked the Japanese on Ta-ku-shan, and aided by fort fire and a naval co-operation reoccupied lesser slopes about the position; but before they could make good their lodgment they were vigorously attacked by the Japanese and driven clear of the hills by daylight.

The same day, 10th of August, the Port Arthur fleet made its great sortie, which resulted so disastrously. The remnants of the fleet returned on the 11th, and again made an attempt on the 16th, but were prevented from getting away. Two days previous to this last attempt, on the 14th of August, the Vladivostok squadron, in attempting to co-operate with the Port Arthur fleet, was engaged by Admiral Kamimura, the *Rurik* sunk, and the other two ships were just able to crawl into harbour after the engagement. It was a

dismal ending to the great combined naval operations, and stamped failure on the history of the Russian Pacific squadron.

After the capture of Ta-ku-shan, the eleventh closed in and made close connection with the ninth division (holding the Feng-hwang-shans) and the first division (holding the ground to Louisa Bay), and the line of siege was complete. The independent brigades were withdrawn and held in general reserve under the direct orders of General Nogi. It was now necessary for the Russians to be cleared out of the villages in the immediate front of the position held by the first and ninth divisions. From the morning of the 12th to the evening of the 15th the first division operated night and day, clearing the hillocks and villages west of Suei-shi-ying. The progress was rapid until the lines of real defence were met, and then an endless skein of wire entanglements everywhere barred their way, and while halted at these barriers they were unmercifully shelled night and day by the higher dominating works. For the first time the magnitude of the task was brought home to them in a material way, and when they had generally cleared the area in the neighbourhood of the western hills they were ordered to rest and prepare to sustain

their part in the great assault. The ninth division were a little more successful, and wormed their way over the slopes of Fenghwang-shan, and obtained a commanding position north of Ta-ku-shan. Ammunition was dribbled into the firing line, and the artillery emplaced in the line of hills from Shaio-ku-shan to Louisa Bay.

On the 11th of August General Nogi received from Marquis Yamagata the following command from the Emperor :—

“His Majesty the Emperor, out of pure benevolence and goodness, sincerely desires that the non-combatants at Port Arthur may be kept free from the disastrous effects of fire and sword as much as possible.

“In pursuance of this Imperial wish, you are ordered to escort to Dalny and hand over to the commander of that port such women, children, priests, diplomats of neutral countries and foreign attachés at Port Arthur, as may desire to take refuge therefrom. Those non-combatants at the stronghold who do not belong to the above category, in so far as so doing may not jeopardise our strategical interests, may similarly be dealt with.”

It was not until the 16th that this kind offer could be taken into the Russian lines (on account of the operations in the west), but on the 16th Major Yamaoka, of the general staff, preceded by a white flag and two trum-

peters, approached the Russian outposts and was halted. His mission was made known, and the Emperor's message, as well as another from General Nogi counselling surrender, was handed to Colonel Reiss for General Stoessel. The Japanese note called for a reply at 10 a.m. the next morning, by which time the non-combatants were required to be ready to quit the citadel. The following morning the notes of the two trumpets were again heard, and the major rode out to receive the Russian reply. It was brief: they refused to surrender, and refused to yield over the non-combatants. The trumpeters and white flag returned to the Japanese lines, and the major to report to his general, who immediately settled down to storm the citadel and perhaps reduce it in the way he had reduced it ten years before.

CHAPTER IV

PORT ARTHUR

Defences and general description of the fortified district of Port Arthur—The matured plan of the Japanese to reduce the fortifications by direct assault.

THERE was a matured plan for the reduction of Port Arthur, and it was part of this plan that precipitated the first assault—that daring and extraordinary attempt to reduce a modern fortress by storm on the lines of a prearranged scheme.

No account appeared to have been taken of the great changes in the defensive arrangements that had taken place at Port Arthur after the departure of the general staff of the Third Army from Tokio in May. At that time military opinion in Japan had not decided the better method of procedure, escalade or siege. The brilliant feat at Nanshan was ever before the minds of those who counselled that a direct *en masse* assault would carry the whole position, strongly fortified though it might be; but others, aware of the great

part that the naval co-operation from Kinchou Bay played in the capture of Nanshan, maintained that this would only bring disaster to the Japanese arms if attempted at Port Arthur under the different conditions. General Nogi, influenced by his success in 1894, when his brigade rushed and carried I-tzu-shan and the town (bringing about the fall of the citadel then held by Chinese troops), held to the opinion that, with a probable sacrifice of a division of infantry, the position could be reduced by direct assault without preliminary siege. After an extended bombardment with siege cannon, the obstacle would certainly not present a harder task than Nanshan. So it appeared, and on this assumption a plan was carefully arranged to storm Port Arthur.

It became generally understood in Japan (and with the army) that given three days' hammering with artillery, and accepting the heavy butcher's bill, the result was a foregone conclusion. This idea existed strongly in the Third Army, and on the night of the 19th of August the Japanese were so certain that the place was to be in Japanese hands in three days that the foreign war correspondents, who had been cleverly trailed across the peninsula and then lost in the village of Ying-cheng-tzu, were unearthed

and allowed to see the close of the drama. So anxious were they that we should not miss the capture of Port Arthur, that we were bundled into Chinese carts at midnight on the 20th of August, and hurried off to the front; for, as we were confidentially informed, Port Arthur would fall that night or in the morning. There were ten of us, and ten witnesses of the truth of this fact which I make mention of, to substantiate the general statement that I have made.

It has been correctly observed that on the outbreak of hostilities the fortifications at Port Arthur were not only incomplete but inadequate for the defence of the citadel. But from that date to the beginning of August, when it was besieged, over six months elapsed, and during that time gaps in the line had been closed in, earthworks thrown up, naval guns of large calibre mounted, redoubts and advance works of great individual and collective strength constructed in positions receiving the supporting fire of the permanent forts. Miles of wire entanglements were run out in every direction over the fort approaches, and endless trench-work interlaced the main position. Even range stones painted white were cleverly sunk into the ground over which the Japanese infantry

would probably attack, and the position made as impregnable as fortresses constructed in haste can be made. And, moreover, the Russian troops had recovered their morale, and this was worth many fortifications to Stoessel.


On the other hand, the Japanese troops had not lost any of their courageous dash, that had stood them in such excellent stead, and were ready and eager to satisfy the national appetite and storm the town.

And so, despite the fact that the eighteen 28-centimetre howitzers (which had figured largely in the original prearranged plan) were at the bottom of the sea, it was decided to draw deeply on the courage of the infantry, and trust to this to supply the deficiency of the artillery. Another thing weighed heavily with General Nogi. Kuropatkin was at bay, and an opportunity presented itself to Oyama of annihilating his army at Liaoyang, and in his scheme the Third Army was deeply concerned and urgently required. So with that wonderful decision of really great men, General Nogi dared to do what few European generals would have ever allowed themselves to dream of doing, he decided to risk the loss of an entire division and test his plan.

But before treating in detail this first assault, I will attempt to convey some idea of the strength of the Russian position, and explain the defences with knowledge derived from visiting the entire line of defences, and watching the siege from start to surrender.

(This description will be more readily followed if the Map of the Fortifications is consulted.)

From the summit of Feng-hwang-shan, the centre of the Japanese line, an excellent panoramic view of the chain of forts surrounding Port Arthur may be obtained, and for a general description of the fortified area on the morning of the 19th of August 1904, a bird's-eye view from this point cannot be excelled. Six miles north in a direct line from the old town, and roughly half that distance from the nearest fort, you are at this point midway between the coastlines and practically in the centre of the perimeter of fortifications. Until the eye becomes accustomed to the scene, it presents nothing but confusion and deception; for after the rainy season the valley that widens to a couple of miles at the foot of the Feng-hwang-shans is overgrown with tall kowliang, and presents a vista of restful green, peaceful and out of keeping with the true conditions of the district. Nature, further busying herself





in the art of war, has mantled the approaches to the fortified hills with green waving crops that almost hide the slopes deeply cross-cut with trenches and circled with lines of wire entanglements.

But above the slopes scores of hills roll away in every direction, and show in unmistakable plainness that they have been carefully prepared for defence. For the rest, there is a bewildering confusion of hills that makes it necessary to select a prominent starting-point, and examine the scene very closely. The eye instinctively selects Golden Hill—conspicuous with fluttering bunting in the halyards of many signal masts surmounting the irregularly stone-fronted battlements—and is drawn west to a little patch of blue water at the foot of a smooth-backed hill named Pai-yu-shan, the White Jewel Mountain. Rising abruptly from the water's edge—which proves to be part of the West Port—is the beetled back of the Tiger's Tail peninsula—really an island, since it narrows to a tidal-washed sandpit at the foot of the towering mountains of Liao-teah-shan, the jagged pinnacles of which prick the sky to the south-west. Due north of West Port, in a cluster of hills, appear the prepared-peaks of An-tzu-shan and I-tzu-shan,

two permanent forts of well-known strength in a setting of batteries that brace the forts on every side.

West of An-tzu-shan, removed by tumbling hillocks seared with deep ravines and creviced with trenches, is another group of hills, flattened and freighted with guns. These are the Tai-yang-kou or Sunmouth hills, and contain the permanent fort of Tai-yang-kou and the twin supporting batteries of that name. The land lying west of Tai-yang-kou to the shores of Pigeon Bay is flat and swampy, though well sprinkled with Chinese hamlets and Russian barracks. Between Pigeon and Louisa Bays there is a regular tangle of rugged hills, capped and smothered with advance works and semi-permanent fortifications.

Curving from the swampy shores of Louisa Bay, low hills roll like an agitated sea till they lose themselves in the undulating plain of the Sueishi valley, which is the western branch of the railway valley that extends from Shwang-tai-kou to Feng-hwang-shan. The east branch of this railway valley separates the Feng-hwang-shans from the Ta-ku-shan group, and through this gap the railway wends its way, swings across the valley, turns abruptly west, winds around the Erhlung

and Pai-yu-shans, and circles into Port Arthur.

Lying peacefully in the cradle of the Sueishi valley is the large village of Suei-shi-ying, and the valley that now loses itself in the swamps of West Port separates the western from the eastern hills and divides the fortifications. In the north or centre of the Russian line, scarcely half a mile south-east and south-west of the Sueishi village, and dominating the winding road that leads through the village to the citadel, there are four advance semi-permanent redoubts, constructed at the corners of a hollow square of trenches. Overlooking the railway, and commanding the valley, tower the Double Dragon or Erhlung hills, containing the formidable permanent forts Sungshu and Erhlung. At their foot, but across the railway (near the little village of Palichwang) is an outwork named the Erhlung lunette, constructed to protect the water supply of the Erhlung forts, and being connected with flank trenches to the Sueishi lunettes, supported and enabled the Russians hold the valley in the north between the main section of fortifications. In the neighbourhood of the Erhlung lunette the ground is considerably broken up with dongas and water-courses which the

Russians utilised as retreat and subsidiary trenches for supplying and aiding the semi-permanent. East of the Dragon hills, on the claws of the main range, are two semi-permanent works named the East and West Panlungs, or Slate Dragons. Behind these are several battery positions, and to the east the fortification known by the letter "P." A few hundred yards east of "P" fortification is the permanent fort of East Keekwan, or North fort, and a little to the right rear of this fort is "Q" fortification. Southward looms up the East Keekwan Hill, with the South Keekwan fort and west battery. Hereabout there are many batteries, and in the centre of this section of hills appears the battery position and observation point of Wantai.

Separated by a narrow gulch, and south-east of the Keekwans, are several prominent but unfortified heights, which served as observation points. On the lower slopes of these heights are the permanent fort and fortifications of Pai-gin-shan (White Metal Mountain) and Lao-li-chui. Farther south are the coast hills and seaward forts, with which this description will not touch.

Having now roughly indicated the most

prominent features of the panorama, it will be convenient to divide the broken range of hills surrounding Port Arthur into three well-defined groups—the eastern, western, and coast—and for added clearness to subdivide the western group into two sections.

The first section (of the western group), running north and west of West Port, contains the permanent works of I-tzu-shan, An-tzu-shan, and Tai-yang-kou. Swelling ground merges this section into the second, running almost parallel to the west coast ridges between Pigeon and Louisa Bays.

Passing over the first section of western hills, we find in the second section the important semi-permanent works constructed after the outbreak of hostilities. Several of these heights, ranging in altitude from 400 to 700 feet, were selected for this purpose, and for want of better names have to be termed 131, 169, 174, 180, and 203 Metre Hills, the figures corresponding to their several heights.

The hills 131, 169, and 174 are together and about six miles (as the crow flies) north-west of the Old Town. The strongest works were, however, 180 and 203, which are about a half-mile nearer the town. This group of fortified hills was the chief obstacle in the

way of any western advance, and a great deal of work had been expended on its defence; for while 203 remained Russian, it prevented the Japanese from getting between the sections I have mentioned, and threatening I-tzu-shan and An-tzu-shan with siege parallels.

Not only were the hills themselves fortified, but the lower slopes leading to them were crossed with wire entanglements entwined around irregular lines of stout wooden piles, about four feet in height, driven in some three feet apart. These obstacles were from five to six feet wide, and in irregular lines at distances from 100 to 400 yards apart.

Over the glacis of the hills there were other closer lines of similar entanglements. Unfortunately for Russia, the great value of these hills was only appreciated after the outbreak of hostilities, and thence afterward a great deal of feverish activity was displayed and much ingenuity employed in the preparation of their neglected defence. The trenches circling the summit of 174 Metre were roofed over with wooden beams and railway sleepers, which were further topped with earthwork. The breastwork of these trenches was stiffened with rows of sandbags, and inlaid with steel

ace-of-club shaped loopholes. Just off the sky-line were emplaced two 4-inch cannon and five fieldpieces, while machine guns were hidden in the trenches. 203 Metre had all this and more, for here the sleepers were overlaid with a double layer of $\frac{1}{4}$ -inch steel plates, and the trench ends braced across with railway iron and rails. The trenches were subdivided into a number of bomb-proof compartments to localise the effect of shell fire. The hill, 180 metres high, was lined with a double row of encircling trenches, which were however not covered over except at the northern end of the hill.

Other semi-permanents in the western defences were the Sueishi lunettes. These four works south-east and south-west of the Sueishi village were dependent on the most northerly of the western two, which was the key of the position. Semi-surrounding this work had been excavated a deep moat about 10 feet wide, and in the back, a little distance from the open rear of the fortification, shelters had been constructed for machine guns, and these, having a clear field of fire, were able to sweep the entire interior space when entered by an enemy, thus answering the same purpose as the caponieres in the moat defence of permanent forts.

The Erhlung lunette was similarly surrounded by a moat, and arranged with these shelters in the rear, but the two Panlungs were constructed in a different manner, having shell-proof compartments along the parapet, and an interior defence of bomb-proof trenches for the garrison. These two positions were armed with field guns and quick-firers beside machine guns. "P" fortification was simply a trench-surrounded hill acting as a flank defence of the North fort, but "Q" fortification, also called Kuropatkin fort, was a cunningly devised battery position or series of gun-stands in separate emplacements, and was connected by trench-work to the north and south forts of East Keekwan. It was a most important factor in the eastern defences, and filled a gap between these two forts, and is stated to have been devised by General Kuropatkin.

Mention must now be made of the Chinese wall, which had been reconstructed and formed the enceinte of the eastern fortifications, and was a strong element in the defensive arrangements of the north-eastern sector of permanent works. Behind an earthen wall of varying thickness, a series of small shell-proof huts or living compartments had been in-let and constructed out of stout beams.

These shelters were occupied by the general body of infantry unemployed in the actual fortifications, and were immediately available for drafts or, as they were more frequently used, as an independent firing line; for the wall was topped with sandbags and steel shields with loopholes for rifle fire. So cunningly was the real construction of the enceinte wall concealed, that during the entire siege it was practically impossible to breach it with artillery, and but few of the daring infantry that overran it ever returned.

Wantai overlooks the Panlungs and North fort, and was armed with a couple of 6-inch naval guns, mounted on a wooden platform.

The approaches of all the works mentioned, without exception, were fenced in by entanglements, and many of the slopes were heavily mined.

Generally speaking, the permanent works in the West stand in a more isolated position than those in the East, which were gripped closer together for mutual support. The Russian line of defence was admirably suited by nature for fortification, having a clear field of fire, good command, and excellent support between the different works, which were cleverly chosen. As the permanent forts

are of similar construction, with but slight interior modifications, what follows may be accepted as a general description, applicable to all. The glacis, or long outer slope, of the hill selected was carefully cleared of dead ground and levelled for purposes of a clear field of fire for the infantry galleries sunk in the inner and outer glacis—that is, the real and artificial slope. These rifle pits were laced to the position by retreat trenches. After the hill had been levelled, a moat, some 30 to 40 feet wide and deep, was hewn out of the country rock around the position selected for the construction of the fort.


Then, 10 feet or more under the glacis, a subterranean gallery was excavated in the central front and flanks of the counterscarp wall of the moat. This gallery was then reconstructed with concrete walls and roof of a uniform thickness of three feet. This, known as the caponiere gallery, was designed for the defence of the moat, and its casemated interior was fitted with loopholes in the concrete wall facing the moat, which enabled the entire space in the moat to be swept with rifle, machine gun, and light artillery fire. Against these caponieres the shells of the heaviest known artillery are ineffective.

— PLAN. —

or

FORT N° 3.

ERHLUNG SHAN.



Legend


- Concrete Galleries
- Caponiere gallery
- Sand bags
- Trenches for Reserve Infantry

Section A.B


Legend

- Japanese Mine Shaft
- Japanese Mines Nov. 19th 1900
- " " Dec 28th 1900

- ① Place
- ② Counter-scarp wall of moat
- ③ Caponiere Gallery (concrete)
- ④ Moat.
- ⑤ Recarpment of moat.
- ⑥ Parapet rifle pits
- ⑦ Parapet bomb-proof (concrete)
- ⑧ Fortress Artillery (concrete gun stand)
- ⑨ Infantry 2nd line
- ⑩ Barnacks (concrete)
- ⑪ Trenches for Reserve Infantry



David H. Jones



The opposite wall of the moat—the escarpment—was levelled off and then glazed over with cement until it presented a smooth, perpendicular face. At the top of this wall there are the parapet defences in the form of bomb-proof shelters. Then come the first of the interior defences, a series of earth and timbered traverses, behind which lay the light guns of the first line of defence. More traverses follow, and shelter the line of heavy fortress cannon. Behind these concrete platforms are underground magazines and concrete shelters for the gunners, while passages lead to the underground concrete barracks of the garrison, with kitchens, sleeping quarters, etc., etc. In these barracks the infantry are as safe from shell fire as in the caponiere galleries. Retreat tunnels or bridges lead out from the fort and trenches connect up the position with other forts.

[ARMAMENT.]

ARMAMENT OF THE PRINCIPAL FORTIFICATIONS AT PORT ARTHUR.

South Keekwan . . .	Six 6-inch Krupp cannon.
Fort 1, Lao-li-chui . . .	Five 28-centimetre Canet guns.
„ 2, North Fort, E. Keek- wan . . .	Five 15-centimetre howitzers ; two 12-centimetre Canet.
„ 3, Erhlung . . .	Six 15-centimetre ; four 9- centimetre ; six 12-centi- metre.
„ 4, I-tzu-shan . . .	Six 6-inch.
„ 5, Tai-yang-kou . . .	Six 15-centimetre ; two 9-centi- metre.
„ 6 . . .	One 28-centimetre howitzer ; four 12-pounds.
East Fort . . .	Six 28-centimetre howitzers.
Golden Hill A . . .	Seven „ „
„ B . . .	Six „ „
„ „ . . .	Six field guns.
Fortification 1 . . .	Six 12-centimetre.
„ 2 . . .	Four 4-inch.
„ 3, Sung-shu-shan . . .	Four 12-centimetre ; six 15- centimetre.
„ 4, An-tzu-shan . . .	Six 12-centimetre.
„ 5 . . .	Field battery.

Tiger's Tail Batteries :—

Lao-hui-wei . . .	Four 15-centimetre with shields.
Wei-Yuan . . .	Six 6-inch ; two 12-pounds.
Pan-tzu-shan . . .	Five 8-inch ; five 9.2 pounds.
Man-tou-shan . . .	Four 28-centimetre.
Chang-tu-shan . . .	Four 28-centimetre guns ; four 28-centimetre howitzers.
Chich-kuan . . .	Six 28-centimetre guns.

Batteries and Semi-permanent Fortifications :—

S. Keekwan, West Battery	Two 6-inch Krupp naval guns.
Wantai Battery . . .	Two „ „

Batteries and Semi-permanent Fortifications (*continued*) :—

"A" Battery	4-inch field guns.
"H" "	Six 6-inch short cannon.
"I" "	Four 28-centimetre howitzers.
"P" "	Field guns and quick-firers.
"Q" or Kuropatkin Fort .	Two batteries mixed fieldpieces.
East and West Panlung .	Two 4-inch field guns and quick-firers.
Erhlung Redoubt or Lunette	Two field guns, machine guns, torpedo tube.
Sueishi Lunettes . . .	Machine and quick-firers, torpedo tube.

Metre Range :—

203 Hill	Two 15-centimetre ; six field machine guns and quick-firers.
174 "	Two 4-inch guns, machine guns.
180 "	Two 4-inch " "
Western Lunettes and Redoubts	Field batteries and naval small arms.
Obeliskoff	Field batteries.
Pai-yu-shan	"

CHAPTER V

THE FIRST GREAT ASSAULT ON PORT ARTHUR

Disposition of the Japanese force—Opening stage of the assault, August 19 to 21, 1904—Three days of preparations for the assault by infantry and artillery—Three nights of discovery—Searchlights and star shells, and a hidden foe.

THE first assault on Port Arthur was a daring attempt to introduce field operations into siege warfare. It was a great failure, and the lesson that modern fortifications scientifically constructed cannot be rushed, even by overwhelming numbers of the bravest soldiers, not excepting Japanese infantry flushed with repeated victory, was a lesson that was fully paid for by the loss of a division of the flower of the Japanese army. It was evident that the staff of the Third Army did not appreciate the fact that the encircling moats, deep and wide, defended by caponiere galleries, could not be taken like rifle pits; for, even after the lesson of the first failure, the fact was but slowly admitted, and certain methods of attack wisely deleted from the operations.

The chief under-estimation of the position by the Japanese was the question of the opposition that would be offered by the garrison, and the Japanese fully expected to carry the fortifications, not so much by superior military tactics, but by a wholesale collapse of the defence. The defence did not collapse, and herein lies much that contributed to the reverse.

Roughly, the plan of assault was as follows. Wantai, in the centre of the north-eastern sector, was the objective. From Wantai it was proposed to drive in a wedge between the eastern fortifications, and take the Erhlung and Sungshu forts in reverse. This accomplished, the captured ground was to serve as the basis of a general movement against the town. An overwhelming rush was to carry the secondary line of eastern defences, to swamp the garrison and reduce the rest of the position by storm. There was a good deal of rush necessary for the successful carrying out of this plan, and success depended largely on the suddenness and daring of the scheme. The preceding operations, it will be remembered, took the form of a demonstration against the west by the first division. This feint attack was made with a twofold object: first,

to create a diversion, and delude the garrison into the belief that the Japanese were following in detail the successful operations against the Chinese in 1894; and, secondly, to allow the ninth division steal the ground necessary for frontally attacking the Panlungs (the first obstacles *en route* to Wantai). (In fact, under this ruse the ground was actually occupied by the ninth division previous to the 19th of August.) On the 19th of August the disposition of the investing force was as follows:—

Right Wing.—First division (first and second brigades, Tokio, regiments 1, 15, 2, 3), from the northern shores of Louisa Bay in an almost straight line to the foot-hills a quarter of a mile north of Sueishi village.

Centre.—Ninth division (sixth and eighteenth brigades, Kanazawa, regiments 7, 35, 19, 36), from north of the Sueishi village curving over the valley and crossing the railway at a point half a mile due east of the Panlungs and northwest of Ta-ku-shan.

Left Wing.—Eleventh division (tenth and twenty-second brigades, Shikoku, regiments 12, 43, 22, 44), a line from the east coast—parallel to the eastern fortifications at a distance of 1000 yards—to the foot-hills of Ta-ku-shan.

General Reserves.—Two independent brigades, 18,000 of second reserves (six regiments, 1, 15, 16, 30, 38, 9), under direct orders of General Nogi.

These infantry reserves were bivouacked in groups upon terraces cut in the reverse slopes of the hill, where they were absolutely safe from shell fire. General Nogi was in touch by a perfect system of telephone wires with all branches of troops, while the hospital service was directed similarly by General Ochai. Ammunition columns, commissary depôts, pioneer corps, engineers, sappers, and auxiliary arms were in direct communication with headquarters, as also the naval detachment, while wireless communication was maintained from Dalny and Shaio-ping-tao with the blockading squadron under Admiral Togo.

The bulk of the artillery, including the siege park, was emplaced upon a semicircular line extending from the east coast to the western plain near Louisa Bay; the centre of this artillery line was a mile and a half to the north of the Erhlung hills, and zigzagged at irregular distances to the east and west. The artillery was not evenly distributed, for the majority of howitzer batteries were screened in the Feng-hwang-shans.


About 300 pieces of cannon in all were ranged against the fortifications, and included 15- and 12-centimetre howitzers (ten batteries of these), 9-centimetre howitzers, and some old 21-centimetre howitzers captured at Nanshan, 4.7 and 12-pounder naval guns, 6-inch siege guns, and mountain artillery batteries.

Two naval 6-inch guns were brought up from Dalny, but were not emplaced in time for the first assault.

All guns were beautifully emplaced, the battery positions on the reverse slopes of the hills splendidly concealed and masked on the flanks by sandbags and mounds artificially blended with the hillside. The units of the batteries were in subdivisions of the emplacement, and traverses of sandbags protected the working numbers of the gun detachments.


From the siege park a heavy concentration of direct fire upon the eastern forts was possible, but the presence of the north and central hills prevented similar fire being brought to bear on Tai-yang-kou, etc.

The artillery commander, General Teshima, directed the battery fire from Observation Hill (centre Feng-hwang-shans), from which point a systematic network of telephone wires connected up subordinate artillery observation



JAPANESE 4.7 NAVAL GUNS ON LAND CARRIAGES.

(Copyright Photo by J. Rosenthal, of the Charles Urban Trading Co., Ltd.)



points and the balloon section operating in the rear. The Japanese took every precaution to ensure success, and made the utmost of a favourable position for attack. From the highest to the lowest, from general to private, all obeyed with cheerful co-operation the word of General Nogi, who was in supreme undisputed control of the operations from skirmishes to concentrated artillery fire.

The hopes of the troops ran high on the 18th of August when the gun crews rested from their drill and commenced to prod the Russian fortifications with sighting shots, and early the next morning to open a general bombardment of the entire line.

The hopes of other less important individuals went up with a bound the next day, for the Pen Brigade (war correspondents) were accorded an interview with the commander-in-chief, General Baron Nogi, at Shwang-tai-kou, and after a kindly welcome were cheerfully informed that "you have come just in time to see the close of a successful campaign," and under an escort of official interpreters (whose qualification for this position was misinterpretation of general orders and qualities of irritation), were marched to the firing line. Feng-hwang-shan was allotted as an observation post,

and from this point I will describe the events of the first few days.

The Japanese artillery were now (9 a.m., 19th August) busily engaged covering an attack on 174 Metre Hill by the right wing of the first division. Divisional artillery had moved up, and were lending general support to this attack, while a couple of batteries of howitzers were engaging the garrison of I-tzu-shan. Shortly afterwards the division artillery opened up with shrapnel on 174 Metre, and bubbling wreaths of smoke were floating over the hill when the infantry of the 15th Regiment could be made out skirmishing over the slopes with fixed bayonets. At this time a rattle of musketry announced the volleys of the defenders ; the line of Japanese bayonets thinned and retired to cover. An astonishing general rapid fire had now been developed by the entire siege park, to which the Russians returned a slow, spasmodic reply, making indifferent practice. There was now evidence of infantry movement in our immediate front, in the Sueishi valley. A detachment of the right wing of the first division were endeavouring to work into the Sueishi village, and maintaining a sharp exchange of rifle fire with the Russian outposts in this part of the field.

Farther west the 15th Regiment made an assault on 174, but, being smartly shrapnelled, were again forced to retire. A brigade of reserves was at this time despatched to reinforce the right wing, and in the afternoon the artillery concentrated on the eastern forts and succeeded in silencing the two Panlungs and "P" fortification. A further attempt to storm 174 was made at two in the afternoon, and they had gained the glacis entanglements before the Russians on the left flank (from the hills south-east of 174), opened up a murderous rifle and machine-gun fire, which the Japanese artillery, being unable to silence, little clusters of the 15th were quickly bolting for cover, smartly shrapnelled as they made for shelter. This was, however, not the main attacking force, and the glasses failed to locate them, for they were pressing the attack all afternoon, and a heavy fire was maintained till evening from the direction of the west of the hill. The Russians slowly awakened more cannon, and commenced searching in the foothills for the howitzer batteries, but met with no success. On the other hand, the Japanese practice appeared to be steadily improving and bearing fruit, for the eastern line was now smothered in a dense black cloud of earth

and smoke, and by twilight scarcely a shot was fired from the Russian line, save in the west, where small-arm fire broke out afresh. The day, one of brilliant sunshine, was but the curtain raiser, the preliminary practice of the orchestra of 300 guns.

(We were compelled to tramp back six miles to Shwang-tai-kou (under the escort) after a long day in a hot sun lying on a mountain top with a canteen of water and emergency rations—and this, we were informed, was the routine to be adhered to until Port Arthur fell. The interpreter escort was relieved, and a fresh guard mounted over us.)

Long before daylight we were afoot and tramping back to the firing line. The Japanese had maintained their general howitzer fire throughout the night, and we were not a little anxious to ascertain the changes in the position of the infantry. The hills were already ringing with echoes when we spread ourselves over the rocky summit of Feng-hwang-shan and swung anxious eyes over the position. The citadel was bathed in all the glory of morning sunshine, and from behind the fortified ridges rose the lazy curling smoke of morning fires, drifting in wreaths to the sky. Signal flags fluttering in the hal-

yards on Golden Hill ; a couple of slim torpedo boats slipping into the harbour from night patrol ; in the West Port a tug slowly steaming up to a sheer-legged pontoon alongside of which lay a many-funnelled torpedo boat—apart from this, there was a heavy silence brooding over the fortifications.

In the lines of the invaders there was ceaseless activity. The overnight bombardment had enabled a field battery to establish itself a few hundred yards to the north-east of the Erhlung lunette. Infantry were already picking their way through the watercourses, and ammunition was being passed along to the Japanese infantry hidden in the broken ground of the valley. All morning the artillery pecked away at the forts in a busy manner, with less rapidity and better practice than on the previous day. Shortly before noon the right of the artillery concentrated on 174 Metre Hill, and the 15th Regiment developed its attack from ground won overnight, the sappers having destroyed the entanglements by cutting the stakes (the wire having previously resisted all the efforts of the pioneers with sheers).

The artillery ceased its fire on 174 Metre Hill, when the Japanese infantry negotiating the obstacle stormed the trenches. For half an hour

a terrific fusilade of rifle fire was maintained in that direction, and after a sanguinary encounter with rocks and bayonets the Japanese captured the hill after sustaining over 1400 casualties. The Russians left 350 dead on the field, and lost the armament of the position and four machine guns. After noon the siege park concentrated shell and shrapnel on the north-eastern sector, and, under cover of this fire, about three o'clock in the afternoon small bodies of infantry of the ninth division commenced a jerky advance over the slopes in the immediate front of the Erhlung lunette. The field battery (established overnight) to the east, unmasked and opened fire with a salvo of shrapnel on the Russian work, and this was the signal for a regular hail of common shell from the central park to be directed on the Erhlung lunette. No reply came from the defenders, and the Japanese firing line rose from cover and rushed the moat-surrounded work. They were simultaneously greeted with the r-i-p-h of a volley and the quickening pulsing of machine guns, and halted. Then I-tzu-shan and the Erhlung forts opened a wild, widespread shell-and-shrapnel fire on the struggling attackers, who, having recovered from the first surprise, crossed the moat and

disappeared inside the lunette. Almost at the same time a detachment of the first division attacked the "key" of the Sueishi lunettes, and the whole valley was soon full of the rattling of sustained infantry fire.

The attack against the Erhlung lunette failed, and the foiled infantry came staggering back to the friendly cover of the tall kowliang and deep dongas. The attack against the Sueishi lunette kept up a little longer, but here also the Japanese, unable to face the decimating fire of the hidden machine guns, were forced to evacuate and retire on the Sueishi village, which was immediately subjected to salvoes of shrapnel from the dominating forts.

The dull booming of the seaward forts broke in on the sharper cannonade, and from the offing, ever and anon, came flashes from the bulwarks of the blockading squadron. Half an hour later fire broke out in the rear of the East Panlung, and the appearance of the flames was an ungiven signal for a smart shell fire; and as flames and dense black smoke began to envelop the place, the artillery increased its fire, and the fortification was soon obscured in dense clouds of black smoke, heavily laden with clouds of dirt. The forts had ceased firing, and after sunset the entire siege park

pelted the eastern line with shrapnel. Another day of preparation had passed, and the general assault was in sight as we tramped sorrowfully and wearily back. Requests to remain were wasted on the smiling escort, and we reached camp at seven in an evil frame of mind.

To make matters worse, we were calmly informed by the "relief" that as Port Arthur would most likely be captured that night, the general staff had given permission for us to tramp back six miles to witness the "taking." Irritated beyond words at the cool manner in which things were being shaped to sicken us of our work, we corralled some Chinese carts, and started back for Feng-hwang-shan.

After being jolted about for a couple of hours in a picketed country, the drivers succeeded in losing us. The official interpreter seemed happy, and as the drivers were lost, and afraid to proceed, he, smiling, proposed that we should go to sleep in the carts and wait for daylight. In the confusion that followed two of us eluded "his interpretership," and after a scramble past sentries reached the summit of Feng-hwang-shan. It was now nearly 3 a.m., yet over the theatre of war a strange silence reigned. The beautiful moonlight night


had passed, and it was now inky black, making the scene from the hill-top weird and full of dismal omen. Strong, sickly, yellow search-light-beams were for ever flitting across the silent valley, now crossing each other's rays, now swinging over the sky and flashing sharply against the western hills. And star-shells soaring high into the blackness of night burst in phosphorescent light, and dribbled like hundreds of shooting stars to the earth, where there was not even the hum of human voices to break the suspense, until suddenly out of the darkness came the sharp cracking of rifles. The prelude was over, the tragedy had commenced. Searchlights became stationary, flooding places in the valley with patches of light, and it was easy to follow the hidden fight, as the searchlights followed the attack.


Machine guns now joined the rifles, and a din of fire crept up toward the lunettes in the valley. This was, however, but a scene in the act, for the whole of the right wing and centre of the Japanese was soon in action, operating against the lines of entanglements across the slopes of the Panlungs and Keekwans.

The Japanese artillery was carefully silent, and but seldom ventured to join in the fight, save to pot away at the searchlights. The

operations soon settled in three distinct columns of attack—against the western heights, the Panlungs, and the Keekwans. In the east (though difficult to judge) it seemed that no headway was being made, and when dawn peeped into the sky they were still hard at it in the west. When the morning mist and smoke lifted from the contested ground, hundreds of men could be seen scurrying down from the lines of entanglements in the east and seeking the friendly cover of the dongas. In the Sueishi valley the khaki men had established themselves in the village, and a desultory popping of rifles came from the lunettes, still firmly held by the Russians. In the west the first division had firmly secured their position on 174, 169, and 131 Metre Hills; but for the rest there had been a hitch, and the strenuous attacks had accomplished but little.

The vigilance of the garrison and the havoc wrought by the machine guns, aided by the clever handling of the searchlight when the Japanese reached the entanglements, defeated the attempts of the Japanese to gain the ground necessary for developing the assault. At eight o'clock in the morning a small force rushed and carried the "P" fortification at the point





JAPANESE FIELD HOSPITALS.

(Copyright Photo by J. Rosenthal, of the Charles Urban Trading Co., Ltd.)

of the bayonet, but were quickly shelled out, and forced to retire with the other troops. The attacks on "Q" fortification were easily checked, and the infantry operating in this work were unmercifully handled in the morning before the Japanese artillery could smother the Russian fire and cover their retirement. The lines of stretchers, with their burdens of torn flesh passing through the shady kowliang fields all morning, were conclusive evidence of the hard night's work. At the railway station of Chang-ling-tsu (the supply hospital for Dalny) I counted a battalion of severely wounded men brought in from a couple of regiments of the ninth division, and this before ten o'clock in the morning.

Elsewhere in the field hospitals and dressing stations there were overflows of wounded men, waiting in silent groups for attendance. It had been a night of discovery, and of very unpleasant discovery, for the Japanese, who still desired to storm Port Arthur.

The morning was given over to the artillery, and especially the naval brigade, which kept up a furious direct fire on the Panlungs. During the afternoon a detachment of pioneers, about half a company strong, carried out demonstrations against the entanglements, fixing nooses

around the stakes by which many of the posts were hauled down.

Others, rushing up to the entanglements, fell down and feigned death, then crawling under the wires turned over on their backs, and, manipulating sheers, succeeded in cutting gaps in the obstacle. But the Russians soon discovered this ruse, and commenced a systematic slaughter of all wounded or seeming wounded lying anywhere in the vicinity of the entanglements. And many innocent Tommies were drilled full of holes to make sure that they were not shamming death for strategical purposes.

The Sueishi lunettes were peppered with shrapnel during the afternoon, and the Russians retaliated by shelling the village. The naval brigade was located soon after midday from its peculiarly short barking report, and the tars stuck manfully to their guns, although they were hopelessly outclassed in metal by the Russian 11-inch howitzers. Before sunset the Japanese opened a rapid fire, which was smartly replied to, and a terrific cannonade closed a practically uneventful day.

CHAPTER VI

CLOSE OF THE FIRST ASSAULT ON PORT ARTHUR, AUGUST 24, 1904

Capture of East and West Panlung fortifications, August 22
—Russian counter-attacks, night, August 22—*En masse*
sortie of Port Arthur garrison, night of August 23,
which, preceding Japanese assault, dislocated the general
plan of the first assault and contributed to its failure.

ON the afternoon of August 21, General Nogi ordered a brigade of reserves to support the ninth division, and the plan of assault to be advanced another stage after moonset in the early hours of the morning of the 22nd of August. Soon after midnight the Russians switched on their searchlights, and it was evident that no part of the line was seriously threatened by immediate capture. From 2.30 a.m. the Japanese attack was developed with redoubled fury along the entire front of the centre and left wing. The fighting was fiercest in the vicinity of the Panlungs and the lines of entanglements hedging in "P," "Q," and North fort. For the first time

since the opening of the assault the attacks were pressed, but, meeting the decimating volleys of the concealed enemy, were beaten back at every point. Fresh troops were continually added to the firing line, and desperate efforts made to effect the capture of the Pan-lungs; but insufficient lanes had been cut in the entanglements, and the troops were frightfully mauled while cutting fresh paths through these obstacles. Luckily the cables of the mines were located and cut before use could be made of them by the garrison; but the devilish utility of the searchlights was again demonstrated by the skilful manner in which they were manipulated in locating the masses of Japanese for the general fire of the garrison. Despite the disadvantages, the attack was persistently pressed until 5 a.m., when, finding that no advantage had been obtained, the shattered columns were withdrawn to the cover of the many ravines and dongas running at right angles to the Russian line.

The first division co-operated in the attack just before dawn, and were able to advance their firing line and cover the moving of the divisional artillery to the slopes about a mile to the north-west of I-tzu-shan.

The Japanese fleet was also in active co-

operation throughout the night, lending support from off the south-east of Ta-ku-shan. Two battalions of reserves were despatched to the ninth division at daylight, when the artillery immediately opened a heavy concentrated fire on the Panlungs, and, succeeding in squashing the Russian fire, enabled the broken battalions re-form for continuing the night attack against these two fortifications. The 7th Regiment of the ninth division had been allotted the task of capturing the semi-permanents, and had been all night under arms striving to make some impression, but with no success. General Nogi, seriously reflecting upon the unexpected strength developed by the opposition, summoned a council of divisional commanders to headquarters to reconsider the plan of attack. During the absence of General Oshima (commanding the ninth division), the commander of the 7th Regiment, Colonel Ouchi, together with his battalion leaders and junior officers, forwarded a request to be allowed to immediately proceed with the attack on the Panlungs. Their wish being granted, the artillery redoubled its fire, and, when the belching mouths had smothered the defences of the Slate Dragons with a deluge of shell and shrapnel, the gallant 7th attacked.

With deliberate courage they worked up over the broken ground in a disjointed frontal attack, the companies cleverly converging on the position as if on manœuvres. When a battalion or more had developed a strong firing line they were caught by a furious cross fire from East Panlung and North fort. Volley after volley was poured into them from the enceinte wall, and the firing line literally mowed down by a sustained scythe of rifle fire, which quickly forced them to break ground and retire. It was now about eleven o'clock, and a small party of this daring force, stubbornly maintaining its position, effected a lodgment in the dip of ground between the East Panlung and "P" fortification.

This party then set about reconnoitring the position, and a volunteer, armed with a canister of dynamite, crawled up to the very breastworks of the redoubt, and, affixing the charge, managed to destroy one of the machine-gun shelters before being discovered and killed. This raised the hopes of the little party, and was repeated again with equal success. The rest of the regiment now renewed the attack and doubled back in squads of thirty and forty, making for the shelter of the depression, where the little party had established itself.

Full two battalions reached this cover, and overflowed the shelter it afforded. The Russians then brought a couple of machine guns to bear on them, and the force, smarting under the lash of this fire, wavered, and, breaking from the unfriendly shelter, were darting individually back over the glacis when an officer, reckless of life, leapt up from cover, dashed for the redoubt, and firmly planted the regimental colours before paying the penalty of his heroism. The effect of this self-sacrifice was momentous and dramatically tragical, for his lead was quickly followed by others, who kept the colours flying at the sacrifice of their lives. But the fluttering colours had been seen ; the men ceased running, and joining the struggling mass of humanity, forced the standard nearer the redoubt. Bayonets flashed in the sunlight as the line of steel, not to be denied, surged over the breastworks and dashed at the waiting foe. A wild, bloody mêlée followed, and the cold steel of Japanese bayonets won the day as the fort changed hands. But it was not over. The garrisons in the West Panlung and North fort enfiladed the 7th Regiment in the captured works, who tenaciously held on, striving to re-create the defences in the battered work, while the Japanese

artillery, with increasing desperation, plied round after round into the forts. It was a critical time, and the 7th grimly waited with rapidly thinning ranks for relief. It came from an unexpected quarter. Two companies of reserves (detached to cover the operations of the 7th Regiment), seeing the dilemma of that force, asked for permission to attempt the capture of the West Panlung, which at this time, set on fire by the Japanese shelling, was burning fiercely. The permission being obtained, these two companies made a spirited rush for the burning redoubt, and dashed into the flames. The suddenness of this daring attack threw the garrison into confusion, and the Japanese, making the utmost of the opportunity, were quickly masters of the situation.

This immediately relieved the tension on the 7th Regiment; but although it was now five o'clock, the dislodged garrisons, refusing to vacate the position altogether, maintained a heavy rifle fire on the lost works. But no human force or hellish agency was able to make the gallant 7th budge from their own. The slopes of the Panlungs were like shambles, and the Russians continued to pour in hailstorms of shrapnel; but what had been won by the self-sacrificing devotion of one of the

bravest regiments that ever fixed bayonets was beyond recapture. At evening the 19th Regiment of the ninth division demonstrated against the Erhlung lunette, and under cover of the diversion supports were rushed up to the battalionless 7th. Under cover of darkness they were twice desperately counter-attacked by the Russians, and fierce fighting was necessary to maintain hold on the captured position. But a continual stream of supports was dribbled into the firing line, and the ground securely held despite frantic shelling and desperate assaults on the part of the ejected garrisons. A battalion of reserves was added to the command of General Oshima, and the night passed without further attempts being made to advance the general plan of assault. The way had been cleared to Wantai at a terrible sacrifice, and the "division" that was to be sacrificed in the storming operation was almost already out of action. The spirit of the troops was excellent, and one and all were ready to double the sacrifice if the end could be brought in sight. But there were elements in the struggle that they could not eliminate by self-sacrifice, and, but for the national desire, the assault would most surely have been abandoned; but, as it was,

the word had gone out, and Port Arthur was to be stormed at any price. So fierce was the fighting after the 20th that no attempts were made to benefit by the Geneva Convention and use the Red Cross flag. The wounded were allowed to lie for days under the blistering sun without succour, and left slowly to perish on the reeking shambled slopes. Under cover of night rescue parties did go out to gather some of these unfortunate wounded, but, being forced to crawl over the ground, had to fasten ropes around the legs of the wounded and haul them over the uneven ground, thus inflicting terrible torture on the suffering and almost insane men. Men with just a spark of life in them were brought to the dressing stations with their bodies crawling with maggots from their decayed wounds; and scenes more horrible—but I refrain from further reference to the awful condition of the Japanese wounded.

On the morning of the 23rd of August the remnants of the 7th Regiment sallied out from the East Panlung and worked up toward Wantai. They were unmercifully handled, and had to crouch in shell holes for cover, where they lay all day, monuments of plucky determination carried too far, for they had pene-

trated deeply into the heart of the enemy's territory; the thin edge of a wedge that could not be hammered in. Through the day, on account of a lack of ammunition, the Japanese artillery were strangely inactive, and apart from the action of the 7th Regiment, there was no infantry work. Meanwhile the plan of the Japanese commander dawned upon the defenders, and they were not slow to act, for General Krondrachenko planned a counter-move, which, though not successfully carried out in detail, frustrated the rush tactics of the Japanese and held them in check for many months. The inactivity of the Japanese on the 23rd allowed ample time for developing these plans. Briefly stated, the idea was to counter-attack the Japanese before they got their battalions moving for the great assault, and then, after throwing the Japanese lines into disorder, retire and contest the ground in front of the position the Japanese were intending to assault. The sortie was to move out in three columns, one from the direction of "Q" fortification, a second from the Erhlung fort, and the third and central column from Wantai. It will be seen later how this was carried out, and in what details it failed.

There was a quiet determination in the

manner of the Japanese on the afternoon of the 23rd of August, and as it was evident that the great assault would take definite shape that night, a couple of us (deciding to join the actual firing line), in the singularly quiet evening that passed, slipped out of camp unnoticed. It was then a little after eleven o'clock, and hardly had we got clear of Feng-hwang-shan than a faint rattling of rifle fire came from the foot of Wantai. No less than seven searchlights were flashing from the fortifications, and three of these converged on the Panlungs. The rifle fire steadily increased, and the quiet searchlights swung down to where the regiments of the ninth and eleventh divisions were waiting to attack. A few minutes later the rays of light commenced working up and down the slopes of the Panlungs, and Russian rifle fire working down the slope of Wantai could be distinctly heard above the general rattle of musketry. The Japanese reserved their fire for a few minutes, and the Russians, continuing their unchecked advance behind the rays of the searchlights, quickly drove the wasted remnants of the 7th Regiment into the East Panlung. Then the Japanese opened up with a sickening burr of musketry, which momentarily halted the Russians. Supported

by a heavy machine-gun and artillery fire from "Q" fortification, the wings of the sortie now joined the centre, and working up a heavy fire bore down on the Panlungs. Star-shells bursting in rapid confusion over the Japanese troops aided in the work of the sortie and hampered the movements of the Japanese. Beneath the Panlungs the main body of the besiegers were gathered, waiting to make their attack, and these quickly developed a firing line and joined issue with the garrisons of the Panlungs. The Russian force now split up into two bodies and attempted to carry out Krondrachenko's plan of enveloping the lost semi-permanents. One force made a desperate attempt to descend to the west of the West Panlung, while the other made an equally determined effort to work down between the East Panlung and North fort. Their object was to join forces between the two Panlungs, and then, by falling back on them, annihilate the garrisons and effect a recapture. Here the sortie failed, for the main body of Japanese were now well up and pouring in a hot fire upon them; and the two Russian forces, forced to give way, retired to the enceinte, where, supported by the fire from all the fortifications in the neighbourhood, they made a determined stand.

Volley now answered volley, and all the seven searchlights were busy flashing in the faces of the Japanese infantry. A regular fury of firing filled the air as the Japanese assumed the offensive and attacked the enceinte beneath Wantai. The firing remained stationary for a while until the Japanese brought up their machine guns and quick-firers and commenced pounding away at the cleverly hidden counterparts of the enemy. Then a double purring of machine guns and a double edition of terror-striking pom-poming was heard above the continuous roar of musketry. The awful hissing of bullets, the bewildering fury of the volleys, the thrilling play of machine guns, and the hum of human cries all sounded in the distance like the rush of a hurricane through a leafy forest. And when this medley of noises had merged into a monotonous screech, high above the awful battle noise came the thrilling sound of soldiers' voices raised in soldiers' cheers. Three long Banzais then busied the hills with echoes, and announced the fact that the Russians were breaking ground and retiring. Slowly they retired, helped back to their lines by the dazzling glare of the silent searchlights and the noisy, wicked devilry of the concealed machine guns.

The Japanese were, however, smartly held at the enceinte, and for a time their advance stopped by cross fire from the batteries on either flank of Wantai. This moment was selected by the tenth brigade of the eleventh division for making an attack on "Q" fortification to create a diversion in favour of the troops halted at the enceinte. They had scarcely got moving before they were unmasked by star-shells, and under the glare of a couple of searchlights subjected to a terrific fire from the Keekwan south fort and west battery, and this, coupled with the fire of "Q," soon broke up their attack.

(In the excitement occasioned by the changing events we stumbled into the arms of the Japanese rearguards, and for three or less seconds saw a dozen steel points of as many bayonets levelled with business intent, and gazed into as many rifle barrels, and heard, with a cold chill, cartridges snap into a dozen breeches. . . . Then we made friends, and, lying flat on our faces, remained with the outpost and watched the assault to its close.)

The firing decreased somewhat after the failure of the left wing of the eleventh division, and one long, lingering Banzai, followed by a ripple of musketry, told of another attack

farther east, but it was not pressed. In the west the first division commenced some pretty artillery practice on the western searchlights, and shells so frequently blanked the face of the lights that we were not surprised to see two lights die out. By this time the moon had set, and the change giving the searchlights greater power, they were now efficiently employed in the east, where firing broke out afresh. Over in the west, between the Sueishi valley and the hill 174 Metre, many star-shells were falling in pretty confusion and lighting up the blackness of early morning. A detachment of the left wing of the first division, taking advantage of the absence of the two powerful searchlights in that part of the field, were advancing in skirmishing order, and making their presence felt by the Russian outposts, when suddenly the extinguished searchlights re flashed, swung over the sky, and right down on the now perplexed and illuminated ranks of the Japanese infantry. The next act was truly tragedy. No sooner had the searchlights converged on them than from I-tzu-shan, An-tzu-shan, and the approximate ridges roared simultaneous salvoes of fortress artillery, and from concealed infantry a long volley of rifle fire. The extinguishing of

the searchlights had been a Muscovite trap, which the Japanese stumbled into, and now the searchlights kept crossing and recrossing each other's rays in a bewildering manner, and it needed all the strenuous efforts of the artillery to extricate the advanced Japanese. Then all became significantly silent in the west.

From now on—although the only probable result of continuing the unprotected assault in full sight of a concealed enemy was a repulse—the general assault was vigorously developed and became intensely impressive, for a wonderful scene was now enacted. General Nogi's plans—delayed by the sortie—were now set in motion, and the ninth and eleventh divisions made the attempt to drive in the wedge and reach the summit of Wantai. Against almost unprecedented methods of warfare and unnamable odds, the Japanese infantry, displaying most wonderful courage, went steadfastly to work, to do or die. Isolated bands gained footing, and crouched in agonising suspense, waiting to gather enough force to warrant a rush for the trenches, and in their isolation were found by the light of star-shells and pounced on by the glaring searchlight for the decimating fire of hidden machine guns and riflemen. Some, heedless of life, by strenuous

bravery gained the trenches, only to be riddled by bullets and clubbed by rifles. It was cruelly impressive to listen in the cool of the morning to the shrieking shell, tapping of pom-poms, and whirls of machine-gun fire, to see in the grim darkness the flashes of artillery and the sparks of rifles, and the pale flickering of particles of star-shells and the dazzling glare of searchlights, and to know that it was all slaughter, a butchery of willing men vainly massacred for the sake of a national sentiment that could not wait for revenge. Dawn was long, long in coming, and the fighting slowly, so slowly, subsided, like a disappointed child sobbing itself to sleep. Six hours of carnage were over, and those who watched and did not fight could but imagine what had happened. Soon over the scene of strife came the blood-red beams of the rising sun, struggling through the morning mist heavily laden with drifting smoke, and ere it cleared the Japanese artillery screeched out in wild defiance and ushered in another day of carnage. The great assault was over, the great assault that failed, and the wonderful concentrated artillery fire that followed was but the aftermath.

Quickly working from either end of the eastern fort ridge, the artillery fire met midway

in the line at Wantai above the Panlungs, which were now covered with clouds of shrapnel from the Russian artillery, which had early responded to the Japanese fire. The concentrated fire worked backwards and forwards along the whole line, until, in an hour, so accurate was the shelling that the line of eastern fortifications were smothered in clouds of earth and smoke raised by the bursting shells. The preponderance of Japanese fire early made itself felt, and by the devastation of this terrible cannonade the Russian gunners were overpowered and silenced, for it was the result of the fifteen days' range-finding practice of their enemy. Under cover of this artillery fire the Japanese infantry made a last attempt to reach Wantai, but, directly they got moving, the Russian guns in the west opened a heavy shell fire which crushed the life out of the attack, and forced the responsible commanders to realise the hopelessness of persisting in the assault; and the Japanese, beaten, but by no means defeated, retired beyond the enceinte, and were only able to claim, as the result of four days' continual fighting, the two semi-permanents of Panlung.

There was a significant silence that afternoon in the rear of the besieging line, and at the front neither infantry nor artillery fire broke the

oppressive quiet of the day. Casualties were terrible, and at least a full division (15,000 men) were put out of action. The 7th Regiment only mustered six officers and 208 men, and the brave Colonel Ouchi was among the dead. The losses of the ninth division were particularly heavy, and amounted to over 6000 men from the 19th to the 24th of August. Sickness (chiefly beri-beri) claimed over 9000 men from the 1st day of August to the 24th, and if we include Ta-ku-shan, and all the lesser fighting in August to the close of the assault, little short of 30,000 men were put out of action by sword or disease.

It will be clear, from the foregoing narrative of the first assault, that what in no small measure contributed to the reverse was that the garrison, acting on a pre-notion of the Japanese plan, dislocated it by a deliberate counter-attack, and when overpowered retired slowly, contesting every yard of ground that the Japanese had counted on covering without serious opposition. It is probable that had the Japanese been able to move earlier, and frustrated the sortie before it took definite shape, and then immediately assumed a vigorous attack, Wantai might have been captured on the night of the 23rd; but it is also more than certain that it could not have

been held on the morning of the 24th of August unless North fort and "Q" fortification had been also captured, for the approaches of Wantai are so dominated by the surrounding batteries, and especially those of the two positions mentioned, that not even a mouse could have found other than shell holes in which to seek shelter from the fire that could have been directed on it from every side.

Another reason for failure was the utilisation by the Russians of star-shells, operated by them in harmonious combination with powerful and skilfully handled searchlights, which enabled the concealed machine guns to be used with terribly accurate effect. In face of the mad courage displayed by the garrison, their own imperfect knowledge of the ground and the Russian battery position, and the consequent lack of general control during the night attack, the Japanese commanders seem to have trusted far too much to the capacity of their infantry. For this attack (in no sense a siege operation) was made with every disadvantage of the ground to contend against, and field operations were introduced unassisted by siege artillery of the large calibre subsequently employed; while the garrison were free from actual danger until long after the Japanese

were within their zone of fire. In the western part of the field the operations were not at all successful, as no headway could be made against the western heights, and the feint attack was easily crushed. Indeed, the Russians appeared to have discovered the Japanese idea from the outset, and carefully directed all their energy to frustrate the main object, which was to divide the eastern line. The Russians, profiting by their narrow escape, re-created the Wantai position, and made it trebly strong. A persistent shell and shrapnel fire effectively kept down the interfering fire of the Japanese in the Panlungs, and the slopes of Wantai were crossed and recrossed with skeins of wire entanglements, and the enceinte hereabout reconstructed by making along its open rear traverses of sandbags. So strong was the position remade that it remained Russian until the day when a white flag fluttered in the valley, and the citadel was surrendered; yet—and this will give some idea of the daring of the first assault—on the afternoon of August 23 a mere handful of the 7th Regiment were half-way up to the summit of Wantai.

CHAPTER VII

FROM ESCALADE TO SIEGE OPERATIONS

Closing in on the permanent line of fortifications with siege parallels—In touch with the semi-permanents—The garrison delivers a series of sorties—Siege parallels—Behind the investing lines—Arrival of a battery of 28-centimetre howitzers—Preparatory work for the September attacks.

FOR a couple of days after the first assault matters were at a standstill, the Russians contenting themselves with a half-hearted bombardment of Feng-hwang-shan, while the Japanese rested their weary battalions and gathered the seriously wounded to the supply hospital at Chang-ling-tsu station. The weather had been remarkably fine during the operations (from the 19th), but on the afternoon of the 26th of August lowering clouds appeared in the west, heralding a storm. At about four o'clock on the morning of the 27th the storm burst with intense tropical fury and vehemence, the rain descending in sheets from the cloud-bursts, and the violence of the wind making it an almost impossible task to retain footing

on the summit of Feng-hwang-shan. Hardly had the rain commenced to fall than the entire line of fortifications opened a furious artillery fire, under cover of which the Russians sortied *en masse* and attacked the advanced Japanese lines.

The siege park opened up in reply to the fortress cannon, and the rattle of musketry from both sides, momentarily increasing, soon merged into a roar like falling waters. Overhead the thunder incessantly pealed, and vivid lightning in great jagged lines played across the lurid sky; and in the terrible blackness of the stormy night the searchlights shone out with dazzling brightness. Shell after shell burst in startling relief across the artificial light, as often answered by cannon-flashes from the hills, like the sparks of steel hammering cold steel or a galloping dynamo; and oftener star-shells rushed up into the air, faltered a second, then dribbled to the earth in a golden shower, spluttering out in wind and rain. From the eminence it was a weirdly magnificent spectacle that you looked upon; from the zig-zagging line of spurting hills to the mountains, where glimpses of a turbulent, white-capped sea showed against the harder outlines. In the heavens the lurid lightning was making

crosses with the lanes of electric light; in front and around roared and crashed the artillery, and above thunder rumbled and pealed; while the wind-swept rain, rushing down the hillsides, made of it all a sufficient orchestra to herald even the crack of doom; for man and the elements had successfully combined to make a scene beyond the imagination. At last the storm died out, the rain stopped, the artillery and rifles were silent, and the day so roughly ushered in was quieter than any we had passed in front of the citadel.

The sortie was not successful, and ended in little more than a noisy demonstration on the part of the garrison, and an equally noisy waste of powder and shell by the invaders.

When the report of the failure of the great assault on Port Arthur was forwarded to Tokio, the Emperor sent a telegram of thanks to the army under General Nogi's command, and the wires became busy between the Manchurian headquarters and the general staff in the Japanese capital. Marshal Oyama decided to attack Kuropatkin without further delay; and, on the morning of the 24th, General Kuroki, assuming the offensive, opened the battle of Liaoyang. Had the Third Army been available—as was hoped—the history of

that protracted battle might have afforded similar reading to that of Sedan.

The strenuous days of August were followed by a comparative calm, and on the first day of September the character of the operations underwent a marked change. The artillery were put under khaki-coloured covers, and the sappers and miners assumed the chief rôle. The crops on the slopes and in the valley withered and died, and the approaches leading to the forts were soon scored with siege parallels that daily, in regulation neatness, wormed their way nearer the Russian defences. They were not free from molestation either,—these sappers,—for the Russians, with persistent regularity, sortied overnight and endeavoured to destroy the work; while during the day they were stormed at with great 10-inch shells and sniped at with leaden pellets.

Ceaseless activity was now developed in the Russian lines, and every effort made to harass the Japanese engineers eating their way over the slopes. The Panlungs were, time and again, attacked, and for ever under a merciless and murderous shelling that makes it a never-ceasing wonder how on earth the 7th Regiment, with its remade battalions, held the open works. A full battalion a week

were the casualties in the ranks of the sappers and garrison of the Panlungs during the first days of September.

The engineers of the Third Japanese Army have every reason to be proud of their work before Port Arthur, for the parallel trenchwork they constructed under the very noses of Russian cannon, the general excellence of their mining, and of the sapping that brought the infantry in touch with the several moats of the permanent works, was beyond comment exact and effective work. As the story of the siege gradually unfolds itself to the reader, the great part they played in bringing about the surrender of the fortress will be evident, and as much appreciated as the clever and courageous dash of the infantry. It would be obviously out of place to treat in September of anything but the pick and shovel work, as the mining proper did not assume any proportions till a much later period.

The first set of parallels that were finished connected the garrisons of the Panlungs with the headquarters of the ninth division. The distance between these two points (in a direct line) is not less than 800 yards, and nearly 2000 yards of trenchwork, in six parallels, bridged this distance.


The parallels were equidistant, but not uniform in length, varying from 150 yards at the first parallel to not more than 60 yards as the objective was approached.

Broad enough to take in the wheels of a field gun-carriage, and sufficiently lofty to allow of upright walking, the levelled floors were perfect for marching. At the turnings of every parallel there were short branch trenches run out, with sanitary pits; and the entire length of trenches were at all times a perfect object-lesson in cleanliness, being plentifully sprinkled with chloride of lime and kept in naval cleanliness.

The culinary arrangements of the troops engaged in garrison, picket, or sapping work was undertaken at divisional headquarters, and rations, water, etc., were sent up with reliefs which were posted daily.


At the fifth and sixth parallels, under the walls of the trenches, bomb-proof shelters were excavated for the general reserves of the Panlungs, and for the quarters of the colonel of the regiment and his battalion officers, clerical staff, etc.

Rifle-racks were constructed along the trench walls, and slots inlet all the way up the parallel for boxes of reserve small-arm ammunition to



JAPANESE RESERVE INFANTRY IN SIEGE PARALLELS.

(Copyright Photo by J. Rosenthal, of the Charles Urban Trading Co., Ltd.)



be used in cases of emergency, as during the night sorties of the Russians.


The ground negotiated by the sappers was (for the most part) of soft shale, and easily picked, until the glacis of the hills were reached, when firmer country rock was met with which compelled slow progress. During the first stage of the sapping, progress was made at the rate of 100 metres a day, but at the latter stage (within 300 yards of the objective) not more than 10 metres a day could be claimed. In front of the three divisions, between four and five miles of this direct parallel, work was done during September.

At the rear there was much activity. A light railway was laid between the divisions, with numerous branch lines for tapping the commissary and ammunition depôts. Telephonic connection was relaid with heavier wire and better poles. Batteries, especially howitzers, were rearranged, and two 6-inch naval guns mounted in the centre of the park. On the 14th of September the first new battery of 28-centimetre howitzers arrived, and were added to the siege artillery. These howitzers (counterparts of those lost in the *Hitachi Maru*) were made at Osaka in Japan, from a Belgian model of a fortress mortar. The barrel weighed

16 tons, and the fort mortar mountings another 20. These guns have an effective range of 7000 metres, and fire 500-lb. shells. The guns were carried from Dalny by rail to a temporary erected platform six miles from Port Arthur. Here they were unshipped by sheerlegs, placed on a framework of beams resting on a couple of wide-wheeled wooden trolleys, and then man-hauled over a plank track laid on the sun-baked roads. Splendidly handled, the guns were mounted in pairs on beds of cement, on either side of the railway-gap, or, as we named it for excellent reasons, the Shell-Strewn Road.


Altogether the conditions under which the Japanese laboured during the siege were most favourable. They had uninterrupted railway communication with Dalny, and no hostile natives to hamper their lines of communication, transport, commissariat, or ammunition depôts. Two main roads lead out of Dalny to Port Arthur, and these were extensively used during the early part of the siege, before the required number of trucks had been pieced together at Dalny, and made available for the Japanese army in the field at Port Arthur and in Manchuria.

To be ready for any breakdown of railway



GUN-BARREL OF JAPANESE 28 CENTIMETRE HOWITZER ON WOODEN TROLLEYS BEING HAULED
TO CEMENT EMPLACEMENTS.

(Copyright Photo by J. Rosenthal, of the Charles Urban Trading Co., Ltd.)



communication the Japanese linked Dalny to the firing-line by a series of relay depôts. At these depôts supplies and ammunition were stored, and transport carts and animals equal to meet a sudden emergency always kept in readiness. A central depôt (for ammunition and commissary) was established at Chang-ling-tsu, with two subsidiary depôts from which divisional supply was maintained. An average of 150 truck-loads were daily supplied to Chang-ling-tsu by the Dalny base commissary depôt, and supply was handled by drawing a percentage from the trucks for immediate transportation to division and the subsidiary depôts. Thus congestion was avoided, and the staff of the commissary department at the main depôt always able to handle with despatch all trains, and thus maintain efficient control over issue.

In all the villages in the rear of the army small branch issue depôts were started and organised to meet any extraordinary situation, such as a sudden withdrawal of troops into reserves, redistribution, etc. In the villages canteens were opened for the benefit of the travelling troops. A general post-office was opened, with branches at the divisions, and a most efficient service maintained, mail being

delivered at the sap-heads regularly twice a day, and outward mail collected at regimental headquarters. Hospital arrangements were perfected, and dressing stations with ambulance and sanitary corps attached to almost every active battalion, and field hospitals with full field staffs allotted to regiments. These latter were close up to the firing line, and kept free of seriously wounded by a daily clearance service maintained by a Chinese stretcher-bearer corps. These daily ambulance columns were timed to reach Chang-ling-tsu collecting hospital to make connection with the Dalny train service. At Dalny those troops whose condition necessitated rest and special care were placed on hospital ships and sent to Japan. In this way the wounded were handled, and the system was worked so skillfully and efficiently that no strain was brought to bear on any one section of the hospital service, and daily casualty was easily handled at the front.

During the first weeks of September the Japanese infantry were daily put through manual drill, and received lectures on taking cover, maintaining direction, and proper control during assaults, etc.

Over 15,000 drafts for the divisions arrived

during September, and were immediately sent into the firing line for snap-shooting at the Russians. Besides these troops of the first line, battalions of second reservists were added to General Nogi's command, and by the middle of September the effects of the August reverse had been completely effaced and the army brought up to full strength. During this time the Russians expended great quantities of ammunition on anything resembling a Japanese battery, but never located anything except the battery of direct-firing naval 4.7's, which was one day put out of action after a lively duel with the "I" battery of 11-inch howitzers.

The sappers having by the 16th of September brought the infantry in touch with the semi-permanent advance works, General Nogi ordered the September attack to be made. The plan of this attack was to maintain a strong sustained feint-attack against the eastern fortifications, while the Erhlung and Sueishi lunettes and the western semi-permanent advance works (180 and 203 Metre Hills) were attacked. On the 17th of September the artillery opened a range practice with a few batteries, which drew a smart shell fire from the garrison. The next day (18th) General Baron Kodama arrived at headquarters from Manchuria, and the

infantry attack was ordered to be opened the next day. As the September attacks were not made at the same time, and in no instances co-operative, they will be dealt with in detail.

CHAPTER VIII

SEPTEMBER ATTACKS

Capture of Erhlung lunette—Capture of Sueishi lunettes and 180 Metre Hill—Unsuccessful attack on 203 Metre Hill, heavy casualties.

Capture of Erhlung Lunette, September 20, 1904.

THE construction of the Erhlung lunette was as unique as its position in the line of defences. The broken ground in the neighbourhood had been extensively utilised for defensive purposes, and strong flanking trenches as well as central retreat and supply canals were constructed, and these precautions prevented its capture in reverse, and contributed largely to the repulse on August 20, when after 300 casualties the Japanese retired from the attack.

Surrounding the lunette was a moat about 15 feet deep, and a dozen feet wide. The parapet and breastworks were strongly fortified with timber baulks and bags of sand, while in the interior rear of the redoubt machine guns were posted in bomb-proof shelters, and these

having a clean field of fire were able to sweep the entire interior space when entered by an enemy. Another important factor in the defensive arrangements was a cave or tunnel under the glacis (central front), which, answering the purpose of a barracks, sheltered the garrison during the heavy bombardments.

Armed with three field guns, several quick-firers and machine guns, and supported by the fire of the Erhlung and Sungshu forts, it was a formidable outwork, and its garrison of six companies gave an excellent account of themselves.

On the morning of September 19 (the occasion of the second attack) the Japanese infantry were in parallels constructed by the sappers to within a bare 30 yards of the lunette. The eighteenth brigade of the ninth division were ordered to attack the position, assisted by the divisional artillery and a section of the siege park.

From early morning of the 19th of September the artillery shelled the Erhlung and Sungshu forts, concentrating in the afternoon on the Erhlung lunette. At four o'clock the infantry received orders to hold themselves in readiness to assault, and an hour later two ground scouts were sent out of the parallel. These pioneers

crept forward, pushing shields (made of inch-wood with eighth-inch steel-plate coverings), but were not long out of cover before their lifeless bodies and shattered shields were lying on the glacis. A few minutes later half a company emerged from cover, darted across the glacis, and disappeared into a donga close to the lunette. They were immediately followed by another half company armed with grenades, who scattered and found cover to the east of the lunette.

In the meantime two battalions of the 19th Regiment developed an attack against the flank trenches, but the dominating forts shelled all the ground about the lunette, and the Russian infantry in the flank trenches poured volley after volley into the Japanese. Unable to make headway against the flanks, the Japanese commander withheld making a frontal attack, and the artillery reopened a smart shrapnel fire on the lunette. It was dark before the attack was further developed by an advance against the left flank, which was immediately followed by an assault on the main position by the 36th Regiment. A large force of Japanese entered the work, and with a free use of grenades the machine-gun shelters were destroyed and the interior menace re-

moved. This advantage, obtained at a heavy sacrifice, was followed up with a more spirited attack on the flanks, and the position was then captured, the garrison being forced to retire after the usual bayonet scrimmage, here brutally intensified by the free use of hand-grenades.

Immediately after the capture of the lunette, the shelters, etc., were destroyed, and, after irreparably wrecking the position and setting fire to the timbers, the Japanese sallied from the lunette and destroyed the water-works supplying the forts, and then retired altogether from the lunette, which the Russians subjected to a terrific cannonade all day.

The Japanese, however, maintained a large force in the flank trenches, and prevented any chance of recapture by advancing a heavy firing line parallel with the lunette.

A torpedo tube on its marine mountings, and several fish torpedoes, was found in this lunette, and the dent in the tube probably accounted for the torpedoes not being used during the attack.

The operations against the Erhlung lunette cost the Japanese over a thousand casualties, but secured possession of the ground necessary for advancing the sapping operations against

the Erhlung fort. The demonstration carried out by the eleventh division did not assume great proportions, but the operations in other parts of the field, being pressed, were vigorously opposed by the Russians.

Capture of Sueishi Lunettes, September 20.

From the earliest hours of the investment, the rivulets dribbling through the Sueishi valley to the mud-swamps close to the New Town were stained with the blood of those striving for the mastery of the "teeth of the valley"—the Sueishi lunettes. Four low-lying, innocent-looking humps in the valley, where it narrowed between the eastern and western fort-hills, marked the lunettes; while a thin, serrated line of sandbags defined the sides of the square of trenches connecting them together. The key of the position was the "B" lunette (northern of western two). Its ramparts ran dead into a 10-foot wide moat which semi-surrounded its front. On the flanks—where the trenches ran out to the other works—they had been bomb-proofed with railway sleepers, boulders, and earth.

The main strength of this lunette was in the clever machine-gun shelters a little distance from the rear of the work, and when they

belched out their streams of lead the entire interior space of the lunette was swept by their safely concealed nozzles. It was this factor in the defence that the Japanese tumbled up against in August when attempting to storm the position.

The night of the 18th of September passed with a cold and miserable rainstorm, and the bitter north-wester made the rank and file of the 3rd Regiment of the first division anxious to move, when day dawned equally discomfiting in the confinement of the parallels that were then but 50 yards from the "B" lunette. But the redoubts were first treated by the efficient artillery before the infantry were released.

Afternoon found shell and shot still tearing up the trenches, but at sunset the artillery were silenced, and the infantry attack developed under a covering of a deluge of shrapnel. Armed with bamboo scaling-ladders and hand-grenades, a detachment of pioneers were sent out of the parallel, and, followed by a strong assaulting party with fixed bayonets, rushed over the 50 yards separating them from the moat of the "B" lunette. They were greeted with a ripple of rifle fire, that quickened and deepened into a roar of musketry

as they approached. The glaxis was soon mottled with writhing bodies, and the main body of assaulters came tearing back to the parallel. Twice this was repeated, and not until the third attempt were the ladders fixed and the firing line, accompanied by the grenadiers, able to scramble into the interior of the lunette. Then was heard a sickening crackle of machine guns; and, once more beaten, the Japanese retired to their parallel. It was now dark, and the sinister ray of a searchlight lit up the scene of the struggle.

The 3rd Regiment was split up for a night attack, two companies to attack the "D" lunette (northern of eastern two), while a battalion and a half reassaulted the "B" lunette. But all that darkness might have given to the assaulters was sneaked away by the light of the searchlights,—a cool, quiet light that aided but one side and hampered the other. Desperately though the Japanese attacked they could not make any impression on the position until dawn, when the united strength of the regiment was hurled against the "B" lunette. Ladders were firmly fixed, and a massed rush made for the machine-gun shelters. The grenades succeeded in their deadly work of destruction, and uncovered the Russian

gunners. Gunners and guns were soon silenced, and although cleverly timed Russian shrapnel burst across the attackers, they soon forced the garrison out at the point of the bayonet, and leaping into the trenches grappled and cut their way to the other works. By nine o'clock (20th September) the four lunettes were occupied, but not until the casualties of the 3rd Regiment totalled nearly 500 killed and wounded.

The spoil consisted of three quick-firers, four machine guns, two mortars, a marine torpedo tube, and four fish torpedoes. Between the western lunettes ("A" and "B") three unexploded mines were found, but as no attack was made on that flank the Japanese were never in their danger zone.

To date (20th September) the casualties of the 3rd Regiment exceed a thousand.

Capture of 180 Metre Hill, September 20.

After capturing 174 Metre Hill on the 20th August, the first division were not idle, and the sappers of the first brigade were actively engaged securing the position on the flanks and making passages and covered ways to the headquarters of the division. Afterwards, offensive parallels were constructed against the

hill 180 metres high, and by the 19th of September the first brigade held the ground from west of 203 Metre Hill over 174 Metre Hill, and part of the hill 180 metres high. Along this line the Japanese were not more than 200 metres from the Russian trenches, but farther east the distance between the belligerents increased, as the slopes of I-tzu-shan, etc., could not be contested, as they were strongly held by the Russians and under a direct line of fire from 203, 180, and the many battery positions sprinkled around I-tzu-shan.

The position and fortification of 180 Metre has already been described, but to enable the attack to be clearly followed it will be necessary to add a little detail.

At the eastern end of the ridge, which is about 300 yards along the crest, there is a peak about 160 metres high, and this was held by the 1st Regiment of the first division.

Only the steep escarpment and counter-scarpments of the hills 180 and 160 Metres (a distance of 60 or 70 yards) separated the Japanese trenches (on the reverse slope of 160 Metre) and the lower of the double line of Russian entrenchment (on the face and summit of 180 Metre).

A brigade of field artillery, a battery of

naval 12-pounders and some 6-inch howitzers pounded the hill all morning of the 19th of September, and at 5.20 p.m. concentrated on the extreme east of 180, a few yards from the position of the 1st Regiment, allotted the task of attacking the position.

A few minutes later a score of men broke from the cover of 160 Metre Hill, dashed down the slope of that hill, across the neck, and up the slope of 180, to the cover of the dead ground beneath the lower line of Russian trenches. This cover was gained without loss, and another half company followed suite without casualty.

Meantime a half company filed down the gulch in front of 180, and worked up the face of the hill by the aid of a deep crevice. A scout was sent out by this party, and, dashing across the live ground, succeeded in getting safely under the buttresses of the hill, where he stood erect, waved his khaki-covered cap, and acted as a guide to the rest of the detachment, who dashed singly across in a race of life and death; for the intervening space was now literally alive and bubbling with bullets from the Russian sharpshooters on the hill. One—an officer—with drawn sword leapt from this crevice, and—darting like a hare doubling from a hound—made for

the cover. Hardly had he covered 20 yards than he was shot, and—the point of the incident—as he lay writhing on the ground he became the target of fifty riflemen, who to their everlasting shame unmercifully riddled the dead body with bullets. Others, heedless of the barbarous methods of warfare, and determined on revenging his death, dashed across in the race, and some fifty or more out of the squad reached cover, proudly unfurled a little ensign and flung it to the breeze. By sunset the 1st Regiment had taken up a commanding position for assaulting the lower trenches, and shortly after midnight occupied them uncontested.

In the morning the Russians were holding the crest and the Japanese the lower trenches, and in this position they remained all day confronting each other, while the Japanese artillery swept the entire crest-line with a heavy fire. About ten o'clock in the morning an attempt was made to bring pressure to bear on the west of the hill, but the detachment who made the attempt were annihilated by a remarkable shrapnel fire from the guns on 203 Metre Hill.

At four o'clock in the afternoon the Japanese artillery concentrated over the heads of the

infantry, and after half an hour of accurate shelling and a few minutes of preparatory shrapnel, the Japanese fixed bayonets and tightened buckles for the assault. It was about five o'clock, and the light still clear, when the standard-bearer crossed the lower trench, and waving the colours dashed up the glacis, followed by the "Banzai-ing" troops. The line of bayonets, gleaming in the parting sunlight, quickly reached the trench, and charged at the waiting Muscovites. A volley greeted them at a dozen paces, and the line crumpled; then with yells that echoed across the gulch they leapt into the trenches. Silhouetted against the blue of the sky they fought like demons, clubbing their rifles, thrusting and parrying with their bayonets, and then in death struggles, grappling within the earth wall of the trenches, were lost to sight. Rocks flew up from the struggling mass, and Japanese deliberately knelt and took pot-shots at fleeing Russians. Then the line of steel swung out of the trench and skirmished along the ridge to the south, but, meeting the accurate volleying from 203, instantly swung in and closed on the trench again. Another force, advancing from the west, gained the trench-line, and together they finished off the garrison.

There was no hesitation in the game of kill, no thought of wearing gloves, and in a short half-hour there remained only dead or dying Russians in the trenches. It was a short, quick fight, and while it lasted held you spellbound, so clearly could every action be seen; and verily the Russian fears death as little as the Japanese, who do not fear it at all, and they fought together more fiercely than one cares to see men fight even in a just cause. Over 130 dead Russians were found in the trenches, about one for every two yards; and the Japanese loss was 450 killed and wounded.

Attack on 203 Metre Hill, September 19 to 22.

North-west of Port Arthur the hilly country especially adapts itself to the construction of defensive works, and of those heights chosen and fortified by the Russians none had the same value to the forts as had 203 Metre. Not only on account of its own peculiar and special entrenchments,—which were wonderfully strong,—but chiefly for the reason of its relative position between I-tzu-shan on the one hand and Tai-yang-kow on the other. Separated from them by a series of low, tumbling hillocks, 203 Metre Hill is the apex of a right-angled triangle, with the base line between the two

forts. Once in the hands of the Japanese, although untenable because of the enfilade fire of the fort, it would be possible to encircle the hill to the west and south, and cut off the communication of the two forts by pressing on the "base line" with siege parallels.

To capture the hill was necessary and essential to the movements of the right wing of the investment, but the subordinate height of 180 Metre had first to be occupied before it was feasible to assault the strongly defended summit.

On September 19 the sappers had constructed parallels to within 300 yards of the first of the triple line of entanglements encircling the glacis of the hill, and from this base it was proposed to attack the position.

During the night of the 19th the sappers of the 15th Regiment succeeded in cutting over a hundred feet of the entanglements, and during the early hours of the 20th the infantry of this regiment, assisted by the 16th Regiment of second reserves, made an attack on the hill. A strong firing line negotiated the first line of entanglements, but when halted at the second line were mowed down from the concealed Russians. With remarkable fortitude the men attempted to skirmish up the hill, but were

caught by enfilade fire from the north-east knoll of 203 and forced to retire. At dawn the forts, opening a heavy fire frustrated any attempt to renew the attack during the day, and although several other attempts were made under cover of darkness they all failed, and on the 22nd the Russians securely held the position. The Japanese suffered terrible loss from the Russian shell fire, and their casualties for the attack on 203 exceeded those in the other parts of the field, and by the evening of the 22nd had reached close upon 2500; and it was then deemed prudent to cease operations until the artillery could destroy the bomb-proof compartments.

On the 18th of September, while co-operating with the land forces, the Japanese gunboat *Heiyen* was destroyed off Pigeon Bay by a Russian mine, and further Japanese naval co-operation withheld, and this was a very serious handicap to the first division. The capture of the lunettes enabled the Japanese centre to close in on the Erhlung and Sungshu forts, and sapping was immediately recommenced. During the operations, from the 19th to 26th of September, the total casualties exceeded 4500, which (apart from the unsuccessful attack on 203 Metre Hill) were small

in proportion to the value of the positions captured. The second attack may be said to have ceased on the 26th of September, and the second stage of sapping then commenced.

The garrison became very busy after the loss of the lunettes, and on the night of the 25th a band of 100 Russians sortied against the Japanese lines close to the village Palichwang; but after half an hour's desperate hand-to-hand fighting they retired, leaving twenty dead on the field. The next night they repeated the same attack with the same result.

On the 28th the naval brigade opened fire on the fleet, and for a couple of days bombarded them with success, the *Peresviet* and *Pobedia* being hit a dozen times and set on fire.

CHAPTER IX

SAPPING AND MINING

Closing in on the north-eastern permanent fortifications—


The Japanese battery of 28-centimetre howitzers opens fire and bombards the fleet—A succession of sorties—General siege operations leading up to the second assault on Port Arthur—Capture of Hachimake-yama—Capture of the glacis trenches of the Erhlung and Sungshu forts.

OCTOBER the first was an artillery day, for on that day the 28-centimetre howitzers opened fire for the first time, and with the co-operation of the naval 6-inch Long Toms mauled the fortifications of Port Arthur with heavy ordnance fire. A similar bombardment followed on the 4th and 7th, during which the fleet were cannonaded, and the battleships *Pobedia*, *Retvisan*, *Peresviet*, and *Poltava*, and three smaller war-vessels, repeatedly struck. The three latter battleships were deprived of their power of motion, and deserted by their crews on the 6th and 7th, and the damaged vessels towed into the east harbour. There they were comparatively safe; for the Japanese, who for some mysterious reason now ceased to use

their balloon, had no observation point from which to direct their artillery practice against those waters where the fleet were sheltering. They were, however, actively bombarded again a few days later, that is on the 11th, 12th, and 13th, and the next day the 28-centimetre howitzers poured a heavy fire on the Sungshu and Erhlung forts. During this time (1st to 13th) the Russians retaliated with many sorties directed against the sapping operations. On the 3rd, just after sunset, a large force attacked the saps directed against the North fort, and after a long and fierce fight were driven off. The same night over a battalion attacked the head of the saps directed against 203 Metre, and were beaten off with heavy loss.


The next night a detachment of the eleventh division went out and destroyed a 47 mm. gun on the extreme south-east of the fortifications, and the Russians replied by attacking the Japanese in the direction of Palichwang village.

Small parties nightly sortied in every direction, and on the night of the 10th a more than usually daring party, of close on a battalion, made a desperate attack on the Panlungs, entering the works and throwing grenades. They were



BATTERY OF JAPANESE 28 CENTIMETRE HOWITZERS IN ACTION.

(Copyright Photo by J. Rosenthal, of the Charles Urban Trading Co., Ltd.)



driven off with great loss, but immediately made an attack on the Japanese sappers working against North fort.

The following afternoon nine torpedo boats issued from the harbour and appeared twice off Ta-ku-shan, exchanging fire with the Japanese coast scouts.

Meanwhile, by the aid of parallels, the 3rd Regiment had succeeded in straddling the railway at the foot of the Sungshu fort. At this time the Russians, with small patrols, were holding many outlying posts. One of these was located near a small culvert, close to the railway bridge, at the north-east edge of the tidal swamp of West Port.

After sunset on the 11th of October, three companies of the 3rd Regiment dislodged this force by a surprise attack, and forced the patrol to retire on the force holding the bridge. Later in the evening, being reinforced by a detachment of the 19th Regiment, the combined force operated against the bridge.

After sustaining fifty-seven casualties in repeated attempts to rush the position, the Japanese retired to the culvert, where all throughout the 12th they kept a small party intrenched, and deluded the bridge patrol into a sense of false security. At twilight,

between the light of day and the power of the searchlights, a strong attacking party was sneaked up, a rush made for the bridge, and the outwitted Russians dislodged.

Later in the evening the Russians, making simultaneous sorties against the sap-heads of the 22nd Regiment in the east, and against the Japanese holding the bridge, attempted a recapture of the lost patrol. Both sorties were fruitful in many Russian deaths, and barren of results ; the Japanese casualties being 38. The capture of this bridge enabled the sappers to obtain footing on the slope of Sung-shu-shan, and the operations against that fort were advanced a stage.

Further east the 36th Regiment, operating from the Palichwang village, had wormed themselves across the railway, and were sapping up a hill between the Erhlung fort and the West Panlung. This hill was crowned with a circle of trenches, and for this reason named (by the Japanese) Hachimake-yama ; Hachimake being the name applied to the cloth twirled around the heads of Japanese labourers. Hachimake, flanked on either side by deep gulches running from its foot, is a " peninsula " of the main " Dragon Hill." Across its neck, where it narrowed and ran to the enceinte,

a zig-zag of curtain or traverse trenches had been constructed by the Russians, and this formed an excellent line of retreat from the wreath of trenches on Hachimake. On the 15th of October the sappers had brought an offensive parallel within fifty yards of the defensive arrangements on Hachimake, and the next morning gave way to the artillery, which commenced in a desultory manner to prod the Erhlung and Sungshu forts. Toward noon the gunners quickened their fire, and later concentrated on this "claw of the Double Dragon."

The Russians replied, throwing 11-inch shells indiscriminately about the valley, while a perfect shower of shrapnel was directed at the parallels sapped against Hachimake.

At 3.30, according to a prearranged plan, the heavy siege artillery ranged themselves against Hachimake, and there followed a most sickening spectacle, as round after round of 11- and 6-inch shells burst within a space of less than 50 yards square, held by infantry in rifle pits. To the deluge of mammoth shells, field batteries added merciless cloud-bursts of shrapnel, and the hill was soon enveloped in a great bubbling mass of smoke, into which pieces of bomb-proof timbers, pieces

of sandbags, and fragments of decapitated men were for ever rising in blacker relief against the wreaths of lighter smoke. He who wrote that "Peace hath higher tests of manhood than Battle ever knew" knew nothing of the test of manhood displayed by a handful of Russian soldiers in the face of that appalling shell fire on that October afternoon. Five hundred pounds of metal, dropping from the skies and bursting with such fury as to tear craters in the earth sufficient to bury a cart and horse, and flinging from that crater a dozen whirling pieces of steel, each as big as a man's leg,—hundreds of these engines of destruction were bursting into countless fragments in a space half as large as a football ground. And other shells, half that weight and equally as destructive, were making other similar craters. Amid this tornado of steel, leaden pellets, larger than marbles, were showering faster than wind-driven hail, and among it all men were cowering, rifle in hand, waiting for death, cringing and shrinking aside to allow a shattered comrade to die, and wondering if the rim of the next crater would bite away the ground on which they were lying, and kill and bury them the same instant.

You can have but a faint idea of the hope-

lessness of speculating on the terrors of death when you are being shelled with 11-inch high explosives, for hell must have less triumphs than this phase of war, and you lie still and resign yourself to fate, unless you care to run away, and it was this that the Russians would not do on the afternoon of the 15th of October.

But this is all apart, for when the devastating shell fire had reached the zenith of its destructiveness, and the gunners were tired of feeding the rapacious mouths of their heated cannon, up from the shelter of the parallel leapt a young Japanese officer, his bare up-lifted sword flashing in the sunlight as he swung it over his head and dashed up the slope of the hill.

A second later a swarm of dark winter-clothed troops darted from cover, and a lunette of glistening steel swept up after the flashing blade. The slope over which they rushed was then pelted with lead from a spurting line of rifles manning the breastworks of the Erhlung fort. The Japanese artillery, which had by magic ceased fire on Hachimake, was now plying round after round into that fort, and the line of Japanese bayonets disappeared into the ring of thinning smoke hovering over the destroyed trenches. In an hour the

bayonets finished the work so destructively commenced by the artillery, and the honey-combed summit of the hill was Japanese. In the craters there were found over a hundred Russian bodies, and scattered about the hillside the remains of uncountable others. The Japanese lost in that hour of bayoneting five officers and 149 men. Of such incidents as this that I have related was the siege made up; often instead of hundreds, thousands were killed, but the process of killing was always brutally alike.

An attack made after the capture of Hachimake-yama on the infantry galleries on the west slope of Erhlung fort-hill was held in check by rifle fire, and the operations were over for the day.

After the capture of Hachimake-yama the intention of the Japanese commander was evident from the vigorous sapping directed against the north-eastern defences. In a few days the long outer glacis of the Erhlung fort was covered with the work of the sappers. Sandbags were now extensively employed in this work, for the soft shale had given way to harder limestone and granite, and this being covered with little subsoil made it expedient to use sandbags for walling the trenches. This exposed the line of an advance which

became the object of ceaseless attention from Russian sharpshooters, but the sappers worked so faithfully and accomplished such rapid work that by the 23rd of October they had approached to within 150 yards of the trenches surrounding the inner or artificial glacis of the Erhlung fort, and some 200 yards from similar defences of the Sungshu fort. Eastward the work had been pressed against "P" fortification, where the distance separating the infantry was little less than 130 yards. Against North fort the sixth parallel had been constructed, and this brought the Japanese to within 43 metres of the moat. From this point the engineers had tunnelled in, but had only got a little distance before they were countermined by the Russians and their work destroyed. At the same time the explosion was beneficial to the Japanese, for it created a breach in the north-east corner of the caponiere gallery.¹


Against "Q" fortification the sappers, labouring under a heavy cross fire, had only managed to get within 200 yards of that battery. South-east of "Q" the saps were 150 yards from the glacis trenches of the South

¹ As the whole work against this fort deserves special notice, as affording the best example of sapping and mining siege operations, it is treated in detail in December account of operations, when the fort was captured.

Keekwan; and farther south little, if any, progress had been made, as this part of the eastern line would be rendered untenable once the Japanese gained their lodgment on the north-eastern sector.


Much happened in the rear of the army during this time. The light telephonic communication was everywhere replaced by heavy wire, and some 30 miles of light railway was now laid, and the divisions independently connected up with the supply parks. Two batteries of 28-centimetre howitzers had arrived, and been added to the immense siege park. The three batteries were distributed in the following manner:—Five guns with the first division, nine with the ninth division, and four with the eleventh division.

A couple of hundred wooden mortars, capable of hurling grenades a distance of 200 yards, had been made in the pioneer workshop attached to the army, and these were now distributed between the eleventh and ninth divisions. Thousands of bamboo scaling-ladders (30 feet long), and a vast number of useless and useful shields, of as many patterns as Joseph's coat, had been added to the offensive apparatus of the infantry. Last, but not least, thousands of murderous grenades filled with 500 grams



JAPANESE PICKETS IN ADVANCED FIRING LINE OF SIEGE PARALLELS. THE SMALL WOODEN HOWITZERS WERE USED FOR THROWING GRENADES INTO THE RUSSIAN TRENCHES.

(Copyright Photo by J. Rosenthal, of the Charles Urban Trading Co., Ltd.)



of dynamite for use at breathing quarters, when even bayonets were cumbersome; engines of modern scientific destruction, were also distributed for the benefit of the troops of the Mikado. Close on a million sand bags (not counting thousands of rice bags) had been utilised in making head cover for the besieging infantry, and on the 24th of October thousands of dull picks and turned spades were brought out of the saps, and more thousands of keen bayonets took their place. The infantry again displaced the sappers and miners.

That afternoon the artillery commenced to pay the usual "calls," and the next day opened a quiet bombardment, while the infantry cleaned accoutrements and made ready for the second assault.

While engaged rooting round for information, on the afternoon of the 25th, I came across numerous groups of Tommies changing underwear and assiduously tubbing at the side of the creeks. Knowing what was in the wind, I questioned one of these Knights of the Bath as to the reason of the wholesale tubbing, and ventured to suggest that it had some connection with the coming assault. He nodded his head, and answered me with a Japanese proverb they taught us with the "kata-

kana" at school, which runs something like this :—

"Japanese fight like gentlemen, and if they are found dead on the battlefield there will be found dead gentlemen."

And it was evident that these gentlemen desired to be found "dead gentlemen." More to the business point was the sight of other groups, who had finished tubbing, sharpening up their bayonets, with faces innocent of devilry, but full of the "fight like gentlemen." Perhaps the oddest sight was these same Tommies munching away at sweetmeats like a lot of schoolboys, or arm in arm strolling about, like you can see them any day on the Genza at Tokio. Certainly no psychologist should write his volume until he has studied the soldier, seen him munching lollipops, and watched him in an hour's time deport himself in the whirling hell of the death scrimmage of the firing line.

He would see many things that they never put in drill books, and he would see many things that would make him write copious annotations to a chapter on the subject of sentiment. But, as Mr. Rudyard Kipling puts it, "that's another story."

Scarcely had the morning mist unwrapped

from the fortifications on the morning of the 26th of October than the 28-centimetre batteries were thundering away and peppering the Erhlung and Sungshu forts with 500-lb. pellets of destruction. The fire was not rapid but plodding, and before noon 250 shots had got home effectively on those two forts. The naval brigade then assisted with 6-inch shells, and the North fort was sprinkled with a few hundred shells. Bomb-proof timbers and other interior defensive material was for ever flying up into the air, and a gun in the main battery of the North fort stuck its dismounted nozzle up just before dense black smoke announced a fire within the defences. After midday the lesser guns chimed in, and at two o'clock the entire siege park was in action against the north-eastern defences. In the saps on the glacis of the Erhlung and Sungshu, little wreaths of blue smoke announced the opening fire of the little grenade mortars.

The Russians sprayed a nervous fire upon the supporting lines in the Sueishi valley which upset the Japanese postal arrangements, but otherwise was of no importance. Shortly after five o'clock the artillery reached its semicolon, and was punctuated with an exclamation of shrapnel. Quickly the fronts of the forts

were blanketed in blue clouds, as four batteries simultaneously shrapnelled, in harmonious salvoes, the devastated breastworks crunched by the continuous heavy artillery fire.

At the height of the shrapnelling a party of infantry, not more than quarter of a company, emerged from the saps and rushed up the glacis of the Erhlung fort. At this precise moment the artillery ceased fire. The assaulters gained the Russian trenches and jumped inside. A moment later a couple of men appeared on the edge of the trench waving flags. This signal was responded to by a company of infantry armed with trenching tools, who, when they had gained the trench, split up into three groups, and with astonishing rapidity commenced sinking three parallel lines of trenches out from the Russian defence to their parallel. Pick and shovel were diligently plied despite a warm shrapnelling from I-tzu-shan and An-tzu-shan, while almost immediately the valley and slopes of the two forts were bubbling with shrapnel clouds, and the deluge of that leaden hailstorm was never at any time in the siege equalled by Russian or Japanese gunners. Everywhere the narrow valley at the foot of the Dragon Hills was seething with coils of woolly smoke, that were the least

material of the spectacle. The Japanese reopened fire in desperate haste to squash this fire, and for an hour the hurricane of metal and shower of lead kept up with intense fury. By this time the infantry had dug themselves out of sight, and 120 yards of trenchwork had laced them to the captured trenches.

While the sappers were at work the Russians exploded a mine on the west of the glacis, and a couple of unfortunate men were for a moment visible floating in the smoke and earth of the eruption before being dashed to pieces on the glacis. This was the first mine I saw exploded, and those two lives were, as far as I could gather, the only ones lost; so, the great destruction of battalions, à la Chefoo, must have taken place in a street I know where there are many grog-shops, and where it would be easily possible to obtain sufficient to make you have much worse dreams.

The operations against the Sungshu fort were carried out simultaneously and by the same method (differing in minute details) as adopted at the Erhlung fort.

The total casualties for the infantry and sappers, on the afternoon of the 26th October, against the glacis trenches of the two forts

(which were vacated uncontested) was over 250, chiefly from shell fire.

After nightfall the Japanese continued their artillery fire against the Erhlung and Sungshu forts, but despite this precaution the garrisons made desperate sorties throughout the night in vain attempts to dislodge the Japanese. With mad ferocity thrice before dawn they attacked in force, and in the intervals parties of desperate volunteers, led by reckless young officers, rushed and entered the Japanese trenches, grappling, and endeavouring by sheer weight behind their bayonets to drive the Japanese out. These attacks were fruitful in many deaths, and in the morning close on a hundred unrecovered Russian dead lay within bayonet prick of the Japanese trenches. At the Erhlung fort the Japanese casualties were 60 officers and 300 men, and at the Sungshu fort 8 officers and 124 men killed and wounded, in beating off the sorties.

The next three days (27th, 28th, and 29th October) were given over to artillery cannonade, during which time the effective hits of the 28-centimetre howitzers were over 550, and many of the guns in the forts were dismantled. On the night of the 29th a large party sortied from the Erhlung fort, and captured part

of the Japanese trenches, but were driven out at 2 a.m.

All night the cannonade kept up, and the hospital tents were laid out waiting for the victims, for the next day the dogs of war were to be let loose.

CHAPTER X

THE SECOND ASSAULT ON PORT ARTHUR, OCTOBER 30, 1904

Clever Japanese concentrated artillery fire, followed by a simultaneously developed general assault—Failure of the assault—Capture of “P” fortification by the Japanese—Recapture of “P” fortification by the garrison by night attack, October 30—Capture and retention of “P” fortification by General Ichinohe, night, October 30—Reasons why the assault failed—Bamboo ladders and modern fortifications.

THE second assault on Port Arthur, like its predecessor, was carefully prearranged, and part of the consuming sentiment to take Port Arthur by direct assault. The Japanese man-in-the-street was for ever clamouring that Port Arthur was to be made to “fall”; precisely how this was to be done was beside the point, but it was to “fall,” and there were many arches—triumphant arches of green—that withered and died while it was “falling.” At no time during the siege was this newspaper advice more freely tendered than just before the Emperor’s birthday (November 3), and Russian forts were

spoken of as being very acceptable presents, etc. In short, the Japanese man-in-the-street needed a "sop," and he got it in the shape of another unsuccessful assault. The history of that other unsuccessful assault, and the events up to the 30th of October, was given to the world for the first time to help those Japanese people to realise what making Port Arthur "fall" entailed. And now to the assault.

For three days and nights the great siege park maintained a continuous cannonade, which culminated on the 30th in a rapid and wonderful bombardment of the eastern forts, the accuracy and destructiveness (if not the effectiveness) of which was practically beyond criticism. From the first flush of dawn, the line of fortifications from Sungshu fort to the south-eastern slope of the Keekwan Hill was subjected to a deliberately planned and systematically carried out combining fire from the entire siege and divisional artillery parks. In destructive rotation the high-angle firing cannon of larger calibre dropped their shells perpendicularly into the forts, followed by the missiles from the direct firing artillery. By noon the countless bursting shells had mingled into dense whirling and suffocating masses of clouds—clouds of earth, flame, and smoke. And to this was added more, for when

the shell fire reached this climax it was joined by simultaneous salvoes of shrapnel bursting with appalling rapidity across the devastated breastworks, now hidden in a long, low cloud of dense and vapid vapour. Suddenly—coming like the hush of indrawn sighs that follows the final note of a thrilling organ, playing in a large cathedral, that still contains the dying volume of sound—there came over it all a strange, great silence. The artillery were silent. Yet long before the surrounding hills ceased echoing the monotonous booming of cannon, the infantry assaulted. Without a single premature feint to give warning, the assault suddenly developed, as battalion after battalion of men simultaneously leapt from the depths of the encircling parallels, and quickly mottled the brown slopes in five separated quarters with their black-clothed bodies, impelled madly onward in the first happy flush of battle. It was the glory of war; and peals of Banzais floated across the valley as the silken colours, waved by impulsive, trembling hands into blends of scarlet and white, everywhere graced the barren slopes. A bright sun, set high in a blue unflecked sky, painted the tips of the bayonets that glistened coldly in spite of the caressing light. It was magnificent, and it was war; for hardly had the banzai-ing merged into breath-

less and indistinct murmurs, than death was rampant on the hillside, and there was enough of the horrors of "magnificent war."

For quick as summer lightning comes and goes across the sky, as quickly all had changed, and the brown slopes were thickly strewn with black forms that lay still and motionless beside unsullied bayonets. The hillsides were now covered in bewildering confusion with numberless tiny blue clouds—clouds that foreran by fractions of seconds the hails of shrapnel that ever followed the assaulters charging over the glacis leading to the Muscovite redoubts. Flash followed flash from forts supposed to have been crumbled to tiny particles of dust by the ceaseless cannonade that had but ceased to echo in the hills. The glory of war passed for many like a hideous nightmare, a thing of horrible dreams, scarcely real; for where only dead men were expected to be, live men were serving undestroyed cannon, and sweeping with succeeding showers of lead slopes they had sought to cross in safety. Some, heedless of the awakening, still swarmed on, unconscious or unheeding the change in realities that had taken place. So desperate were those men that they overran the "Q" fortification as if it were a rifle pit, and staggered slowly and

tiredly up to the South Keekwan fort. They were shot in their backs, and tumbled off the side of the hill; still their impetuosity carried a few with an unfurled standard right up to the breastworks of that fort. Others overran the glacis trenches of the South Keekwan and joined them, and panting from exhaustion they cowered just out of bayonet touch of the garrison. Hardly before ten minutes elapsed parties rushed and attacked the enceinte, but were crumpled up like feathers in a flame. Some tried to rush North fort from the rear, and were killed to a man. Against "P" fortification the assaulters were quickly driven off, and scarcely had they recovered their parallel when a column of earth and smoke reared itself up, and the sharp explosion that followed made it very evident that they had retired the necessary few seconds before the mine could be caused to explode, for no one was harmed.

Westward the attackers had rushed the Erhlung fort, and were baulked before the wide, uncrossable moat, their ladders (if intended for such frivolous use as bridging or placing in the moat) were about 30 feet too short. It was the same at the Sungshu fort, where they were equally foiled.

Meanwhile, the Japanese artillery reopened fire, and was bursting with astonishing rapidity and accuracy—as the changing circumstances demanded—round after round of shrapnel in valiant endeavour to assist the betrayed infantry. For the infantry had clearly been betrayed into a false sense of security, for the forts were now fully alive and answering with shell and shrapnel as if the continuous bombardment had been to them another kind of a dream. The general attack, now in full swing, was out of control as far as immediate touch with the commander-in-chief or divisional commanders were concerned, and things were in a horrible mess. Turned aside by the rifle fire of the enceinte, a party of attackers skirmished up toward the west battery of South Keekwan, and when they bunched up into a black target the Russians turned a couple of machine guns on them, and the result was ghastly.

Another instance. Up under the parapet of the South Keekwan fort a large party had mustered. They could not go forward on account of the rifle fire of the garrison, and to retire over the long glacis was to face the showers of lead from the southern batteries. In this dilemma the perplexed infantry were potted at from all manner of places by sharp-

shooters, and they soon found themselves (on account of the hopeless failure of other attacks) in a similar position to that occupied by the remnants of the 7th Regiment on the afternoon of the 23rd of August,—they had the enemy on three sides and a half, and the other half was the descent over a steep glacis alive with death. Very soon the Russians brought machine guns and quick-firers to bear on them, and, unable to stand the terrible punishment, the force became panic-stricken and bolted helter-skelter down the glacis. In their impetuosity they stumbled and fell over each other, and in this confusion were subjected to cruel shrapnelling. Some, indeed, caught by fragments of shells, pitched headlong down the glacis, and scores were mowed down before they could gain cover.

A mere handful of men of this regiment (12th) tenaciously held on, and kept the little flag flying, waiting for the situation to change. But the assault was practically over, and stopped after 50 minutes, for the hopelessness of continuing it was of course realised the moment the forts opened fire. For some time after, the Russians kept up a furious rifle and machine-gun fire by which they slaughtered the scattered assaulters. No supports were of

course used, and the isolated bands of Japanese had to break back to the Japanese lines as best they could. Another attack made on "P" fortification resulted in the capture of the position during the afternoon by the 35th Regiment, after no less than 300 casualties. Against Sungshu-shan a reconnaissance in force was carried out to get at the exact nature of the obstructive moat, and while they were demonstrating in force the Russians exploded a mine in the moat which, like the other attempt at wholesale slaughter, was a dismal failure.

Against North fort the fighting was subterranean, and resulted in the capture of a casemate of the caponiere gallery at a cost to the 22nd Regiment of over 50 casualties. But the heaviest losses were in the ranks of the eleventh division, and the 12th and 44th Regiments had 15 officers and 633 men wounded (not counting killed) in the short hour's fighting between "Q" fortification and South Keekwan.

Just before sunset a fire broke out in the New Town, and dense black clouds of smoke covered the western hills as the cannonade dwindled to spasmodic firing.

The night of the 30th of October was impenetrably dark, and the night air reeked with the smell of powder from the heavy cannonade

of the past four days. Like minute-guns on a storm-swept shore, a battery of howitzers plodded away in a careful manner at the Erhlung and Sungshu forts, while the fortress cannon on I-tzu-shan and Tiger's Tail were occasionally firing, and the answering shriek and crash of these shells bursting in the natural gloom came on the nerves with startling effect. One solitary searchlight for hours gleamed fitfully and motionless out of the blackness, like the lamp-light from a cottage window filtering across a barren moor.

Sheltered in a deep trench, between the Erhlung lunette and the Erhlung fort (waiting for the expected sorties), I could hear in the miles and miles of trenches around me the indistinct murmuring of the stretcher-bearers garnering in the harvest of wounded, and, as they drew nearer, the cautious voices of the ambulance men guiding the pitiful cavalcades to the dressing stations. The sights were enough to make brave men weep, so full of pathos were the instances of mutilation. Two comrades were limping painfully along with a bloodstained bandage held tightly between them. The one with the whole of his face smashed in and his eyesight destroyed, by a shell fragment, was being guided by the

other, wounded below the knee and just able to help his brother in misfortune to the hospital tent. But there were hundreds of others that darkness did not show in detail, for which the heart of a non-combatant could but be glad, for "one touch of nature makes the world akin," and this is true of wounded men of every army under the sun.

Under the friendly darkness, and behind the sheltering rays of a searchlight, a daring sortie was made about ten o'clock against "P" fortification, which resulted in its recapture by the Russians. Crawling out from the enceinte, a large party worked up around the Japanese, then throwing caution to the winds leapt at their foes with their bayonets. A wild *mêlée* followed, in which bullets and bayonets, swords, pistols, bombs, pieces of bomb-proof timber—everything, even hands and feet—were freely used. Men strangled each other in deliberate cold-bloodedness, and then, gathering fury from the growing lust for blood, like human tigers they killed each other for the delight of killing; and when there were but wounded or dead Japanese in the trenches, the Russians were masters for a time of a little hill-top. They were not masters long, for General Ichinohe put himself at the head of

the 35th Regiment, and with drawn sword stormed the hill. Inspired by his bravery, and the dashing way in which he hewed his own way with his good Samurai blade, they caught a little of his magnetism, and, nobly responding, recaptured the hill; but not before more than 300 men were out of action would the Muscovite relinquish the "little hill," afterwards known as Ichinohe hill or fort.

Elsewhere daring bands of Russians issued from the Erhlung and Sungshu forts and made a protracted and harassing attack until moonrise, while between the North fort and South Keekwan the Russians cleared the ground of the afternoon attackers.

Things had ended badly for the Japanese, and there had been so many surprises that the next day the countenances (that barometer of the soul) of many Japanese officers of the general staff were "stormy," to put it meteorologically.

Comments on the Second Assault.

There are many reasons why the second assault failed, and I will enumerate them. First, the concrete vitals of the forts having withstood all the impacts of the Japanese

artillery bombardments with 28-centimetre howitzers.

(The artillery commander had evidently convinced himself that gaps of sufficient size had been created in the defence to allow of the passage of the infantry, and that the interior defences had been reduced to a pile of ruins, for no less than eighteen hundred 28-centimetre shells alone were fired on the morning of the 30th, and thousands of others; the day's bombardment costing £40,000 sterling, and representing 20 per cent. of the total cost of the artillery expenditure (exclusive of field artillery) for the siege to that date, so there was some reason for his belief.)

Secondly, the depth and width of the moats.

Thirdly, the unexpected, almost incredible, activity of the Russian gunners when the attack opened.

These were the chief reasons of the failure, which was saved from being a disaster by the prompt cessation of operations; for although six regiments were engaged, not all emerged from cover, and the attacks were so manipulated that no supports were prematurely used, and this saved the casualty list from being doubled. The losses in wounded (we were unable to obtain accurate figures of killed) as

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given by the hospital authorities were as follows :—

October	26th.	27th.	28th.	29th.	30th.
FIRST DIVISION (2nd Regiment).					
Officers	4	1	2	..	9
Men	82	26	69	33	173
NINTH DIVISION (19th, 36th, and 35th Regiments).					
Officers	3	4	8
Men	199	110	33	51	316
ELEVENTH DIVISION (22nd, 44th, and 12th Regiments).					
Officers	15
Men	14	13	11	..	633
SUNDRY.					
Officers	1	3	1
Men	10	19
Total. . . .	313	157	115	84	1174

(To these figures must be added October 31, 174.)

Of course there must be added many more casualties for the sorties on the nights of 26th and 30th, and the sum-total of wounded for the second assault reached almost 2500, and to estimate the total killed and wounded at under 4000 will be giving the Japanese the benefit of the doubt.

Furthermore, the second assault differed in one great feature from any other attacks, for on the 30th of October six assaults were simultaneously delivered from widely separated points, and although at four of these points the infantry had but a few yards to go, in the other two cases they were compelled to swarm over a long glacis, and here the casualties were terrible. (The 12th and 44th losing from 500 to 600 men in the first thirty minutes of the assault.)

Despite the fact that the saps were insufficiently close up against the South Keekwan and "Q" fortification, the infantry of the left wing of the eleventh division were called upon to co-operate in the assault, and they were the chief sufferers. The position had been shelled continuously since the 27th, and the culminating fire was never again approached for intensity, for the simple reason that its effect was shown to have been valueless to the infantry, who were shrapnelled by the Russian gunners immediately they left cover. Perhaps the attack ought to have failed as an object-lesson to the Japanese general staff, for no "object" it might have gained was at all possible from the method of the attack. For instance, ladders had been constructed 30

feet long to cross moats (it is presumed) that were 40 feet deep, and at least that distance in width,—and moats that were defended by caponiere galleries it must be remembered. How these ladders were to be used it is not easy to understand. If to bridge the moat, they were too short and frail, and if they were intended to have been placed in the moat to scale the escarpment, it was, to put it mildly, “a mad idea.” Once a ladder was manned the climbers would have been annihilated by rifle and machine-gun fire from the loopholes of the caponiere casemates. What other use they might have been put to could not be disclosed either by diligent inquiry or observation ; in fact, it was not wise to press the point in conversation.

As a reconnaissance in force the assault was a great success, for it completely unmasked the strength of the position attacked ; but as this could have been made with much less sacrifice, the casualties of the afternoon of the 30th of October were out of all proportion to the benefits derived. I criticise harshly, and with some spirit, for there was a continuance of this impetuosity that sacrificed unnecessary lives ; and, later, two regiments were withdrawn from the firing line, and sent into

reserve (after being reduced to mere skeleton regiments), when a little less impetuosity would have restored to them their confidence, and allowed them to hold their nobly-won positions without the humiliation of premature dismissals and withdrawals. The persistency of the introduction of field tactics into the siege operations was only equalled by the determination to demonstrate to the world that Japanese infantry are irresistible machines, and, contributing to a different result, proved that they were mortal. No words of mine can hope to do justice to the calm devotion and courage displayed by the officers and men under arms of the Third Japanese Army during the periods of obligatory self-sacrifice imposed upon them by an adamant-willed staff, who were willing to make any sacrifice themselves and demanded it daily of their subordinates. They took great risks because they had much at stake, and they knew the value of the Third Army to Oyama, and, like another great commander, on more than one occasion they put the blind eye to the telescope, for great men may do things that small men must not dream about. The staff were equally as surprised as the artillery-men at the result of the bombardment, and they

immediately checked the assault as far as they were able ; but this does not explain the reason of the South Keekwan assault, or the probable use of the bamboo ladders. This latter puzzle needs the maximum of explanation to reduce it to a minimum of understanding—to those, at least, who witnessed the events of the 30th of October.

CHAPTER XI

BREACHING THE DEFENCES OF THE FORTS

Sapping and mining operations leading up to the destruction of the caponiere galleries of the Erhlung and Sungshu forts—Russian counter-mining—Underground fighting at the North fort of East Keekwan—Preparation for the third assault, November 26, 1904—The fight for Tragedy Trench.

AFTER the failure to cross the moats with bamboo ladders it was wisely decided to blast the caponiere galleries of the Erhlung and Sungshu forts, and tumble them into the moats.¹ At the North fort (of East Keekwan) it was not necessary to blast the wall of the caponiere gallery, for the Russians, in their countermining operations against the Japanese shaft, created a breach in the wall (at the time they destroyed the Japanese shaft), and by enlarging this breach the Japanese were enabled to effect an entrance from the exterior. This they did on the 30th of October, and then followed a bloody month of subterranean fighting of

¹ The method of procedure at the two forts was similar, and is given in detail.

the most horrible nature, until the 26th of November, when the entire gallery was captured. The fort was, however, held by the garrison until the 18th of December, when the utterly demolished work was captured by the Japanese, that is nearly two months after getting in actual touch with the exterior defences. To cope with the extra work the Japanese engineers were reinforced, and their strength brought up to nine companies, while extra sappers (trained on the spot) were added to the divisions. Winter quarters were prepared (semi-dugouts, with canvas roofs), and winter equipment, consisting of woollen socks, sweaters, and underwear (of excellent and durable quality), woollen gloves and mittens, and blanket-overcoats with long sleeves and detachable hoods, besides heavy winter boots, were issued. Great quantities of wood and charcoal were sent up into the firing line; and the troops, with excellent rations, were made comfortable while the engineers and sappers were eating their way into the vitals of the forts. The conduct of officers and men during this period was characterised by extreme morality and an unflinching, uncomplaining devotion to every detail of their duty. The abstemious lives they led in their cold, cheerless bivouacs, without

a hint of luxury, were in keeping with the frugal lives they had lived in their native land, which so eminently befitted them to be as good soldiers in the firing line as they were in the less exciting and more exacting days of quiet. There was a total absence of snivelling and criticism of superiors, and a quiet, Crusader spirit permeated all ranks. Continually under the carping lash of newspaper criticism,—for the Japanese had but a faint idea of what the Third Army was suffering, and there was always a mild tinge of reproach in the articles, that seemed almost a sneer, “that the fall of Port Arthur was not an accomplished fact,”—under the sting of this—for every Japanese Tommy can read and understand, and papers were all too numerous in the dreary saps—they were silent, a silence eloquent of disappointment that their sacrifice was as “pearls to swine.” To convey some idea of the feelings of the men of the Third Army during this trying period, it must be remembered that they became so desirous of catering to the public appetite that if their discipline had not counter-poised their ardour they might have committed more than the obligatory self-sacrifice imposed by the general staff. The whole thing was full of pathos. They

knew almost too well that Port Arthur could not be stormed, yet there were relapses which compelled one to conclude that the spirit of Bushido is not scientific, and cares as much for the modern defensive capabilities and resources which the training of the laboratory supply as the older Samurai did for arrows.

Breaching of the Defences of the Erhlung and Sungshu Forts.

When I was allowed to crawl up the saps and examine the sapping and mining against these forts, I saw the hair of the heads of some men sitting in a hole in the rock calmly chiselling away at the rock, while a party of infantrymen, with buckets of water and bamboo screens, were catching grenades, or putting out fires caused by these grenades falling among the tier of sandbags that afforded the almost hidden miners shelter from the garrison of the forts. Had a shell or a grenade by any chance fallen into the shaft the men would have met horrible deaths, but they seemed quite cheerful, even if they looked tired and dusty. Three of these man-shafts were sunk down the inner glacis of the Erhlung fort, immediately above the counterscarp of the moat. The work was slow and tedious, as

every inch had to be chiselled out of hard rock, and the shafts were down 60 feet before the level of the moat was reached. Despite grenade throwing and counter-mining the three shafts were completed by the 19th of November, and the next day at 10 a.m. (being fully primed with dynamite charges and filled in) they were electrically exploded. The two shafts at the east end were very successful, and the right half of the moat was filled in with tons of rock and concrete to within 6 feet of the parapet; but for some reason the other charge did not do satisfactory work, failing to completely destroy the counterscarp of the moat, and after the explosion there remained a space of over 18 feet between the top of the débris and the edge of the parapet. During the afternoon three scouts were sent out over the débris to reconnoitre the position at the east end of the moat. Crawling through the rubbish, they scaled the counterscarp, and got within touch of the sandbags topping the parapet defence. After carefully surveying the ground they approached the trenches, but being discovered by the Russians at the other end were forced to beat a hasty retreat. A reconnaissance in force was then decided on, and at five o'clock in the afternoon an officer,

accompanied by twenty infantry-men and five pioneers armed with grenades, started out. The Russians, alarmed by the appearance of the three scouts, were on the alert, and fusiladed them with rapid volleys, which caused the party of reconnoitrers to retire precipitously. Evidently not desiring to take any chances, I-tzu-shan and other proximate batteries shelled the Japanese lines, while two squads of reserves—a party of 50 from the direction of Wantai, and another party of about a company from the general reserves at Port Arthur—were soon doubling up to the support of the fort.

The Japanese artillery shelled these supports, and for a few minutes there was a lively duel, but the total casualties that day for the Japanese was only 30, so little resulted from the expenditure of Russian ammunition. The result of the reconnaissance was to disclose the fact that there had been no gallery in the central front of the moat, but only at the corners of the flanks. So, very little was known at this stage of the siege of the vital construction of the forts (despite the stories of Japanese officers acting as barbers, etc., in Port Arthur during their construction); in fact the number of genuine surprises were more than we had before successfully crossing the Tugela.

Sungshu Fort.

Seven shafts were sunk down the glacis of the Sungshu fort by the same method as at the Erhlung, except that they were inlet in two rows. Four of these shafts when sunk down 12 feet (from the level of the edge of the counterscarp of the moat) came in contact with the concrete roof of the caponiere gallery. They were then diverged outward parallel to the top of the roof, and when the outer wall of the gallery was reached they were sapped down parallel to it. These four shafts had been sunk equidistant along the glacis, and were now intermediated by three direct shafts, which when completed gave the engineers seven shafts with their floors in a straight line at the root of the outer wall of the gallery they desired to destroy. The "roots" were then connected by manholes, and a long narrow tunnel thus made along the base of the gallery. The work was completed by the 16th of November, and the charges laid and preparations for dynamiting finished that night. The following day at 3 p.m. the several mines were simultaneously electrically fired, and a dull report was followed by a great upheaval of rock and concrete, mingling in a dense column

of whitish smoke. On examination of the work it was found that the left half of the gallery had been completely demolished, but the right half, withstanding the explosion, remained intact save for a small breach in the roof of the caponiere, and the force of the explosion had also demolished part of the Japanese saps. For the next couple of days the Japanese were busily engaged rebuilding the saps and clearing a passage across the moat. By the 23rd a covered passage had been constructed across the left half of the moat, and across the other end a wooden trestle causeway was made, which was, however, soon demolished by the fire of a couple of 15-centimetre guns mounted in the west of the fort. To further impede the Japanese the Russians mounted a 47-mm. gun in a position to fire directly at the covered way across the moat. However, during the night of the 23rd a few daring scouts crept up to where the gun had been mounted with the intention of destroying it, but finding the Russians asleep, and the gun tools lying handy, decided to steal it instead. Quietly taking it to pieces they handed down the parts, and succeeded in stealing it before the Russians awakened.


*Subterranean warfare, the underground fighting
for the Caponiere Gallery of the North
Fort.*

On the 23rd of November the captured section of the caponiere gallery of the North fort was as dismal a place as you could ever wish to get into. All around the dark interior of the gallery men could be dimly seen crouching with rifle in hand. Frequently hoarse shouts rang out, followed immediately by the crash of a bursting grenade. Groping my way (a major of the 22nd Regiment was with me) into the first casemate, I had my first glimpse of a destroyed caponiere gallery. The walls, constructed of pebbles, sand, and cement, conglomerated together, were over 3 feet thick, and now shattered and broken fragments were everywhere underfoot, and a choking dust from the demolished walls filled the stifling, powder-reeking air. The chamber we had entered (one of eight that casemated the central front of the gallery) was about 30 feet long, 6 feet wide, and rather more than 8 feet high.

In the wall facing the moat was an oblong loophole, through which the nozzle of a Japanese machine gun was stuck.


The width of the gallery itself, from wall to wall, was over 9 feet, and the open space between the casemate and the outer wall—3 feet—was arched over from the wall of the gallery to the wall of the casemates, which were not chambers, but a series of compartments formed by partition walls of concrete built out at right angles to the moat wall of the gallery. Thus there extended along the entire length of the interior of the gallery an open passage scarcely more than 3 feet wide. It was along this passage that the Japanese had crept, and by fierce hand-to-hand encounters driven the Russians slowly out of each partition. The partitions or casemates were not all of the same size, but uniform in construction; and the caponiere proper of the gallery originally consisted of a square porch, and a stout steel door opening at right angles to the moat. It was at this time in an advanced stage of demolition, the massive door off its hinges, and the framework of concrete and steel twisted and broken by the use of dynamite.

Passing along the gallery, the destruction was terrible; the arches and partition walls tumbled in every direction, and segments of shells, empty cartridges, broken rifles with twisted barrels, and tattered remains of uniforms



PORTION OF THE CONCRETE WALL OF THE DEMOLISHED CAPONIERE GALLERY OF THE
NORTH FORT OF EAST KEBKWAN.

(Copyright Photo by J. Rosenthal, of the Cuarcas Urban Trading Co., Ltd.)



and sandbags everywhere padded the floor. At every loophole crouched a couple of Tommies continually sniping at the parapet, from which a stream of grenades was for ever flowing, for at this time a couple of pioneers were across the moat, and after cutting their way into the rock of the escarpment were now out of sight underpinning the parapet, and for this reason the garrison were hurling grenades as a token of their disgust.

Leaving the front section of the caponiere gallery, we came to the right flank. Here it was different. All was dark save where a streak of light filtered through a breach in the moat wall. The major hurried me across, and then informed me that the Russians were a few feet down the gallery, behind a wall of sandbags constructed across the passage close to the ray of light. (It is cheerful to be informed that you are the target of a score of rifles hidden behind sandbags, but it was only a little way the Japanese had of illustrating the truth of the saying "where there is no fear there is no danger"; personally, I don't believe that.) Returning to the bomb-proof of the 22nd Regiment, the major took down his diary and gave me the following story of the capture of the caponiere gallery.

After sapping up the slope of the hill and getting to within 43 metres of the moat of the North fort, the engineers considered it expedient to tunnel in the rest of the distance. This was about the 20th of October; and while thus engaged, three days later, about noon, a strong smell of coal-tar warned the sappers that they were in the vicinity of a Russian counter-mine. Search was made, and an opening found in the Japanese shaft some 32 metres from the entrance of the tunnel (leading in from the sixth parallel), and on examination of the hole (which was 10 centimetres by 10 centimetres), it was proved beyond doubt that a counter-mining shaft had been located. It then became necessary to find, and if possible remove, the explosive material set by the Russians for their destruction. This dangerous task was entrusted to a party of six volunteers from the Imperial engineering battalion, who set out shortly after one o'clock; and half an hour later a violent explosion, followed by a great upheaval of rock and earth, announced that the party had fallen in with the Russian mine. Three of the volunteers, severely wounded, were hauled out of the crater by ropes attached to their heels for that purpose, the others perishing in the execution of their

duty. This explosion demolished the greater part of the Japanese tunnel, and at the same time the ground was split in the neighbourhood of the wall sufficiently to allow a passage being easily made up to the concrete wall which was smeared thickly with a coating of tar, and covered on the outside by heavy tarpaulin sheets.

A small rent had been made in the wall by the force of the explosion, and after several ineffectual attempts a large quantity of gun-cotton was exploded under the wall, and a breach one metre high by one and a half wide through the concrete wall made. Through this hole a dozen grenades were thrown, and under cover of the smoke and confusion some fifty infantry-men filed in, and occupied the first casemate. Sandbags were hastily thrown in, and a wall of these made across the passage between the wall and the partition wall of the casemate. On the 30th October another couple of casemates were occupied after a bloody fight in the darkness.

The Russians retired into the fourth casemate, and, from behind a wall of steel plates and sandbags at the right flank, opened fire with a field and a machine gun. In the narrow passage the shells of the field gun completely

commanded the situation, and the Japanese had to cut through the partition wall to make progress. For a time matters were at a standstill until a mountain gun was brought into action by the Japanese, and a terrific underground duel took place between it and the Russian field gun. The sappers in the meantime were engaged in tunnelling around to the right flank, and the Russians getting wind of it commenced counter-mining, and on the 19th of November exploded their mine, which, although harmless to the Japanese saps, destroyed a portion of the wall of the flank chamber. Quickly running out their tunnel, the Japanese applied gun-cotton, and enlarged the breach sufficiently to allow a fieldpiece sweep the chamber and force the Russian gun out of action. Thus enfiladed, the Russians retired down the flank chamber, and about 100 feet from the breach threw up a thick wall of sandbags. The Japanese sneaked up and occupied all the central casemates, and on the morning of the 21st of November five pioneers were sent out of the porch into the moat, and, carefully measuring their way, reached a point opposite to the sand-bagged obstruction inside the gallery. These men set to work chiselling at the wall, and soon

made holes in which they fixed charges of gun-cotton. At the same time (as they were chiselling on the outside) five infantrymen were ordered to dislodge the Russians from the sandbags simultaneously with the explosion.

These infantrymen hit upon a novel scheme. One man crawled into the chamber on his stomach, pushing in front of him a sandbag, then he turned over on his back. A second sandbag was thrown at his feet, and another pioneer wriggled in after it. The first man was now in the centre of the chamber, and silence was necessary, so, drawing his feet aside, he allowed the second man wriggle his sandbag up, then bracing his feet against this sandbag, which was now between his feet and the other's head, he pushed himself nearer the sand-bagged wall. In this manner the five men silently entered the chamber and lay almost breathlessly waiting for the explosion. The instant this took place they leapt up, and, while grenades were being thrown through the breach, they occupied the sandbag wall before the Russians recovered from the surprise of the explosion. Thus the 100 feet of chamber changed hands, but the Russians had a plentiful supply of sandbags at hand,

and immediately threw up another wall across the chamber. After that, grenades were freely thrown backwards and forwards and rifle fire exchanged at random. This was the position at the fort on the afternoon of the 23rd of November, and of course the whole fort, with the exception of the three-quarters of the caponiere gallery, was still Russian. A frontal attack was made on this fort during the first assault, and it may well appear that it was a little premature at that date.

Tragedy Trench.

The first preliminary fight in November occurred during the night of the 23rd, when the 12th Regiment attacked the glacis trenches of the South Keekwan. The Japanese saps were then a bare 30 yards from the Russian trench, and at six o'clock, just at dusk, the 12th assaulted. What followed was tragedy. A spurting line of fire and a furious volley, then another and another, and the air was sobbing with human cries, and the 30 yards was strewn with wounded and dead. In the grey twilight the hovering clouds of shrapnel were scarcely noticeable, but the cracking of the shrapnel cases was like the lash of a thousand whips. Bullets sizzled in the air, shells crashed

in every direction, and between the 30 yards the 12th ranks were rapidly thinned. They retired, beaten but not defeated. Again they charged, and again they were volleyed at, at less than 30 yards; but their impetuosity carried them on, and they gained the trench and entered it. A meeting of rival devils would be peaceable compared to the *mêlée* that won a few yards of the trench and then lost it for the 12th Regiment, for they were forced out at the cold glittering point of the bayonet. Re-forming again in their parallel, they again stormed the trench, and in an hour were again masters of a few yards in the centre of the trench line. Again for the second time they were butchered out by the garrison. With redoubled fury they left the parallel for the third time, and were soon for the third time masters of the centre of the trench. The garrison waited a while, then resumed the fight with grenades and bayonets, and, closing in on the Japanese from either side, for the third time the 12th were cut out of the trench, and dawn found the Russians holding their own. The intervening 30 yards was black with bodies, and they said there had been over 300 casualties on the Japanese side—how many more than 300 the hospital general did not

CHAPTER XII

THE THIRD ASSAULT ON PORT ARTHUR, NOVEMBER 26, 1904

Tragedy—Grenades and high explosive shells—Victory of the bayonet over artillery—Wonderful defensive arrangements of the garrison—Failure of General Nakamura to dislocate the defences and capture Sungshu fort in reverse—Terrible death-roll—Comments on the failure of the third assault.

THE third assault on Port Arthur was a ghastly tragedy. The former assaults by comparison were skirmishes, mere preludes to the tragedy. All morning on the 26th the artillery maintained a slow fire with hundreds of cannon, and a few minutes before one o'clock opened up with a widespread shrapnel fire, and then the infantry emerged from cover and crossed the few yards that separated them from the Russian bayonets. Hardly had the first assaulters commenced to swarm up the escarpments of the three forts (Erhlung, Sungshu, and North fort) than the musketry fire became deafening. So quickly do these attacks develop that before you are quite aware of the fact

thousands of men have left cover and are fighting.

On the bare slopes of the South Keekwan the patch of 30 yards between the two "gashes" that represented the belligerent trenches was soon mottled with men, who every second appeared to be falling like logs, for from the higher "gash" there was a continuous spurting of rifles. Men were already falling back from the parapets, and many tumbling into the moats. There was a bewildering play of bayonets, rapid movement of thousands of rifles, and myriads of tiny flashes from the shattering grenades. A hideous chortling of machine guns and weird knocking of many pom-poms, then distinct volleying, and the Japanese retiring in swarms. The first onslaught gave no return but dead, and frenzied men with half a dozen bayonet wounds were drilled through and through with rifle bullets discharged at a foot's distance, and those bodies rolled heavily into the moats.

But this form of killing was more merciful than the hideous disfigurement of the dynamite grenades, that were used with the most effect by the defenders. Yet thus far only a few minutes had elapsed, and many bands were still picking their way toward the Chinese wall.

Then came horrible instances of great shells and shrapnel bursting among a dozen men or so, and when the smoke lifted you could see two or three running away; the others, blown to fragments, were scattered about the ground. I watched a party of men led by an officer. They dashed onward at a great speed, then appeared to halt for breath, then started off again; then the bands thinned, and the officer was underfoot. The men rushed on, and in a few minutes were tearing and being torn up with bayonets. Not one returned. This went on everywhere, and the watchword was simply "kill, kill, kill." A crimson-and-white flag fluttered for a few minutes between the fatal 30 yards, then moved slowly up to the Tragedy Trench. It fell half a dozen times before it was finally planted by the side of the trench. Then more and more slaughter with bayonets.

Behind the North fort there was a remarkable incident that afternoon. General Krondrachenko was determined that the fort should be held or the garrison perish, and had posted sharpshooters in the rear of the fort with orders to shoot any of the garrison seeking to desert their post. After the first rush of the Japanese two or three Russians rushed out of the fort and attempted to cross the wooden bridge

leading out across the moat. They were instantly shot. With death on every hand, the garrison, whose only safety was in being able to kill all that entered, became like wild animals.

Thrice the Japanese recoiled from the blood-stained parapets broken and beaten, then, returning with terrible fury, won the parapet rifle pits, and effected an entrance into the forts of Erhlung and Sungshu.

Subsequent encounters were ghastly to the verge of madness, and battalions of Japanese withered away like feathers in a flame, their files shattered by grenades and the interior space heaped with their cruelly mutilated bodies. Bayonets and rifles were smashed in the wild frenzy of the *mêlée*, and men torn and lacerated by bayonets were blown to atoms by the dynamite grenades. Weaponless men, bleeding and well-nigh crazy with pain, closed with each other, and in death embrace added their bodies to the tiers that now filled the passages in the forts.

Men struggled on, buoyed up with the hope that the Russians would yield—but they could not, for they dare not; and they would not, for they had become madmen frenzied with the lust for blood. They in their turn rushed the

Japanese holding their vacated trenches, and added their bodies to the piles that impassably filled the pits. Before four o'clock fresh battalions were sent into the firing line, and the Japanese, reinforced at every point, restormed and restormed the forts until they were a veritable shambles of human beings, and at twilight in the east another act was added to the tragedy as the Russians bayoneted and bayoneted until they were again masters of the Tragedy Trench.

After darkness there was a wonderful picture beneath the starlit heavens—the moon not yet up, and the outlines of the hills hidden behind a mantle of darkness. The Japanese lighted flares to guide their artillery, and these lights dotted the hidden hills in a dozen places. And as the night grew and the searchlights gleamed in six separate places, the work of killing was resumed. Star-shells burst high in the air, soaring up almost perpendicularly from the forts; and, as they flooded space with tiny twinkling lights, there came flashes in the gloom; and as the boom of the cannon came across the valley, there was a crash of a bursting shell close to where the phosphorous lights were glittering on the ground. That night three searchlights were converged

on the Dragon Hills, and across the yellow light shells burst in rapid rotation : now high, now low ; now Japanese, now Russian ; for the one was shelling the rear of the fort, while the other shelled the parapet, where Bengal lights were guiding the Japanese artillery.


And amid this hail of shot and shell the horrible tragedy of the afternoon was reacted. The Tragedy Trench passed into Japanese hands for the fifth time. North fort was re-entered, and fighting went on until the interior was so filled with dead and dying that men could neither come nor go save over comrades' bodies. Then there came a time of rest and quiet.


Not so at the Erhlung and Sungshu forts. There the Japanese fought on, for they were expecting aid that was to turn the Sungshu on the left flank and take the garrison in reverse ; for 2000 volunteers under General Nakamura were then filing through the Sueishi lunettes and working down the valley to envelop the Sungshu from the south-west.

A searchlight flitting over the valley unmasked the envelopers and commenced to work violently up and down the sky, signalling the new menace to the garrison. Suddenly the light was extinguished, and the daring

2000 continued to grope their way along the edge of the railway. However, the "defence machine" was already at work, and reserves had been massed on the west of Sungshu to support the garrison. The Japanese were allowed to press hotly up the slopes and get within pistol-shot before the supports greeted them with volleys, and from the supporting fort of Sung-shu-shan (the existence of which was not known till that night) opened a regular cloud-burst of shell fire, and the force of envelopers, soon reduced to half their numbers, scattered down the slopes, and beat a hasty retreat. General Nakamura, severely wounded, with his decimated force regained the Japanese lines. A thousand casualties was given out officially as the result of this attempt to dislocate the defence, and this number was well under the mark.

Regardless of life, the Japanese infantry went on with their storming, and, after being four times repulsed that night, the remnants of officerless battalions hewed their way out of the forts, and sought the shelter of their parallels. Westward an attempt was made to find a weak spot in the defence, but General Krondrachenko's defensive arrangements were wonderfully executed, and at all points a





JAPANESE EMERGENCY BURIAL GROUND CLOSE TO SIEGE PARALLELS.

(Copyright Photo by J. Rosenthal, of the Charles Urban Trading Co., Ltd.)

stubborn resistance was offered. Before dawn the Russians counter-bayoneted the Japanese out of Tragedy Trench for the fifth time, and were again masters of their own. And so all the sacrifice at the altar of Mars was unavailing, and no fort changed hands. No one would state the actual casualties, but in the hospitals there were 208 officers and 5933 wounded men on the night of the 27th November; but the dead were not then computed, for hundreds were in the forts and could not be recovered. And, as if to hide the scene from the glare of daylight, there drifted from over sea a heavy mist, that, enveloping the forts, hid them from inquisitive eyes. The artillery fitfully fired a few shots at the hidden ramparts, and the day slipped sadly and quietly by, and night was with us before we became accustomed to the ominous silence—the silence of sorrow. It was a pause in a hideous tragedy, and the end was not yet.

*Comments on the Failure of the Third Assault,
November 26.*

To find the strength of the exterior defences of the forts, the Japanese paid a heavy price, and the price they paid to test the strength of the interior arrangements was out of all

proportion to the knowledge gained. It was to be expected that forts so well constructed exteriorly would have some care bestowed on their interior defence, and even the semi-completed forts of the Russians were not lacking in the elementary defences of modern fortifications, and were prepared for the entering of assaulters. It was evident, and forcibly demonstrated as the siege progressed, that the Russians were holding their works with but little daily casualty from the bombardments of the heaviest Japanese cannon, and on the 30th of October this was thoroughly brought out, for after that terrific bombardment, the forts were instantly manned and shrapnelling the assaulters as soon as they developed their attack. In the concreted barracks and caponiere galleries these Russians had been sheltering in absolute immunity from shell fire during the entire bombardment, and were only called out at the very last moment.

In the fort rifle pits they no doubt suffered heavily that day, but the Japanese artillery was not successful in silencing the forts or garrison at the supreme moment. So it happened that on the 26th of November (no great artillery fire was played over the fortifications before developing the attack), when the first

batch of Japanese left cover, the concreted gun-stands and numerous bomb-proof shelters for gunners, etc., were soon manned by the Russians; and even after the Japanese drove the Russians out of the parapet defence, they could make no headway against the sand-bagged traverses in the body of the fort.

Something had to be done, and in retaliation 203 Metre Hill was ordered to be attacked, although the sappers were not yet ready to give way to the infantry. But it had to be done, and in co-operation with the untried but celebrated fighting seventh division of Hokkaido, the first division attacked the great western semi-permanent. Much has been written of the first division's frontal attack at Nanshan, but the same division delivered a series of frontal attacks against 203, which make the words "pluck" and "bravery" totally inadequate to apply to the heroic nature of the work here done by the heroes of Nanshan and the untried battalions from Hokkaido. The attack commenced on the night of the 27th of November, after the failure of the third assault, and, continuing until the 5th of December, affords a vivid story of hill fighting with small grenades and 500 lb. shells.

CHAPTER XIII

CAPTURE OF 203 METRE HILL, DECEMBER 5, 1904

Ten days' sanguinary fighting—Revolting destruction by high explosives—Twelve thousand casualties for assault and defence of a single hill—Destruction of the fleet—Lack of Japanese naval co-operation during the fight for 203 Metre Hill.

"THE number of killed and wounded in a battle do not determine its importance," but they certainly determine its horror. And the hill "203 metres in height," the strongest of the western semi-permanents forming the outer defences of Port Arthur, was only occupied by the Japanese after the most sanguinary reiterated assaults, which resulted in over 8000 killed and wounded, while the Russian losses were no less than 4500. Thus for a single hill 12,500 casualties were recorded, and in no solitary instance in the history of the world was so much horror contracted into so small a space, for the revolting destruction wrought by dynamite bombs and high explosive shells

was never more hideously exemplified than at the battle of 203 Metre Hill. The corpses of the belligerents—and there were over 2000 of these on the hillside the day I visited the hill—were mostly denuded of their clothing, scorched, deformed, and defaced beyond recognition, and in the trenches there was a pulp of mutilated humanity. The sight of those trenches heaped up with arms and legs and dismembered bodies all mixed together and then frozen into compact masses, the expressions on the faces of the scattered heads of decapitated bodies, the stupendous magnitude of the concentrated horror, impressed itself indelibly into the utmost recesses of my unaccustomed brain—there to remain and ever remirror itself in my eyes, and shame me for my very callousness that I did ever look on it.

What man has done, man will do again, and human shambles will not be confined to this solitary instance, although they may never exceed its greatness.

Fully realising the importance of the hill, advantage was taken of its isolated position and natural strength, and the great care bestowed on its fortification made it formidably strong. The twin peaks of the hill were capped with guns, while a cobweb of entanglements

irregularly fenced in a double line of encircling bomb-proof trenches, that for a time baffled even the destructive tendencies of the 28-centimetre shells. The resistance that the "defenders" opposed to the former assault (20th September) was of the deepest importance to the invested; for although the fleet had been bombarded on several occasions, without a good reliable observation point it was not possible to direct a continuous fire with the required accuracy to reward the great expenditure of ammunition, and "203" was the observation point required. From its summit the waters of the harbour—even the nooks and crannies affording slim torpedoers haven—were laid bare. Of course it must not be forgotten that a balloon such as the Japanese used during September was the ideal observatory, and why it was not used for the purpose of directing the artillery park against the fleet is as difficult to understand as the probable use of the bamboo ladders. Be this as it may—and there were undoubtedly excellent reasons why a balloon was not used—it was necessary to capture 203 for reasons purely military.

North-west of Pigeon Bay, the highest peak in a tumbling range, 203 Metre Hill, destitute of timber, with but here and there an out-

cropping boulder, rises steeply from the gully separating it from 174 Metre. At one time one of the peaks was 210 metres high, but at this date (November 27) the peaks were twins in height, and northward the escarpment of the hill dipped 100 feet or so, and then rose again and formed another knoll or height that was named by the Japanese Akasaka-yama. Akasaka-yama, dependent on the dominant height of 203, and about 160 metres in height, was defended by infantry galleries.

Three sets of parallels had been sapped against this position—two against 203 and one against Akasaka-yama. A distance of about 30 yards separated the western of the parallels from the second line of trenches on 203, but the centre parallel was over 50 yards away and that against Akasaka-yama perhaps a little greater distance. The artillery on 203 was put out of action a week or so before the third assault and the trenches somewhat battered in, but the natural obstacle supported by the western fortress fire was something to ponder over. The sappers had not finished their work on the 27th of November, but the attack opened that night.

Three regiments were engaged: 15th Regi-

ment, the right wing (western parallel); 1st Regiment, centre; and the 38th Regiment, second reserves, Akasaka-yama.

Under cover of darkness (night, 27th November) the Japanese delivered a vigorous frontal attack, and the vehemence of the assault won for them the crest of 203. However, the hill was not to be so easily captured, for the Russians were quickly reinforced, reformed, and in action with a counter-attack, by which, with the free use of grenades, they resumed occupation of the crest.

Then ensued a fierce bayoneting and cruel hand-grenading, and in the bewildering darkness the Japanese were forced out of the trenches and compelled to retire to their parallels. For the confusion attendant on night assaulting was all in favour of the Russians and against the Japanese, compelled to fight with every disadvantage of the ground to contend with. Undismayed by the carnage, the 1st and 15th Regiments restormed the hill at 8.30 a.m. on the 28th, and won a portion of the lower trenches. Then the batteries of the dominating forts came into action, and scores of shells burst in rapid confusion among the few Japanese lodged in the lower trenches, maiming and creating such havoc among them that before

noon the few living were compelled to retire.

Ten minutes later the hill was restormed and a section of the trenches occupied, but under the decimating fire from the forts and the enfilading volleys from Akasaka-yama they were again obliged to evacuate. At three in the afternoon a fresh assault was made in the face of a devastating fire of rifle, shell, shrapnel, and grenade. With deliberate ferocity the whole line swarmed up the steep glacis in the face of a shower of shot and shell that mowed columns down as they became entangled in the impenetrable hedges of wire; but forcing down all opposition, human and mechanical, they were soon in possession of the crest and hand to hand in the game of "kill." The forts, never silent, plied in round after round directly their own men were clear, and, subjected to never-ceasing salvoes of artillery, the hill was rendered untenable, and by 7 p.m. the shelling had won it back for the besieged.

At 8.30 a.m. on the 29th Akasaka-yama was attacked by the 38th Regiment, who were repulsed with heavy loss. Meanwhile the 26th, 27th, and 28th Regiments of the seventh division had arrived to co-operate in the fight.

These men were filed into the narrow passages,

now reeking with blood, and in which lay the mangled bodies of the recovered wounded—and the men of the seventh division had not yet had their baptism of fire.

The hill was now a terrible sight. The hill-side was black with the slain, and, so accurate had been the alternating bombardment, the trenches were battered beyond belief. Coverings of timber, rails, and steel plates had been wrenched away, and not a single loophole could be seen, for the sides had been smashed in and the whole trench laid bare. And in the trench among the smouldering timbers Russian riflemen were crouching, using for breastworks the corpses of the slain.

Again Akasaka-yama was stormed, but no sooner had the pent-up masses of men whirled into action and exposed their lives on the glacis than a deadly cross fire was poured into them. The fresh men of the seventh division went up full of hope, scaling the glacis with a dash that carried a good force up in spite of the decimating fire. But it was a hopeless task, and not even the extreme valour of those willing men could force down the opposition, although they fought on desperately among growing heaps of dying in a living sea of destruction, till, broken and crushed, the remnants

of battalions retired to seek shelter from the infernal slaughter that literally deluged the hill with blood.

Again at evening, when it was dark, amid deadly chaos the hill was attacked and the crest of Akasaka-yama captured. All through the dark hours of night they held grimly on to the fruits of their soldierly prowess, till midnight, when the continuous shelling forced them to relinquish the trench or accept certain annihilation, and they retired over the heaps of dead and wounded. Dawn of the 30th of November found the whole position securely held by the Russians.

Throughout the day the position was in the hands of the Russians, but at 2 p.m. a regiment of mixed battalions drawn from the seventh and first divisions reattacked Akasaka-yama.

Though in the main this attack was unsuccessful, a small party of Japanese managed to establish themselves in the centre of a trench below the crest of Akasaka-yama. When they had thrown up head cover they were suddenly counter-attacked by a party of Russians, not more than half a company, who, evidently under the impression that the whole attack had been repulsed and that this particular trench was unoccupied by either side, blindly

rushed up to the very point of the Japanese bayonets. Then the Japanese opened fire, and, realising that to retire would be to get shot in the back, the Russians with one accord leapt into the trench, and not a man reappeared again, as they were all speedily killed. A little later in the day the Japanese field artillery, in ignorance of the exact state of affairs on Akasaka-yama, opened up a terrific shrapnel fire, spraying the crest and of course the trench held by their own infantry. These men stuck grimly on for a little while, but, being severely handled, were by this error of their own gunners forced to evacuate and seek shelter in their own parallel.

Night came and found the position still all Russian, not a foot of ground having changed hands during the day's fighting.

During the night of the 30th the engineers and a party of infantry-men commenced to sap up a shallow trench at right angles to the western parallel. This trench was then walled in with sandbags, and, before dawn, had worked up two-thirds of the slope, despite a heavy rifle fire from the summit of 203. A party of infantry-men then worked through this lane of sandbags, and went forward to the dead ground beneath the lower line of Russian

trenches. Here they quickly threw up a parallel line of similar shelter, and were in occupation of it at daylight.

The position on the morning of the 1st of December, then, was that the Japanese had effected a lodgment in the centre and west of the hill. The western lodgment was made after the evacuation of the crest on the night of the 29th, when a few men managed to throw up head cover ; and although they could neither retire nor be reinforced, they were there to stay. The crest and trenches were, however, in undisputed possession of the Russians.

All morning the howitzers pounded away at the hill, and at 3 p.m. infantry began to snake up the parallels.

It was bitterly cold and freezing hard, and these men were sent into action in their great-coats. After developing a good firing line in the advanced parallels, these infantry were led out of cover by their officers, and were quickly scrambling into the lower Russian trench. A detachment working along it to the west were caught by a heavy fire from the crest trench and almost annihilated. The other body of men advancing eastward were nipped in between the volleys from Akasaka-yama and the crest of 203, and soon forced to retire in confusion.

In the meantime a large force had wended up the western parallel, and were preparing to make their assault when the party of infantrymen who had effected the western lodgment suddenly broke out of their shelter of sandbags, and darted down to the western parallel, where these infantry were massed. This changed the whole plan of attack, as the base from which it had been intended to deliver it was now lost to the Japanese by the unexpected retreat of this party.

It was indeed deemed impracticable to proceed with the attack, which was scarcely yet developed, and evening found the position still Russian. The three days following were quiet, and the sappers strenuously worked constructing parallels up the face of the hill, while the artillery, especially the 28-centimetre howitzers, maintained a continuous bombardment of the trenches.

During these days an average of a little over 1000 28-centimetre shells alone were driven into the Russian trenches; and it must be remembered that these Russian defenders were obliged to lie on the top of the heaps of dead and severely wounded Japanese and Russians who had in turn occupied them. Into this mass of humanity, living and dead,

friend and foe, it was found necessary to plunge thousands of 500 lb. high explosive shells, and it was this that littered the hillside with fragments of frozen humanity. Is anything ever recorded in the annals of warfare more revolting than this? On the 5th of December the engineers had completed their work and the critical time had arrived, for the consequences of another repulse would be too appalling to contemplate. From dawn the muzzle of every available piece of artillery was directed against 203 and Akasaka. I have seen Stromboli in partial eruption, and can imagine what a volcanic eruption must be like, and would compare the summit of 203 on the morning of the 5th of December 1904 to that of Fuji-yama in active eruption; but to compare the destruction there is no comparison above the earth.

Afternoon found the Japanese infantry making ready for the attack, and some eight battalions of picked men under Major-General Saito were marched in battalions down the gully between 174 and 203. Before entering the parallels, each battalion was faced about and fronted to salute the different regimental colours, then right-wheeled into the parallel to take up their positions of attack. Arriving

at the main parallel heads, they were dribbled through the entanglements and spread about the sandbag shelters. When all available cover had been filled, the supply ceased, and reserves were massed at the entrance of the parallels.

At half-past three the attack was opened by a general rush of men from the sand-bagged base, and the Japanese were soon working their way up toward the crest. But the Russians, crushed under the throng of oft-repeated efforts to quell the "stormers," broke up early, and in a short half-hour the Japanese were masters of the hill which had cost them 8000 casualties in nine days of terrible fighting. In the rear of the hill the Russians still lurked, waiting for night to aid them in a recapture; but, when evening came, the Japanese were ready with their plan, and a strong and sustained feint attack was delivered by the eleventh and ninth divisions against the eastern fortifications; and depleted in numbers—for the retention of 203 had been dearly purchased—the garrison drew supports from the reserves of 203, and at this crisis the Japanese pressed hotly on, cleared the neighbourhood of the hill, and secured their position on 203.

Daylight of the 6th found the Russians still

holding Akasaka-yama and the wave of slopes to the east, but, being soon under the fire of the Japanese from 203, the entire position was immediately evacuated, the movement somewhat accelerated by the Japanese artillery.

Of 203 Metre Hill but a slight resemblance to its former contour remained. It was no longer 203 metres high and no longer twin-peaked, for the peaks that had made it once so conspicuous had been battered away until there remained two gently sloping mounds to mark where there had been two well-defined points. The hill looked to me as if a thousand quarries had been worked out and the shattered stone flung over the slopes, for everywhere you looked there were huge craters formed by a dozen shell-holes, and around the rim the ground was deluged with splinters of rock. And among this natural débris were scattered over a thousand bodies, some limbless, all torn and lacerated, and all stiffly frozen. Here and there a queue of bodies marked the trend of an assault, and another lane the way of the retreat. From the trenches out-cropped splinters of smoking bomb-proof timbers, twisted sections of steel rails, and throughout the entire length of these passages they were filled with smashed

rifles, bayonets and swords, ragged segments of great shells, and a ton of leaden pellets. And straddling this rubbish were the sacred remains of dead, mutilated heroes.

Destruction of the Pacific Squadron.

After the disaster on the 10th of August the units of the fleet became isolated commands under their senior officers, and at the time of the loss of 203 Metre Hill they were huddled together in the East Port under the direction of no one in particular.

The majority of their crews and many of their smaller arms had been landed and were being utilised in the landward defence. When the Japanese made their first lodgment on the west of 203, a young naval officer with nautical instruments, etc., wormed his way into the shallow trench, and by taking observations was able to give direction and distance, etc., to the artillery commander, who immediately trained howitzers on the fleet.

Special 28-centimetre shells with armour-piercing points were used, and all the battleships, with the exception of the *Sevastopol*, were sunk by the 6th of December, as also the cruisers and several merchantmen. All the vessels were submerged to their upper works

and resting at different angles on the bottom of the east port. On the 6th of December the *Sevastopol*, under the command of Captain von Essen, with a crew of a hundred volunteers, steamed out of the harbour and anchored under the batteries of Tiger's Tail. With the co-operation of Captain Saxe (the chief of submarine department) a wooden boom was fixed around the vessel about 40 feet from her side, extending about 12 feet below the water and held in position by anchors. Torpedo nets were got out to serve as additional protection, and for three nights he was subjected to the repeated attacks of Japanese torpedo flotillas, but with the assistance of the batteries on Tiger's Tail and his own guns he inflicted great damage on them before being sunk. After repeated attempts the boom was finally pierced, and a torpedo hurled into the stern of the ship, blowing a big hole in her side and ruining her steering gear. She commenced to settle down, and that night steam was got up for the last time, and, with a few picked men, the gallant commander, steering the vessel with her twin screws, took her out into deep water, where after dismissing his crew he opened the sluice cocks, and then joining these men in his launch pulled away some distance and watched the

great battleship settle down stern first in 150 feet of water.¹

As far as the other vessels were concerned, the majority have already been raised and have reached Japanese dockyards under their own steam.

There is one point with regard to the fight for 203 that I have thus far purposely omitted, to wit, the lack of Japanese naval support after the sinking of the *Saiyen* on the 30th of November; had this support been forthcoming the position might have been turned on the right flank, and some lives squandered in frontal attacks spared for other fights.

¹ I am indebted to the able special correspondent of the *Times* for the above account of the sinking of the *Sevastopol*.

CHAPTER XIV

WINTER IN FRONT OF THE CITADEL

The capture of North fort of East Keekwan, December 18, 1904—Death of General Krondrachenko, the hero of the besieged.

THE days shortened; the misty days of November, lukewarm with late autumn, gave way to cold, dreary December, and instead of a cloak of sombre grey the hills were whitened with snow, save where they flattened into forts and fortified places. Thereabouts, great blotches of earth—raised by the ploughing shells—darkened the snow, and wind-driven flakes, banked high, clearly outlined the parapets. Elsewhere the meshes of the entanglements—hedging in the forts—showed clear against the white blanket, and from them faintly trickled mile after mile of the investing trenches, crossing and recrossing the shell-strewn slopes. Here and there blue clouds of smoke from wood-fires lazily curled up into the frozen air, betraying the lonely bivouacs in the siege parallels. Now

and again a cracking report of a rifle fired from fort or trench echoes in the still air, and fills the silent places with crisp metallic sounds. Away in the middle distance the rugged promontory of the Tiger's Tail seems merged into the ravined sides of Liao-teah-shan, and from the serrated ridge of that grand old mountain to where the land slips into the cold green sea all is silently mantled in frozen snow, save where the sun languidly warms the sheltered south. Over it all there is a strange, almost sad, quietness; the clutch of winter had invested the garrison as tightly as the Japanese. Yet, seemingly, to the belligerents climatic changes mattered little, for forts and trenches are as strongly manned in storms of snow as they were in blistering heat or torrential rains; and notwithstanding the outward calm there are hidden forces busily at work. The garrison have ceased their desperate sorties, and the frosty nights pass in peace, save when the pickets exchange a greeting, and on warmed steel thaw almost frozen fingers. For the rest, the garrison, tired with a ceaseless butchery, worn out with sleepless nights, lay in heavy sleep, dreaming, How long? How long?

Forced to be ever under arms, never knowing at what point or at what hour of the day or

night their assailants will attack them, compelled to ever live within the close, stifling air of the subterranean barracks day after day and night after night, ill-fed and poorly clothed, compelled to rush out of semi-darkness and enter into desperate encounters with half-seeing eyes, blinded in natural but now unaccustomed light, their sufferings can easily be imagined. And those others, required to remain huddled together in the fort bomb-proofs or crouched in rifle pits, never for a day out of the range of the deadly shells that, ever and anon crashing into their frail shelters, answered the question, "How long? how long?" Always confronted with this agony or this destruction, the garrison of Port Arthur have earned their spurs and undying but immaterial glory.

After the loss of 203 Metre Hill they enjoyed an immunity from projectiles, only to be madly tormented by the tension imposed by the quiet days, when there was not even the tapping of the enemy eating into the bowels of the earth, and preparing sudden death and burial for them beneath the rock on which they had so long defended the honour of their flag. But sentiment had no part in the mining operations that were

slowly underpinning the Erhlung, Sungshu, and North forts. The shafts were driven in with deliberate design, and when they were finished tons of dynamite were laid. Beneath the northern end of the escarpment of the North fort, two of these shafts had been run in over 40 feet, and branched right and left like the roots of a tree. Two thousand kilogrammes of dynamite, divided into seven charges, was firmly imbedded in the rock, igniting caps fixed, and the shafts re-sealed with the frozen earth. Two threads were run out and connected-up on the electric switch, and the engineers were ready to blast the front out of the fort that had so successfully baffled the assaults of the infantry.

However, the first sign of movement (after the capture of 203 Metre) was made on the morning of the 17th of December, away in the west, by the right wing of the seventh division. Making a surprise attack before dawn, a detachment rushed and captured an outlying trench (north-west of Pigeon Bay, about a thousand metres west of Tai-yang-kow fort) named Yang-shi-fang, from the village of that name. The Russians withdrew without offering any opposition. The same day a brace

of 28-centimetre howitzers were dismantled in the east and in process of transportation to the western part of the investing line, and it was evident that designs were being made on the Tai-yang-kow group of forts. The previous day, 16th, a steamer, eluding the blockading squadron, entered Port Arthur laden with ammunition and flour; the steamer's name being the *King Arthur*—a strange coincidence that name of Arthur.

Morning of the 18th of December was merry with sunlight, fanned by a soft east wind—a day out of time, precursory of spring. As the morning grew the artillery opened a desultory, almost timid fire, on the eastern ridge. Wantai was pounded by a couple of 28-centimetres, while a trio of 15-centimetre howitzers mounted on “P” fortification played a deadly direct fire on the rear of the North fort. The distance being less than 150 yards, the havoc was great, and a gun in the main battery of the fort was lifted off its mountings early in the morning. The Russians retaliated by shelling “P” from the South Keekwan, and soon silenced the trio of howitzers. Then the brace of big guns and a battery of naval 4.7's turned their attention to South Keekwan, and in turn silenced it. This triangular duel

went on all morning, and it was two o'clock before the trio of howitzers reopened their fire on North fort.

There appeared a little movement in the body of that fort, and a few grenades came flying into the moat, bursting out of sight, and sending up little clouds of thin blue smoke. Then sniping commenced as the trio of howitzers quickened their fire, and were joined by a salvo of field artillery, as a dense column of dirty-greyish smoke floated up from the fort, followed an instant later by an indistinct, rumbling report. Scarcely had this smoke appeared than it was followed by a second and denser earth-laden column, belching up from the front of the fort. A simultaneous roar of artillery broke out, and, before the upheaval of earth ceased deluging the ill-fated fort with the tons of débris, the shells were bursting among the ruined battlements. All around the fort the white snow was spattered with particles of the destroyed breastworks, and the Japanese saps were filled in with tons of earth and rock. Despite the falling rock, Japanese infantry had already rushed out of the caponiere gallery to dislodge the garrison that had not been entombed. Their impetuosity cost them their lives, over 60 being

buried in the moat, and the others quickly halted by machine-gun fire from the body of the fort, where the garrison, spared the fate of the pickets, were ready to defend the fort. The non-compression of the frozen ground in the mine shafts had resulted in the dislocation of the first explosion, and this resulted in the Japanese saps being smothered, and the débris had to be cleared before an organised attack could be made on the fort.

The 22nd Regiment had been allotted the task of capturing the fort, and were the same men who had won the caponiere gallery in October, and gallantly but unsuccessfully stormed the parapet on the 26th of November. Alert in the caponiere gallery, anxiously waiting for the explosion, there were many men to whom the recollection of that night of tragedy was ever present, vividly flooding their minds; for they knew what to expect when they gained the interior and faced that sizzling of bullets from concealed, un-get-at-able machine guns. Thus knowing the hideous mutilation of grenade and "scythe-of-bullet," they took many precautions to aid in the identification of their torn bodies after the fight. Red and white rags were fastened around their sleeves with their names inscribed, names were written in

their caps, on their leggings, underwear, and uniforms; and thus prepared, they waited for the first intimation of the detonation that would rend the ground asunder, and open a new path to their hated enemy other than over the fatal breastworks.


The dull report that came was an ungiven signal for them to dash out of the gallery, and 60 were buried in the débris. The rest, flushed with hope, eagerly scrambled over the upturned ground, and quickly reached the deranged breastworks, halted and peered over. The sight that greeted them chilled them through and through; for they saw the crater of the second explosion,—the crater they would have to cross,—and there, on the opposite rim, was the line of sandbags untouched, and the nozzles leering through spurted a line of flame and lead, and took all the heart out of them as they crouched down and waited. Irritated by their dilatory behaviour, General Samejima, commanding the eleventh division (General Tsuchiya had been wounded and invalided to Japan) came into the moat, and seeing terror and dismay mirrored in their faces, evinced his disapproval by ordering the unfortunate men of the 22nd Regiment into reserve. Crestfallen, for it had been but a

momentary relapse, the men obeyed, trooping down the parallel with compressed lips and bowed heads that hid their murderous eyes. They gave way to a battalion of the 38th Regiment of second reserves, fresh from the conquest of 203 Metre Hill, and who had been acting as the general reserves of the 22nd Regiment. Under the leadership of Captain Iwamoto they trotted up the parallels droning a song. They were not impetuous, and it was five o'clock and almost dusk before they were ready to attack. A more peculiar body of men I don't believe ever attacked a position, certainly not a fort. They had covered their blue uniforms with their grey woollen underwear, and their heads in their winter hoods. Around their waists they fastened a rope, and dangling from it were lighted torch-ropes for igniting grenades, of which each carried an armful. Like a band of fiends the grey figures moved stealthily forward, the lights gleaming from their waist-bands as they one by one slid over the rim of the crater, and every man for himself selected cover among the rock and rubbish. In less than an hour 150 men had filed almost unnoticed into the crater, and, scattering well out, prepared to rush the line of sandbags that zig-zagged across the fort at a

man's height, behind which the garrison were waiting. Led by their captain, the men emerged from cover as a firing line behind them let fly with a volley and drew the Russian fire from the sandbags, and then, refilling magazines, watched the " devils " crawling up to the wall. Another volley, and then this party fixed bayonets and waited until the pioneers reached the wall and commenced the grenade throwing. With horrid yells they dashed up the crater, and in the pale moonlight grappled and killed, swinging their rifles like clubs till stocks were broken and barrels twisted and bent.

Supported by reserves, the Japanese soon killed off the defenders of the first stand and captured the machine guns, then, weltering in blood, halted and re-formed before tackling the unknown rear of the fort. The double-storied concrete barracks had been the algebraical " X " of the fortification, and it was now the problem left for the 38th Regiment to solve.

Well supported, the firing line of scouts deployed, and swinging their line of steel and grenades enveloped the main gun-stand and got down to the level of the barracks. For three hours they hacked a way around the fort,





INTERIOR REAR OF THE NORTH FORT OF EAST KEEKWAN, SHOWING DESTROYED
LINE OF FORTRESS CANNON.

(Copyright Photo by J. Rosenthal, of the Charles Urban Trading Co., Ltd.)

then blasted the steel door of the barracks and forced the remnants of the garrison to retire. As they retired, two explosions rent the air, and the whole of the gun-stand and part of the wall of the barracks was demolished by this Russian counter-mine. A quick re-transposition of sandbags then took place, and defence works were thrown up to guard against a counter-attack. It was then a few minutes before midnight, and General Samejima, having satisfied himself that all was ready for repelling sorties, ordered champagne to be brought up, and, raising their voices in triumphant Banzais, they drank bumpers to celebrate the capture of the first permanent fort. But the piteous cries of entombed men in the ruined fort soon engaged their attention, and in feverish haste they delved into the débris to rescue the unfortunate Russians and impetuous Japanese. The red and white rags were very useful, and often very necessary, before the mangled remains were buried.

The Japanese casualties were about 800 (10 officers and 483 men wounded), and they considered the price cheap. No sortie was made that night. The moon dipped behind the hills, and it became impenetrably black; and it was not sufficiently dark for Russia, for

when she lost the fort, General Krondrachenko, the hero of Port Arthur, was dead, killed in the little fort he had so long defended, and Stoessel was free to play with Russian honour.

CHAPTER XV

COLLAPSE OF THE DEFENCE

General Stoessel calls a council of war after the death of General Krondrachenko—Dynamiting the permanent forts—Capture of Erhlung fort, December 28, 1904—Destruction and surrender of the garrison of the Sungshu fort, December 31, 1904—Night assault, December 31, and collapse of the north-eastern and western defence—Capture of Wantai, January 1, 1905—The white flag of surrender.

THE magnificent defence of Port Arthur practically ended with the death of General Krondrachenko, the life and soul of the existence of Port Arthur, the man whose determination and courage prevented even Stoessel surrendering, whose magnetism was like that of Admiral Makharoff to the navy, and whose death was equally as demoralising. With untiring energy this hero of Port Arthur visited every corner of the defence, and, ably seconded by Colonel Ratchenski (killed the same day as Krondrachenko), met attack with counter-attack, assault with sortie, grenade with grenade, concentrated rushes with massed force, trick

with trick, and mine with counter-mine; whose defensive arrangements were the wonder and admiration of the Japanese, and whose determination was as inflexible as theirs to break it.

When this man died, killed at his post by a 28-centimetre shell, there was a general collapse, especially in the west, where the seventh division were particularly active and made astonishingly rapid progress after the fall of 203 Metre Hill. By the 23rd of December they were able to demonstrate against the Tai-yang-kow fort, having captured all the outlying defences to the west of that position to the shores of Pigeon Bay. In fact, so weak did the first division find the opposition, that on the 22nd sapping and cautious trench-work was practically abandoned, and on the 23rd the Russians, for the first time during the siege, were unable to patrol the shores of Pigeon Bay. Two days later, finding the western defence practically nil, the first division cleared all the villages in line from Pigeon Bay to the village of Yahutswei, and then steadily circled around the Tai-yang-kow group of fortifications.

Previous to these events General Stoessel had been feeling his way with the Japanese staff, and sending in *parlementaires* with notes

and requests. The first of these notes came in the nature of a protest that the Japanese were ranging their cannon against his hospitals. This evoked a strong repudiation from the Japanese on the 22nd of December, and for a day or so Stoessel was at a loss for a reason to send in a chit.

General Stoessel then convened a council of war in Port Arthur, at which almost everyone except himself strongly condemned the very idea of surrender,—and I even heard a rumour of a plot that was set afoot by a hare-brained naval officer to kidnap Stoessel and lock him up, but this is only hearsay!

Meanwhile (since the failure of the third assault) the Japanese engineers had been tunnelling under the Erhlung and Sungshu forts. The procedure was similar to that adopted at the North fort, except that a larger amount of dynamite was used. By the 27th of December preparations were completed for the destruction of the Erhlung fort, and the time set for 10 a.m. on the following day. The morning (28th) passed without the slightest indication of what was to happen; not a single cannon fired, and there was not a solitary motion in the Japanese lines to afford the garrison any clue to their inten-

tions. Precisely at 10 o'clock a dull rumbling was heard in the direction of the fort, followed by a great upheaval of rock, and immediately the Japanese artillery opened fire, furiously shelling the fort. After a few minutes scouts were sent up over the broken ground, and in response to a signal from them a full battalion of infantry filed out of the moat, and took cover along the front of the broken parapet and commenced throwing up head cover. They were shelled by I-tzu-shan, but held on, and a stream of men were quickly sent up to reinforce this firing line; but it was not until four o'clock that it was deemed prudent to make a rush for the line of light guns. Here the garrison made a stand, and the all too common hand-to-hand grenading took place before they were driven out, and a subsequent rush carried the second line before dark. The Japanese were now adopting rational methods, for there was now no preconcerted rushes, but the simple application of the results of reconnaissance. This safer, if slower policy, enabled them, after dynamiting the parapets, to gain a preponderance at the objective (and their success was further enhanced by the rapidity with which they re-created defences, which gave them immunity from shell fire), and

made it possible by subsequent clever manipulation to utilise large forces in the interior without losing control. And by this procedure almost the full strength of the 19th and 36th Regiments was employed in the actual work of dislodging the garrison of the Erhlung fort.


During the night the garrison (26th Regiment of sharpshooters) offered a stubborn resistance, but there were then left but 300 men (50 were entombed by the explosion), and when these were reduced to a couple of hundred they set fire to the barracks, and retired at 3 a.m. on the 29th of December. About 300 were killed, out of the garrison of a little more than 550; and the advantage of their position over the assaulters may be imagined when the Japanese casualties by official report were admitted at over a thousand.


*Destruction of the Sungshu Fort and Surrender
of the Garrison, December 31.*

Exactly at ten o'clock on the morning of the 31st of December the first explosion occurred under the parapet of the Sungshu fort, followed a second later by another, and after five minutes by a third explosion from the centre of the fort. This latter was from a Russian counter-mine which was accidentally

exploded. Before the second explosion was heard the Japanese artillery, with more than remarkable promptitude, opened fire with a succession of salvoes of common shell and shrapnel, and in a few minutes the fort was alive with bursting shells, and by the successive eruptions completely enveloped in smoke and totally obscured. Under cover of this artillery fire, and directly the disrupted rock had ceased falling, a party of Japanese infantry-men worked up over the yawning crater, carrying with them a large perforated bucket full of live charcoal—and armfuls of grenades. Selecting cover, the men calmly squatted down, and lighting the grenades commenced a lively grenade bombardment of the interior. For a few minutes the air simply quivered with these deadly missiles, then a white flag fluttered on the ramparts in the left front of the fort. The staff was waved up and down for a few minutes, then planted in the ground. The garrison had surrendered.

It appeared that the entire force holding the first line of defence were buried by the third eruption, and their comrades gallantly elected to endeavour to extricate them instead of offering a feeble resistance before being forced to retire. Immediately this was known fatigue





DESTROYED INTERIOR REAR OF THE SUNGSHU FORT AFTER ITS CAPTURE BY THE JAPANESE.
+ THE ENTRANCE TO THE CONCRETE BARRACKS.

(Copyright Photo by J. Rosenthal, of the Charles Urban Trading Co., Ltd.)

parties of Japanese sappers were quickly sent into the fort, and succeeded in saving the lives of many of the imprisoned men.

The general order was that operations were to cease immediately after the capture of Sungshu fort, but the young officers, desiring to spend New Year's Day fighting (and possibly to capture the entire north-eastern front), easily prevailed upon their superiors to go on, and, permission being granted by the general staff, a general night attack was ordered.

The recent important change in the situation allowed the Japanese a basis for concentrating their force, and this enabled them that night to succeed in the original plan of General Nogi; that is, to encompass and capture the north-east sector of the defences, thus piercing the enceinte and dislocating the eastern defences of Port Arthur.

At 6 p.m. on the 31st of December the ninth and eleventh divisions were concentrated in force, and prepared to test the Russian defence along the line from North fort to Sungshu fort. Careful reconnaissance having thoroughly demonstrated the weakness and unpreparedness of the garrison, it was decided to deliver an attack *en masse* along the north-eastern front.

The movement was unexpectedly successful, and the troops, over-running the entire position, secured a commanding lodgment from Sung-shu to a point above the "Q" fortification. In the meantime the seventh division advanced from their position in the west, swung in eastward, and captured Yahutswei; and, continuing to advance, broke sufficient ground to enable them at any time to capture the land to the shore of the West Port and enter the New Town from the south. They had also by this advance driven in the thin edge of a wedge that would have easily allowed them to separate Tiger's Tail from Liao-teah-shan.

During the afternoon (1st January) Wantai was rushed and captured, and immediately mountain guns and quick-firers were sent up the parallels to aid in holding the ground, while every available machine gun was sprinkled about the captured position. Ammunition was sent forward, dressing stations moved and distributed right up in the firing line, and everything made ready to rush the whole of the eastern defences; when, to the profound stupefaction of everyone, from general to private, a white flag fluttered in the valley—and the siege was over.

The news spread like wildfire that Stoessel wished to capitulate, and the following morning the general staff of the Third Army, represented by Captain Yasuhara, offered us tin cups of brandy, and in a melodramatic manner, and in a most solemn voice, announced, "Port Arthur has fallen, Banzai." We Banzai'd, and then gave three Saxon Tigers, that brought General Nogi scurrying out of his quarters. His face was a study. Wreathed in smiles, his eyes danced with joy, and the lines that had cut deep into his forehead seemed all gone. The hand he offered was as steady as his voice, that thanked us for our congratulations, and there was a mark of great manly sadness and a wonderful softness in the voice that thanked us for "staying with me through the dark days of disappointment and sorrowful hours that my soldiers and I have spent." And we thought of him as the childless father not less than the proud, successful soldier; but, knowing the Samurai spirit of the general, we did not breathe our thoughts, for his loss was his sacrifice and his atonement.

General Stoessel's letter to General Nogi was received at the Japanese outpost in the Sueishi valley at 4.30 p.m. on the 1st of January, and the following is a faithful copy:—

Letter bearing five seals, addressed—

“BARON K. NOGI,

“Chief of the Army Besieging Port Arthur.

“PORT ARTHUR. [No date.]

“SIR,—Taking into consideration the state of affairs at the seat of war in general, I find the future resistance of Port Arthur useless, and in view of a fruitless loss of men I would like to negotiate about the capitulation.

“If your Excellency agrees to this, I beg you to appoint delegate for this purpose who would discuss about the conditions and order of capitulation, and to choose the place where my delegate could meet with him. I avail myself of this opportunity of expressing to you my sentiments of esteem.

“(Signed) GENERAL STESSEL.”¹

At 5 a.m. on the 2nd of January the Japanese reply was sent to the Sueishi outpost, and delivered at 9.30 a.m. by Captain Tsunoda to the Russian outpost.

Japanese reply to General Stoessel—

“SIR,—I have the honour to agree to your Excellency's proposal to negotiate for the conditions and order of capitulation.

¹ The letter was signed STESSEL, not Stoessel.

"I name Major-General Kosuke Idichi, c/o Staff of the Besieging Army, for this purpose, and some staff officers and civil officers will accompany him.

"They are to meet your delegate at Sueishi precisely at noon to-day, 2nd of January '05. The delegates are to be invested with full power to sign the capitulation, which shall take effect immediately after signing, without further approval. Full powers to be exchanged must be signed by the officers in highest command on both sides. I avail myself of this opportunity of expressing to you my sentiments of esteem.

"(Signed) GENERAL NOGI,
"Commander-in-Chief,
"Japanese Army Besieging Port Arthur."

"To
"GENERAL STESSEL,¹
"Commander-in-Chief,
"Fortified District of Kwang-tung."

¹ Note addressed STESSEL.

CHAPTER XVI

THE CAPITULATION OF PORT ARTHUR

Scenes at the meeting of the *parlementaires*—Russians ask that garrison be allowed honours of war—Requests and counter-offers—Twenty thousand wounded in the Port Arthur hospitals without medicines or bandages—Stoessel's message to the Tzar—Signing the capitulation of Port Arthur—Conduct of the Japanese troops after the surrender—An interview with General Stoessel—Tzar's message to the garrison.

THE village of Sueishi, where the *parlementaires* of the two armies met to discuss the conditions of capitulation, presented a spectacle of woeful dilapidation,—a mere collection of ruined cottages, with gaunt, blackened walls crumbled under the alternating fire of Japanese and Russian cannon. The Peking road—one of those highways so common in China, that lead from one province to another over hills and valleys, following in an irritating ramble the dry beds of ancient watercourses, through tiny hamlets and great walled cities—leads out of Port Arthur, and winding through the Sueishi village snakes its way to Feking.

Entering the village from the north by this road, and traversing it for a couple of hundred yards, brings you to a small street running at right angles to it, and crossing the village parallel to the Sueishi lunettes. At the extreme western end of the street are a couple of small Chinese cottages that have partially escaped shell fire. These cottages served for a couple of months as dressing stations for the wounded, and in the largest of the two the fortress of Port Arthur was surrendered by the Russians to the Japanese on the afternoon of the 2nd of January 1905. The tearing up of the Shimono-seki Treaty of 1895 was avenged, and Russia in turn drank the bitter dregs of the cup of humiliation sipped too long by the people she deliberately degraded by *force majeure*.

The eternal morality of history had indeed been vindicated. The scene on that memorable day cannot be easily effaced. A bright, sunny afternoon, with a strange almost Sabbath quietness that was positively aweing after the accustomed cannonade. And yet the scene was warlike, but only picturesquely warlike. Nine dismounted Cossacks, with rifles slung over their shoulders, and short cow-boy whips fastened around their wrists, were walking their shaggy ponies up and down the shell-strewn

road, admired and freely commented on by a grinning gathering of Japanese Tommies and Chinese coolies.

Two large white flags (surrounded by an inquisitive collection of little Chinese children, their mothers and fathers, with a sprinkling of Tommies) were the centre of attraction, and the respective standard-bearers carried on a gesticulatory conversation for the benefit of the curious. But I have anticipated a little.

It was close upon noon (Japanese time) when the Japanese *parlementaires* arrived and entered the compound of the little cottage. Nearly an hour later the Russian mission appeared, preceded by a large white flag carried by a Cossack. This party, consisting of Major-General Reiss, a colonel of the fourth division, a captain of the ninth division, a colonel of the seventh division, the captain of the *Retvisan*, General Balashoff—Director of Hospitals, Lieutenant Malchenko, and a midshipman, rode into the compound, where they dismounted and were there introduced to the Japanese party, General Idichi, Major Yamaoka, Commander Iwamura, Dr. Ariga, Interpreter Kawazura, and Captain Tsunoda. At 12 p.m. the chiefs of staff exchanged credentials, which

were examined, and everything being in order the Japanese presented the capitulatory and supplementary documents.

The Russian *parlementaires* were asked to adjourn into a separate room and read over the documents for forty minutes or an hour. At 1.30 p.m. they retired to consider the documents, but before going asked the Japanese if the terms were absolute, and received an affirmative reply, with the remark that recommendations not out of the question would be heard.

At 2.30 p.m. the second conference opened, and the Russians made the following remarks:—

1st. Request that all soldiers be released and not taken as prisoners of war.

2nd. All garrison were under oath, and permission was requested to telegraph to the Tzar for release.

3rd. The majority of the garrison were sick and in the hospitals.

4th. All standards had been destroyed.

5th. Requested that officers be allowed to retain horses and an orderly.

6th. Men-of-war had been destroyed.

7th. Requested to know the amount of baggage that each officer would be personally allowed to take out from Port Arthur.

8th. Desired that the Japanese would not take over the Red Cross Hospitals at Port Arthur, or make any changes in their interior arrangements.

•

It was also asked what they should do with the Japanese prisoners held in Port Arthur. At 3.07 p.m. this conference ended, and the Japanese retired to consider the Russian remarks. The third conference opened at 3.37, and the Japanese made the following replies :—

“Soldiers and marines cannot be released, but officers, civil officers, and volunteers will be released on parole. Horses cannot be retained, but one orderly will be allowed to each officer. The telegram to the Tzar, if written in English, would be immediately forwarded. Officers would be allowed to take the same amount of baggage as allowed to Japanese officers of corresponding rank. Extra baggage could be left with families or friends at Port Arthur, who would not be interfered with in any way and allowed to return to their homes at leisure. The Red Cross buildings would neither be taken over or their interior arrangements interfered with. A statement of the exact number of wounded in the hospitals was required.”

The Russians replied that there were not less than 20,000 wounded and sick in the hospitals.

During the above conference and deliberations it was reported to General Idichi that a fire was raging in Port Arthur, and that numbers of the garrison were deserting from the forts of I-tzu-shan and Pai-gin-shan.

General Idichi called the attention of General Reiss to this, and at 3.45 p.m. he despatched a Cossack to Port Arthur with a message to General Stoessel requesting that order be maintained.

At 4.35 p.m. on the afternoon of the 2nd of January the terms and order of capitulation were accepted by the Russian delegate, and messages were immediately forwarded to Generals Nogi and Stoessel recommending a suspension of hostilities.

The telegraphic message to the Tzar was received from General Stoessel at 7 p.m., reading as follows :—

“ I was forced to-day to sign the capitulation surrendering Port Arthur. Officers and civil officers paroled with honours of war ; garrison prisoners of war. I apply to you for this obligation. STESEL.”

Meanwhile clean copies of the articles of capitulation were written out in Japanese and English, and signed at 9.45 p.m., when the surrender came into effect. The *parlementaires* then dined together. During the negotiations French and English were the languages employed. During dinner General Balashoff alluded to the pitiable plight of the Russian wounded in the hospitals, there being no medi-

cines or bandages for them. At 11.30 the parties separated, and the Japanese informed him that arrangements had already been made to send in full supplies of hospital requisites, and that General Ochai, the chief of the Japanese hospitals, had given orders for his staff to send in doctors and orderlies in the morning to assist in caring for the unfortunately wounded Russians.

At even, after the capitulation had been signed, the wires were busily engaged spreading the good tidings among the troops. As the full meaning of it penetrated into every quarter, from picket to divisional headquarters, the troops became delirious with joy, and Banzais and hoarse unintelligible but joyous cries rang out, echoing from camp to camp.

Men broke into snatches of song, then wildly, unable to control themselves, shouted and yelled, until the thronging memories seemed to be gripping them and choking the Banzais in their throats. In the field hospitals the wounded, painfully rising from their canvas stretchers, joined in the cheering, with thin voices barely able to wail out their cries. Bengal lights flared up everywhere, and men beat tins and behaved in their ecstasies of joy like schoolboys on vacation day. Around the

many burial-grounds torchlight memorial services were held over the remains of the dead heroes.

In the firing line—on the cold, bleak ridges full of the horror of repeated assaults—there was one long necklace of little camp-fires, and across the valley—the sacred graveyard of thousands — was wafted a succession of incoherent cries like those that come from an excited aviary.

Searchlights were flitting over the scene in peaceful scrutiny, and for the last time the garrison played their “silent ally” on their cheering conquerors. Numbers of the garrison left their dismal forts and came to the wood-fires, there to sip “saké,”¹ and after a night of wild carousing be comically assisted home in the morning by red-faced, bibulous Tommies, seriously happy, and hoping that their Russian pals would not suffer on account of Japanese hospitality.

After midnight all was as silent as the grave, the thrilling volume of human cries sobbed itself out, and the hush of a thousand sleeps made of it a wonderful solitude, a peaceful and strange quiet, like the lapping of oily waters over the sunken vessel wrecked by the storm.

¹ *Saké*, Japanese rice wine.

Next morning (January 3rd) thousands of inquisitive Tommies were wandering over the captured position, and in their ramblings came across scores of the tired garrison contentedly sleeping in the fort bomb-proofs, oblivious to the world and war, for they at least had done their share to earn the rest they were enjoying. The silence of the day was as remarkable as the scene on the captured ridge, and a hush as of the wilderness seemed to hallow the work of the fatigue parties gathering the fallen warriors and placing them on the great wooden crematory biers.

All over the scene of the late strife, soldiers were strolling holiday fashion, arm in arm, now stopping to pick up a bit of Russian accoutrement, now bending over a cannon, and always pottering about examining and quizzing, as we do when happy with deserved happiness. They were content, these Japanese soldiers, to shout themselves hoarse over-night, and with that be satisfied as sufficient demonstration for conquerors. There were also many Japanese who worked that day as hard to load transport waggons with hospital supplies for the wounded in Port Arthur as others had ever done to drive in tunnels under the parapets of the forts.

During the afternoon Captain Tsunoda was sent by General Nogi to Port Arthur to convey to General Stoessel the Mikado's message that "All honours of war be accorded the brave defender of Port Arthur." Alas for him, he was dead, and the man who lived was being illuminated with reflected glory.

A message was also delivered to General Stoessel from General Nogi, expressing the desire that they might meet.

The next day Captain Tsunoda again called on General Stoessel, and offered him some presents from General Nogi. During the meeting Stoessel made some extraordinary statements that are worth recording.

His last message, he said, from Kuropatkin was received on the 6th of October, and in that message Kuropatkin said he would soon be coming south to relieve him. Stoessel sent out spies, and these later reported that Kuropatkin was at the village of Ying-cheng-tsu (about 18 miles north of Port Arthur), while others reported him at Kinchow near Nanshan. But Stoessel said that he had not believed these spies, and thought that "Kuropatkin must be now somewhere near the Shaho."

And when he was informed that Kuropatkin had been defeated, with 60,000 casualties, at

the Shaho by Oyama, Stoessel was surprised. (Is it not strange that he should be surprised, especially as the same information was given to the Russian *parlementaires* on the 2nd of January, two days before ?)

His request for information of the Baltic Squadron was very amusing, and his remark that "Now Port Arthur has fallen there is no use in its coming to the East," was also amusing.

He went on to speak of the destructiveness of Japanese 28-centimetre shells, and then turned round and volunteered the information that he had vigorously opposed the conduct of Sakaroff, the prefect of Dalny (who died of fever at Port Arthur during the siege), who always wished to finish Dalny work to the neglect of the fortifications of Port Arthur! He said that he was anti-war, as he had seen the Japanese fighting during the North China campaign. In his opinion the third division of the Russian army—which he commanded—and the Japanese army contributed the lion's share to the success of that campaign. He was aware before the war of the wonderful organisation and pluck of the Japanese army, and denied that Alexieff was the cause of the war breaking out, as he also was present during the Boxer trouble and knew what

the Japanese could do. The cause of the war was—in his opinion—the result of a lack of understanding between the two people (a truly brilliant remark, worthy of Stoessel).

Speaking of his own part in the siege, he said that as he was commander of the third division he ought to have really been up north with Kuropatkin, instead of at Port Arthur, which was garrisoned by the fourth and seventh divisions.

He had been five years in Port Arthur¹ (what follows in the face of this statement is remarkable), and when the Japanese attacked the fleet in the roadstead on the 9th of February he was terror-stricken, as the forts were only half completed and there were but about 3000 of a garrison.

However, he paid his tribute to Kronradchenko, who he said was killed in the North fort on the 18th of December by a 28-centimetre shell. Stoessel mentioned that he had been wounded three times, once while acting as captain of staff (the same time as Kuropatkin)

¹ Stoessel had been five years in Port Arthur, commanded the third division, that was not there, and was terror-stricken when hostilities opened. What was he doing in Port Arthur quarrelling with Sakaroff if he had nothing to do with the command of the fortress? Rumour has it that he usurped the position!

to Skobeleff, again in North China, and at Port Arthur.

He now hoped to be allowed to spend the rest of his days in peace by his own fireside. He was educating five boys, the sons of three officers killed during the siege.

Arrangements were made during this interview for a meeting between the two generals to take place in the Sueishi village, at the cottage where the fortress was surrendered. The Tzar's reply to Stoessel's telegram was as follows :—

“ I allow each officer to profit by the reserved privilege to return to Russia under the obligation not to take part in the present war, or to *share the destiny of the men*. I thank you and the brave garrison for the gallant defence.

“ NICHOLAS.”

I-tzu-shan and other forts were handed over on the 4th as guarantee, and on the 5th the garrison marched out to the barrack village of Yahutswei.

CHAPTER XVII

A DISGRACEFUL SURRENDER

The abstract statement of General Stoessel, which at first justified the surrender, and the concrete facts that proved it to have been a disgraceful surrender; facts substantiated by figures—A theory of why Port Arthur was surrendered—Composition of the garrison and besieging force.

THE reason General Stoessel gave for wishing to surrender was—according to the document sent to General Nogi (which might, of course, have been written before the outbreak of hostilities, for it bears no date)—for humanity's sake—"to avoid further useless waste of life." From this it would appear that there had been a great sacrifice of life in Port Arthur during the siege, and if General Stoessel's statement had been substantiated by fact, this would most decidedly have been sufficient reason for surrender; but, on the contrary, there had been no great sacrifice of life (under 10,000), and there remained a garrison of over 32,000 able-bodied

men with which to defend the fortress. And when we found out that there was in Port Arthur an efficient garrison numbering two-thirds of the original force besieged, and that there was ample food and ammunition for a full month's heavy fighting, we stigmatised the surrender as disgraceful, and substantiated the statement with facts from the official Japanese returns. General Stoessel flatly contradicted our telegrams, and defended his right to surrender in a most remarkably untruthful statement. This defence of General Stoessel was given to a representative of the *Times of Ceylon*, who had boarded the SS. *Australien* (on which General Stoessel returned to Europe) when she arrived at Colombo.

At first General Stoessel would not commit himself, but when he was shown the telegram of Dr. Morrison, the famous Peking correspondent of the London *Times*, in which the surrender was described as most discreditable and unjustifiable, he denied the charge in its entirety, and gave out, through his personal A.D.C. Lieutenant Nevelskoy, the following remarkable and ridiculous defence. (In order to separate my statements from General Stoessel's, I take the liberty of quoting an editorial in the

North China Daily News, Shanghai, 3rd March 1905)—

" . . . General Reiss's first statement was as to the actual strength of the garrison on the first of January last. He said 'The actual number of men still able to carry arms was 8000. We had in the hospitals 18,000 sick and wounded, and besides those there were some 4000 non-combatants, including doctors, engineers, electricians, and civilians. During the siege 10,000 men were killed outright or died from wounds or sickness. The strength of our garrison at beginning of the siege was, roughly speaking, 40,000.'"

(Before proceeding further I will note that I saw over 15,000 able-bodied men entrain at Chang-ling-tsu, and General Nogi's official report, as under, of the number of the men surrendered, will amply substantiate my statement, and give the lie to General Stoessel's.)

JAPANESE OFFICIAL REPORT.

OFFICERS OF THE ARMY.

Generals	8
Field officers	57
Officers below field rank	531
Civil officers	99
Surgeons	109
Chaplains	13
<hr/>	
Total officers	817
Total non-com. officers and men	22,434
<hr/>	
Grand total for the Army	23,251

	Brought forward	23,251
OFFICERS OF THE NAVY.		
Admirals	4	
Captains	100	
Lieutenants	200	
Chaplains	7	
Civil officers	500	
Total naval officers	811	
Sailors and marines	4500	
Navy—Grand total	5311	
Non-combatants—men	3645	
Total		8,956
Grand total		<u>32,207</u>

(Total of surrendered—28,562.)

(To the above must be added almost 13,000 sick and wounded in hospital.)

This report makes it very clear that there were more men surrendered than the numbers given by General Reiss, and comment would be superfluous.

Continuing to quote General Stoessel's defence—

"As regards food, General Reiss declared that, for the last month of the siege, the garrison had had nothing but flour and biscuits. They had eaten all the horses except one thousand (the Japanese took over 1920), which were kept alive to drag the guns about between the forts, as otherwise the guns would have been useless. There were only 15 roubles in copper coins left in the military chest; about a million and a half roubles having been paid away, chiefly to Chinese."

The following is a list that I have made up from the actual provisions on hand in the principal warehouses the day I went into Port Arthur (January 13):—

Army Department Stores.

Flour . . .	1,422,000 lbs.	Barley . . .	4400 lbs.
Wheat, crushed	176,000 „	Maize . . .	308,000 „
Biscuits . . .	132,000 „	Rice . . .	2,970 „
Salt . . .	770,000 „	Corned beef .	77,000 „
Beans . . .	1,375,000 „	Sugar . . .	44,000 „

Also in Naval Stores.

Flour 700 tons (ex-King Arthur), 40 tons sugar, 2 tons butter.

For the fleet there was 75,000 tons Cardiff coal.

55,000 „ Japanese coal.

15,000 „ briquettes.

Besides the 1920 military horses in wonderfully good condition there were many mules, and innumerable private owned ponies dragging droskies about. A butcher's shop was open, and I found that the cattle had been killed in Port Arthur, and were those that we had seen grazing in December at the foot of Liao-teah-shan. Furthermore, there were many private companies like Sieta's Block, having considerable private supplies which had not been commandeered. In fact, no private provisions had been commandeered.

Continuing with Stoessel's defence—

“... All our guns,” the general replied, “were left useless. Those that were not completely spoiled had all their delicate mechanism spoiled ; we made quite sure of that.” And the same with the ships which are now at the bottom of Port Arthur ? are they utterly destroyed too ? “As has been reported, it is quite true that from 203 Metre Hill the Japanese guns did great damage among our ships, but before they were sunk by them we took care that all the engines and machinery were blown up.”

With regard to this, the majority of the ships have already been raised, and have proceeded to Japan under their own steam ; as for the guns in the forts, I am not in a position to pass more than a general opinion, as some of the guns I saw were in a hopeless condition, while others were in perfect working order.

General Reiss went on to describe that the Russians were so short of ammunition, that they had to use several hundred Japanese 11-inch shells, which did not explode in Port Arthur.

“Toward the end of the siege,” he said, “the number of men entering the hospitals was 400 daily. Many of them died. As regards medical necessities, we had hardly had any at all. For bandages, the sails and ropes from the ships had to be utilised ; in fact, anything that we could get hold of.”

To the question, "What was the condition of Port Arthur?" General Reiss replied: "Every building of importance was shattered to pieces, and there was not a building of any kind which had not sustained some damage in both the Old and New Towns."

The last statement is an evident misconstruction of plain facts, and the truth was that there were scarcely any houses "shattered to pieces," and the damage was so small, that in comparison Dalny was ten times as disfigured by the bandits. As for "every building of importance," etc., these were wholly intact, and there was little indication anywhere of a bombardment.

With regard to ammunition, the following official report gives details:—

SECTION 1.—Permanent forts and fortifications, 59.

SECTION 2.—Guns of large calibre 54

„ medium calibre 149

„ small calibre 343—Total 546.

Shells, 82,670.

Torpedoes, 60.

Explosives, 1588 pieces.

Powder, 30 tons.

Rifles, 35,252.

Pistols, 579.

Swords, 1891.

Smallarmammunition, rounds,
2,266,800.

Ammunition waggons, 290.

Train carts, 606.

Miscellaneous carts, 65.

Saddlery, harness, etc.

SECTIONS 3 and 4:—

Searchlights, 14.

Telegraph apparatus, 15.

Telephone apparatus, 134.

Signalling apparatus, 3.

SECTION 5.—Quantities of intrenching tools.

SECTION 6.—1920 horses.

SECTION 7.—Four battleships (not including *Sevastopol*).

Two cruisers.

Fourteen gunboats and destroyers.

Ten steamers.

Eight launches.

Twelve miscellaneous craft, and also private steamers.

(Besides the above steamers—which were either destroyed or sunk—there were 35 small steamers serviceable after petty repairs.)

General Stoessel's defence was finished with the story of the dilapidated condition of the fortress; and it may serve a useful purpose to examine the military situation, as it really existed in fact, at the time the white flag appeared in the valley.

Although no pressure was brought to bear on General Stoessel by the actual position held by Nogi on New Year's Day, we may adduce therefrom reasons for the surrender, for the collapse of the defence was as disgraceful as the actual surrender.

In short, the Japanese held a line extending from the south of Tai-yang-kow, around the north-western slopes of I-tzu-shan, across the valley over the Sungshu and Erhlung forts to Wantai, and down to the "Q" fortifications; then the line ran outside the fort-belt to the eastern shore. What did this entail?

The evacuation of the north-eastern sector

of forts only, and a withdrawal to the second line of defence. This would no doubt have been the scheme of Krondrachenko, but after his death no precautions were taken and no plans made.

General Stoessel called a council of fortress commanders after the death of the hero, but none save Stoessel and Reiss, and perhaps another, would entertain the idea of a premature surrender. The Japanese might capture the fortress, but it was not to be surrendered to them; this was the spirit of the council.

At the time of this council the military position made it imperative to take immediate steps to lessen the line of Russian defence, and fall back on the western permanents and Tiger's Tail, and to prepare to evacuate the north-eastern front as far as South Keekwan (for the north-eastern front was doomed when the Japanese commenced to undermine the body of the three forts).

By this plan it would have been possible, by a clever and simultaneous retirement from the doomed forts, to hold the south-eastern coast and land forts, the western forts and Tiger's Tail, and use Liao-teah-shan as an asylum for the civilians and the wounded. (For to have evacuated the position I have mentioned

would have made it necessary to abandon the Old Town hospitals—as Krondrachenko had failed in his attempt to get the Japanese to define a particular area for his hospitals on the 15th of December, this was replied to on the 20th, after his death).

The Japanese could not have entered the Old Town as long as Golden Hill and Pai-yu-shan were held; and of course both towns were under observation from 203 as far as Japanese artillery fire was concerned. Had Stoessel intended to defend the fortress to the last, he would have followed Krondrachenko's plan (as the Japanese fully expected he would), and made some attempt to organise the new line of defence. He did nothing. In fact, he had long considered the position hopeless, and, as events proved, had decided to surrender on the first provocation. So when the Japanese obtained possession of Erhlung, Sungshu, and North fort, and he was forced to quicken his actions and withdraw into his second line, he found that the opportunity he desired for surrendering had been created. He had previously allowed his left wing to be crumpled up with contented indifference, and then when things were looking black, and without consulting anyone, and even without attempting

to ascertain the number of men he had in the hospitals, or the strength of his garrison, he assumed it was time to throw up the sponge, and the prepared document was sent in to General Nogi. He had not the moral courage to face his gallant garrison and thank them for their defence, and bid them farewell in the captivity into which he forced them; and his name was received with scorn by every single officer and man to whom I spoke on the Chang-ling-tsu plain, and they one and all considered his last act as a befitting ending to an arrogant, blustering command, usurped and unworthily held.

COMPOSITION OF PORT ARTHUR GARRISON.

Commander-in-Chief of the Fortified District of Quang-tung—General STOESEL.

Fortress Commander—General SMYRNOFF.

Commander of Defence—General KRONDRACHENKO.

C.O.S.—Colonel REISS.

GARRISON, FOURTH AND SEVENTH DIVISIONS.

REGIMENTS.

Siberian Rifles, 25th, 26th, 27th, and 28th.

7th Reserve battalion.

3rd " "

11th and 12th regiments (mixed), Third Army

4th Artillery brigade.

Fortress Artillery detachment.

Quang-tung Artillery detachment.

Gendarmerie.

NAVAL FORCE.

Detachments and crews of—

Retvizan, Pobedia, Pallada, Peresviet, Sevastopol, Bayan, Poltava, Bobre, Olovasny, Stroteboi, Gylia, Amur, etc.

Total efficient garrison, date of surrender, 32,207.

Army	23,251
Navy	5,311
(Men) non-com.	3,645

32,207

(In hospitals, 13,000 wounded.)

COMPOSITION OF THE THIRD JAPANESE ARMY AT THE TIME OF THE SURRENDER.

Commander-in-Chief—General Baron NOGI.

Chief of Staff—Lieut.-General IDICHI.

Naval Chief of Staff—Commander IWAMURA.

Harbour-Master, Dalny—Captain SAKAMOTO, I.J.N.

FIRST DIVISION (DISTRICT OF TROOPS, TOKIO).

Headquarters—Major-General MATSUMURA.

C.O.S.—Colonel HOSHINO.

REGIMENTS.

1st—Lieut.-Colonel OHARA.	} 1st Brigade ?
15th—Colonel IGUCHI.	
2nd—Colonel TANABE.	} 2nd Brigade—Major-General NAKAMURA.
3rd—Lieut.-Colonel USHIJIMA.	

SEVENTH DIVISION (DISTRICT OF TROOPS, HOKKAIDO).

Headquarters—Lieut.-General OSAKO.

C.O.S.—Colonel KOIDSUMI.

REGIMENTS.

25th—Colonel WATANABE.	}	13th Brigade—Major-
26th—Lieut.-Colonel YOSHIDA.		General YOSHIDA.
27th—Lieut.-Colonel OKUDA.	}	14th Brigade—Major
28th—Lieut.-Colonel MURAKAMI.		General SAITO.

NINTH DIVISION (DISTRICT OF TROOPS,
KANAZAWA).

Headquarters—Lieut.-General OSHIMA.
C.O.S.—Colonel SUNAGAI.

REGIMENTS.

7th—Lieut.-Colonel OUCHI.	}	6th Brigade—Major-Gen-
35th—Colonel NAKAMURA.		eral ICHINOHE.
19th—Colonel SAGI.	}	18th Brigade—Major-General
36th—Colonel MIHARA.		MAETA.

ELEVENTH DIVISION (DISTRICT OF TROOPS,
SHIKOKU, MATSUYAMA.)

Headquarters—Lieut.-General TSUCHIYA. (December,
Lieut.-General SAMEJIMA.)
C.O.S.—Colonel ISHIDA.

REGIMENTS.

12th—Lieut.-Colonel MIYAMA.	}	10th Brigade—Major-
43rd—Lieut.-Colonel NISHIYAMA.		General KAMIO.
22nd—Lieut.-Colonel AWAKI.	}	22nd Brigade—Major-
44th—Colonel ISHIWARA.		General YAMANAKA.

GENERAL RESERVES.

Two independent brigades Second Reserves.

REGIMENTS.

1st and 15th	}	18,000 men.
16th „ 30th		
38th „ 9th		

2nd brigade of Artillery.

Total strength—100,000 men (approximately).

CHAPTER XVIII

MEETING OF NOGI AND STOESSEL

The contrast between the victor and vanquished generals
—A visit to the eastern fort-line—General sketch of the
position attacked by the Japanese—Defects in the Russian
scheme of fortification—Incomplete and slovenly batteries.

THIS historical meeting was private, the chief characteristics being the care taken to avoid any appearance of triumph and the simplicity of the conversation. Shortly after ten o'clock General Stoessel, riding a beautiful half-bred Arab charger, and accompanied by three members of his staff and a Cossack escort, rode up to the little cottage, and dismounting entered the shell-strewn compound. The general looked wonderfully well, his florid face thinly covered with a grey beard and his thick, well-knit figure well seated on his splendid mount. Nothing about him gave the slightest indication of fatigue or worry after the long siege, and he looked for all the world like a well-fed Boer dopper.

There was nothing in the man that suggested


confidence, nothing suggesting a leader. He looked what he was, a man of indifferent will, indifferent character, and indifferent ability, for neither strategical gifts nor military studies had raised Anatole Mikhailovitch Stoessel to the position he occupied.

Striding across the compound, he entered the cottage with the three members of his staff, there to wait the coming of General Nogi.

In the compound of the cottage there was an old withered tree; the aged, bearded Chinaman who owned the cottage told me that his name was Le-che-lwan. When he wrote the characters for me I found his was the "Le" of the Plum, and we named his dwelling Plum-tree Cottage. But this is another story.


At 11.25 a.m. the Japanese cavalcade came in sight, and in a burst of sunshine General Nogi rode up and dismounted, entered the compound, and was introduced to General Stoessel.

No greater contrast in men can be imagined. The one coarse-voiced, coarse-featured, and heavy in person; the other gentle of voice, refined in feature, and keenly alert, with eyes that go into the depths of your soul, bringing out confidence and trust, obedience and admiration; and a man as great in soldierly qual-



GENERAL STOESSEL'S HALF-BRED ARAB CHARGER, WHICH HE OFFERED TO PRESENT
TO GENERAL NOGI.

(Copyright Photo by J. Rosenthal, of the Charles Urban Trading Co., Ltd.)



ities as he was tender of heart for those he commanded.


The subsequent proceedings were private, and the following will summarise the translated conversation.

General Stoessel immediately apologised for a fire that was then raging in Port Arthur, which he regretted was due to incendiarism. He hoped the Japanese would soon take over the towns, as the volunteers and labourers were getting out of hand.

General Nogi then expressed his great pleasure at the honour of meeting the brave defender of Port Arthur; and Stoessel thanked him for the consideration that had made the meeting possible, and said that he was proud to have been able to clasp the hand of the hero of the besiegers. General Nogi said that the Mikado had sent a message desiring that all honour should be accorded to him, and Stoessel thanked His Majesty for this great favour, which by granting him honours of war had saved the honour of himself and his family, and for this consideration they would be ever grateful to the Mikado. Then the generals complimented each other on the sterling qualities of their soldiers, Stoessel saying that the entire garrison of the Sungshu

fort perished in the explosion, and that the Japanese simultaneous artillery fire was wonderfully concentrated and cleverly timed for the explosion, for the moment the detonation was heard the fort was deluged with shells.

Speaking of the Japanese infantry, Stoessel said that their courageous work was beyond comment, and a touch of sadness was added to the conversation when he expressed his deep sorrow at the loss of General Nogi's two sons. But Nogi smilingly replied that the gain to his country outweighed his own loss, for both 203 Metre Hill and Nanshan were important positions. After further general conversation the party lunched, and afterwards were photographed together in the compound. Stoessel then sent for his charger, and asked permission to offer it to General Nogi; then mounting the animal he put it through its paces. But Nogi expressed his regret that as all arms and horses were, by the fortunes of war, the property of Japan, they could not be accepted by individuals, but he would accept the animal in the name of the army and see that it was well cared for. Before parting, General Nogi asked Stoessel to remain at his residence in Port Arthur until arrangements were completed for his return to Russia. He also added



X GENERAL STOESEL RIDING FROM PLUM-TREE COTTAGE AFTER HIS MEETING WITH GENERAL NOGI.

(Copyright Photo by J. Rosenthal, of the Charles Urban Trading Co., Ltd.)

that the fallen warriors of Russia then interred in the neighbourhood of the fortifications would be exhumed and gathered in one spot for burial, and over their grave a monument in their honour would be erected. With a hand-clasp the generals parted, and Stoessel rode out of the compound and returned to Port Arthur.

Half an hour later General Nogi came out of the cottage, and accompanied by two members of his staff rode over to the foot of Sung-shu-shan and visited the eastern position.

Visit to the Eastern Fort-line, January 4, 1905.

Starting from Ta-ku-shan—roughly a mile east of the South Keekwan hill—and crossing the rolling slopes furrowed with deep ravines running at right angles to the fortifications, I passed through a couple of clusters of battered Chinese houses, and reached the foot of South Keekwan. Looking back at the slopes it appeared feasible to advance infantry close up to the points of attack under good cover, but this was only possible by a great sacrifice of central command and with a disjointed front. Commencing the ascent, and walking easily, I reached the 30 yard parallel opposite Tragedy Trench.

It had already been a stiff climb, and by the time I was standing in the Tragedy Trench I understood fully the disagreeable task set the 22nd Regiment. The trench was heaped up with unnamable rubbish, and on the slopes glistened whitened skeletons and the frozen bodies of the last soldiers to go up. Reaching the South Keekwan fort, which was dynamited by the Russians on the morning of the 2nd of January, I was confronted with a remarkable spectacle of wanton destruction. The position had been splendidly constructed, and the most commanding of the eastern line, but dynamite had given to the concreted fort the appearance of the huge crater of an active volcano. 6-inch Krupp cannon had been flung up into the air by the force of the explosion, and, falling muzzle downwards, were rammed amid the débris of the gun-stand almost to their breech-blocks. The mountings, shields, hoists, rails, and what not, with much ammunition, were scattered about the hillside. The secondary battery of this fort was smashed to pieces (I found one gun 40 feet away from its carriage) and scattered about like chaff, while the quick-firers and machine guns were in tiny fragments. The entire interior of the fort was a jumbled

mass of huge concrete blocks hurled out of position.

The flanking battery was also deluged with steel, and one gun by some circumstance had been cut in two pieces as clean as a whistle.

The double set of infantry galleries surrounding the hill were splendidly conceived for enfilading a great gulch that separates this position from the first of the Pai-gin-shan fortifications. The bomb-proofs about this position were under the banquettes, and strongly constructed out of great wooden beams. They formed a series of chambers about 6 by 10 feet, and, being well separated, minimised casualty by localising the destruction of shell fire, and were indeed, for the most part, untouched by Japanese shelling.

There are two peaks to the South Keekwan hill, and they are separated by the enceinte wall. On the west peak was the west battery of South Keekwan, which proved to be but a temporary gun-stand mounting a couple of 6-inch naval Krupp cannon on a wooden platform. There were no shields or head cover for the working numbers of the gun crew, but the guns were, however, in good condition, and had a good field of fire, but not much advantage

had been taken of its possibilities as a battery position.

The enceinte wall running between south fort and west battery was made up of a series of bomb-proof chambers similar to those in the battery, and were absolutely unharmed by the Japanese shell fire.

Following the enceinte wall to "Q" fortification, or Kuropatkin fort, the great value of this battery position of light field artillery was very clear. It commands the approaches of South Keekwan and the North fort, and being about midway between them (beneath the former and a little to the right rear of the latter) was well supported by the former, and formed an excellent retreat and covering battery for the rear of North fort.

Immediately in the rear of "Q," and overlooking its open rear, is another smaller battery of 4-inch guns, which entirely commands it in reverse.

Still another battery to the left commanded the gorge of North fort and the slopes of Wantai.

Two naval 6-inch Krupp guns, mounted on beams, were the only armament of Wantai; and as the gun-stand covered the entire summit, the ammunition and detachment shelters were

forced over to the reverse slope and a little distance from the guns. It was an excellent observation point for the eastern line, and a good general view of the position occupied by the Japanese can be obtained from its summit.

If there was such a thing, Wantai was certainly the "key" of the north-eastern position; but, as I have remarked before, it was so dependent on all the surrounding batteries that the several attempts to force its capture before reducing the dominating batteries and forts was—a little foolhardy.

The slope of Wantai offers a steep climb, and was crossed by wire entanglements, and, as the pivot of a position, presented in itself no great opposition to infantry, but, being set like the kernel of a nut, it was the exterior that offered the obstruction. But what still remains an unsolved problem is how the 7th Regiment succeeded in holding the East Panlung fortification with only a bare 150 casualties a day. The East Panlung is outside the enceinte, and exposed to rifle and artillery fire from the entire position I have just described, and although never used as a basis of attack (as originally intended), the repeated sorties of the Russians compelled a large reserve garrison

to be always held in the sixth parallel; and in covering the work of the sappers and checking the sorties the garrison of the Panlungs did yeoman service in a difficult and trying position, which appears almost incredible that they succeeded in retaining under the heavy artillery fire directed against them.

Leaving Wantai, and walking west along a fine 30-foot wide gun-road (winding around the eastern position), a good view is obtained of the "*second line of eastern defence*," which was conspicuous by its lack of fortification. Not one of the hills appeared to have as much as a rifle pit, much less a fort. A great horse-shoe-shaped valley intervenes between the gun-road and the unfortified second line.

There were many infantry shelters on the reverse slopes close to the gun-road, and in the hills between Wantai and Erhlung fort there are the two batteries of "H" and "I."

"H" Battery overlooks East Panlung, and was mounted with 6-inch short cannon. There were many unexploded Japanese 28-centimetre shells hereabout. In "I" battery there were four 11-inch howitzers, two of which were out of action. One gun had been blown clean off its slide, and the other had had its working parts destroyed.

It was "I" battery that closed the final artillery duel with the Japanese on the 2nd of January, and there was in the gun-stand a pathetic reminder of the last day of the siege. One of the howitzers had been fired, and the working numbers of the gun crew had re-entered the stand. The gun-barrel had been turned down and a fresh shell slung in the hoist, and the gunners were in the very act of serving when a reply shell from a Japanese 28-centimetre howitzer landed and burst among the detachment. The hideously mangled corpses of the gunners lay straddled across the platform, and the emplacement was littered with the fragments of the remaining crew.

From "I" battery on there were many evidences of the destructiveness of high explosives.

The Erhlung fort, as was to have been expected, was terribly demolished, but the result of the explosion, being of a different nature (more rock than concrete and metal) to that at the South Keekwan, was not so destructively noticeable. In the front of the fort there was a great crater, and the line of light artillery was hopelessly destroyed; but, apart from a woeful scattering of accoutrements and broken

firearms, that bore eloquent testimony to the work of the grenade, there was little of note to be seen.

The Sungshu fort was in a greater state of disruption, as the Russian mine had played havoc with the interior, and it was evident that the garrison could not have held the fort even had they not been entombed.

As the western forts were never contested they need no special comment, but it was clear that the north-eastern sector of forts was the most formidable of any of the groups.

Speaking generally, a good field of fire was commanded by the entire Russian line of defence, and being naturally suited for the construction of fortifications there was excellent mutual support between the different works. The faulty placing of cannon on the summit of hills instead of on the reverse slopes made them easy targets; and again, in nearly every instance, there were no shields or head cover for the working detachments, and bomb-proofs were often some distance from the gun-stands instead of being under the banquette.

The majority of the forts were not complete, frequently in the important matter of lateral lines of retreat and communication. Exterior defensive work was often cleverly concealed,

but, trench construction suffered from improper attention to the ditch walls, which were often at a gentle slope and easily overrun. There were many excellent observation points in the chain of hills, but very few were utilised; and there was a great lack of telegraphic and telephonic communication between batteries and observation points. Searchlights were fixtures, and trolleys appeared not to have been used.

The lack of a balloon was a very serious handicap to the garrison gunners, and their practice was indifferent. The Russians were, moreover, seriously handicapped after October by the Japanese using 6-inch naval guns and 28-centimetre howitzers, which placed them at a disadvantage and pulverised the ordinary shell-proof arrangements, but were nevertheless ineffective against the concrete shelters. The Japanese engineers constructed over 20 miles of saps (utilising 1,200,000 sand-bags besides thousands of rice-bags) to bring the infantry in touch with the forts. They also laid over 40 miles of light railway to connect up the divisions, artillery parks, hospital and commissary depôts.

CHAPTER XIX

SURRENDER SCENES—MARCH OUT OF THE PORT ARTHUR GARRISON—DEPARTURE OF GEN- ERAL STOESSEL—ENTRY OF THE JAPANESE INTO PORT ARTHUR.

Condition of the garrison—Opinion of General Stoessel as held by his subordinates—Departure of General Stoessel, the paroled officers, and women and children—Disgraceful conduct of Russian officers toward the civilian women and children—The march past of the Third Army with the tattered regimental colours.

THE bitter words, "*or to share the destiny of the men,*" that glared in the Tzar's message to Stoessel forced almost all the officers of the Port Arthur garrison to bow their heads, share the ~~destiny~~ destiny of the men, and go with them into captivity. On the 6th of January the first detachment of prisoners filed out of the village of Yahutswei, took a long last look at the town they had so long and bravely defended, then set their faces north and started out for the station of Chang-ling-tsu, over 12 miles away as the crow flies.

The distance to be marched by the prisoners

was, however, almost 18 miles, but as the weather was mild, and the country snow-free, it was easy marching. The long, straggling line wended its way through the numerous Japanese horse-lines, artillery and transport parks, among the western foot-hills, then entering the valley trudged wearily over the dusty transport road leading to Chang-ling-tsu. An armed guard mingled among the prisoners of war, whose steady tramping raised great whirling clouds of dust, and it was late before the bedraggled troops, marching wearily without order, and looking crestfallen, and more like a crowd of rejected emigrants plodding wearily home than a force of surrendered soldiers, arrived at the station. Yet they showed no signs of privation or starvation; on the contrary, they were in splendid condition—appeared to be in good health, and were all men of splendid physique. For the most part they were warmly and often over-clad, wearing new overcoats, and were mostly newly shod—this change in apparel having taken place after the surrender. The officers were splendidly uniformed, and in their careworn and frowning faces there were greater evidences of the siege than in the appearance or condition of their men. It proved a fine evening, and

fortunately no wind got up. After a roll-call the men disbanded, roaming about at will, or squatting on the ground waiting for the arrival of other detachments. When these arrived, 1200 men were entrained for Dalny, and the rest, some 2000, bivouacked on a patch of broken ground close to the station, passing the night under their blankets. Lying huddled together they presented a pitiful spectacle, their heads resting together on their heaped-up kits, and their legs sprawled out, until the ground had the appearance of being littered with so many rimless wheels with human spokes. Grouped about little wood-fires, many elected to pass the night with the pickets, spinning yarns, or cooking scraps of bartered food that had been drawn, like blood out of a stone, from the philosophical, make-the-best-out-of-the-occasion Chinese villagers. - -

At dawn all was animation, as the prisoners wandered about seeking water and fuel, for during the morning a cold north wind had sprung up, and they were in no pleasant plight. Later in the morning the Japanese erected tents for their prisoners, and sent them cases of tinned meats and biscuits, out of which the motley crowd—gathering into groups—prepared scanty meals. •

Meanwhile the officers, feeling their humiliation keenly, walked sullenly about, their tall forms and splendid figures, handsomely uniformed, towering above the more compact frames of the Japanese orderlies, assisting in the arrangements for entraining.

At 9 a.m. the men gathered together and chanted prayers dictated by an aged, white-bearded priest. The deep bass voices of the Russians sounded strangely over the plain, then full of the rattling of transport carts, and the chattering and yelling of Chinese teamsters, for ever cracking their whips, and "o-o-o" or "e-e-e-ing."

After prayers the prisoners wandered about without let or hindrance, and were joined during the afternoon by thousands of others as well fed and clothed, and showing as little sign of the privations of the siege as General Stoessel himself.

Squads were marched on to the platform with their kits on their backs, formed up into double lines, mustered off into sections of 40, and, under the orders of a Japanese officer and Russian non-com., detailed to the open trucks. In this clock-work manner 4000 to 5000 a day were despatched to Dalny, where in most cases they were again marched

from the station to the decks of transports, and in a few hours under weigh for Japan.

Out of the thousands of prisoners that I saw, there were few that showed any trace of toil, sickness, or privation; and their general appearance afforded not the slightest indication of their having been actively engaged in siege operations. Yet what they had faced was sufficient to have at least whitened their hair.

From conversations with the Russian officers at Chang-ling-tsu station, and after a careful canvass among the rank and file, I was convinced by the unanimous opinion held, and by the manner in which lips curled when his name was mentioned, that Stoessel was a weak man with a loud voice and domineering manner—a man of no individual character or spirit, apart from bullying. They made it clear that he was inclined to surrender in August, but was prevailed upon not to do so by Krondrachenko, who they all agreed, without a dissenting voice, was the sole defender of Port Arthur,—had he not been killed Port Arthur would not have surrendered. Speaking of the composition of the garrison, they made conflicting statements, but I gathered that there were originally over 50,000 men, and of these 10,000 were Poles and indifferent fighters. They claimed over 10,000

killed during the siege, and said that at 203 Metre Hill their casualties were over 4000, and that during the last four days of the fighting at 203 no less than 4000 28-centimetre Japanese shells struck the hill.

Although not a success, they claimed—rightly—that the great sortie on the night of the 23rd of August (planned by Krondrachenko) was most opportunely made, and dislocated the Japanese plan of direct storming. Of General Stoessel they said unmentionable things, and but for the untimely interference of a staff colonel I would have heard a little scandal which the court-martial may disclose.

Departure of General Stoessel, January 11, 1905.

Chang-ling-tsu station was the scene of some remarkable sights the day of Stoessel's departure. Many women and children were to leave by the same train, and from early morning a string of droskies laden with bundles and people (from babies to old women) arrived at the station, and the contents soon scattered about the platform. The poorer women contented themselves with sitting on the top of their chattels and feeding their babies from paper bags. These were the saddest sights. Some of the babies were only a few months old,

and, refusing to be comforted, maintained a ceaseless wailing pitiful to hear. The better-dressed women (not wives of officers but mostly companions) were unabashed, and even at this tiresome moment had time to use powder-puffs, and were for ever arranging hats and rearranging nets over disarranged tresses, to the great amusement of grinning Japanese Tommies, whom they looked down upon with withering disdain that was but wasted on the air.

About two o'clock several officers of high rank drove up to the station; these included Generals Folk, Smyrnoff, and Illman, and three admirals. A few minutes later General and Madame Stoessel drove up. Madame Stoessel, a portly dame resembling in every detail of form and costume a Dutch farmer's wife, stepped out of the drosky, followed by a host of little orphans, each cuddling a little dog, and ~~walked~~ down the platform after her husband.

The general's appearance was received with marked coldness, and many officers walked off the platform with sneering expressions on their faces. General Idichi stepped forward and spoke a few words to Stoessel, shook hands and bade him farewell. Soon afterwards the train was backed into the station, and the word passed round to entrain. Then followed

a disgusting spectacle, as the officers (it must be understood that most of these had accepted parole) made a rush to secure seats in the covered carriages. They were not content with seats for themselves, but bundled in a few dozen dogs. The women—not the be-powdered ones—were allowed to scramble in as they could, and those with tiny infants, afraid to join the rush, sat sorrowfully-still among the heaps of baggage and watched the covered cars rapidly fill. An indignant protest that I made to Captain Count Matsudaira went a long way to help the poor women, but Russian officers did not worthily uphold the honour of their uniforms that afternoon.


General Stoessel kissed his four orderlies good-bye, then mounted the train; and, as it pulled out of the station and disappeared ~~around~~ the bluff, I thought of Krondrachenko's grave near the battery of the Golden Hill.

The Entry of the Japanese, January 13, 1905.

The simplicity of the entry into Port Arthur added to the historical event a quiet dignity in keeping with the unassuming character of the great leader of the Third Japanese Army. He had entered that fortress-town at the head of a brigade ten years before he re-entered it

at the head of a victorious army. Bugles sounded that morning (the first time since the 17th of August, when the fortress refused to surrender and the white flag came back to the Japanese line), and the divisional detachments were marched out to their allotted stations in the Sueishi valley.

At eleven o'clock General Nogi, at the head of a mixed column of troops, bluejackets, artillery, transport and hospital sections, entered the Old Chinese Town through the Nicholas Gate, east of Pai-yu-shan. The cavalcade was preceded by the Tokio military band, and after wending its way through the streets of the Old Town crossed the Creek Bridge and entered the New Town. Midway in the town, close to the public gardens, General Nogi, his staff, and the foreign military attachés, wheeled out of line, faced about, and fronted the saluting base. Here there had been erected no flag-staff, and no standard was unfurled. The band took up a position a little ahead of the general, and played national airs while the men trooped past. The divisional detachments, headed by the commanding general and staff, rode up, saluted the commander-in-chief, wheeled out of line, and took up stations with the headquarters to receive the salute of their



TRIUMPHANT ENTRY OF THE JAPANESE INTO PORT ARTHUR. (X GENERAL NOGI.) THE BUILDING TO THE RIGHT IS THE NEW HOTEL (IN COURSE OF CONSTRUCTION) WHICH WAS USED DURING THE SIEGE AS A HOSPITAL. THE HILL IN THE BACKGROUND IS 203 METRE HILL.

(Copyright Photo by J. Rosenthal, of the Charles Urban Trading Co., Ltd.)

men. Regimental sections to the number of 200, bearing their regimental colours and headed by buglers, then marched past, and as the general saluted each standard a fanfare of bugles rang out, and the men clicked eyes right. It was a stirring sight as standard after standard, torn to shreds and hanging in stained ribbons (like those that hang in St. Paul's Cathedral), was carried triumphantly past the reverently saluting commander-in-chief. The gallant 7th Regiment, the 12th, and the 22nd, that barely mustered 200 original strength, carried the shreds of silk with well-earned honour reflected in their faces as, in an almost forgotten goose-step, they swung past their chief.

The well-clad troops marched past with a good swing, and if the line was sinuous instead of correctly straight it was because the men were drawn to their commander by the same irresistible magnetism that had so often repelled them and forced them to capture positions or perish; and in consequence of this it was a ragged march past, not at all a military pageant of military precision, but the marching past of a grim fighting host who had finished their task.

For reasons best known (if known at all)

to the general staff of the Third Army, the foreign military attachés and war-correspondents were precluded from entering Port Arthur before the official entry on the 13th of January. The valid reasons—if they existed—were annulled by the permission granted to a party of wandering naval attachés and outsiders who were allowed to enter on the 8th of January. Unfortunately for us a few Japanese developed that malady termed by Americans “swelled-head,” and became studiously rude after the surrender, so rude, in fact, as to be insulting, and to escape this humiliation the war-correspondents sent in a request to be allowed to leave the army from whom they had received so many tokens of friendship.

General Nogi, of course, knew nothing of this remarkable change of front on the ~~part~~ of two of his subordinates; but we received a reply (the original of which I retain) which was amusingly apologetic, and we were asked to stay a few days longer, etc. I would not mention this distasteful matter, but that I may be accused of being desirous of hiding a subject which left a most disagreeable taste in our mouths, and in consequence of which there was little of interest for us to write about

when we were allowed to enter the town. The little traces of the siege, which would have afforded reflection, had been all effaced, and there was little beyond a few charred buildings, a "beach-combing" population, and the destroyed fleet to reward us for thirteen days' waiting.

The buildings in the neighbourhood of the water-front of the Old Town showed signs of indiscriminate shelling, but there were few absolutely destroyed buildings; and in the New Town there were singularly few marks of Japanese shell fire.

The railway station had been totally destroyed, and a score of destroyed trucks were in the siding; but the general appearance of the towns, like that of the garrison, gave no evidence of a destructive siege. The civilian population shrieked with laughter when we asked where the caves and underground dwellings were, à la Chefoo; it was the first they had heard of the matter, and said, on the contrary, that the dwellings were in continuous occupation during the entire siege, and that except during the heavier bombardments the population promenaded the streets with great freedom. Of food there was plenty, and we were offered, and some accepted, the hospitality of a German firm, and received really

royal repasts, liberally accompanied by champagne. I went into one butcher's shop, and saw many grocery stores open; these were, of course, in the occupation of Europeans and catering to them. As for the garrison, there were tons of flour and beans, besides other edibles. In fact I was at first a little dubious of my eyesight, and inclined to believe that there was a screw loose somewhere, but there was no deception and it was all plain hard fact.

Crossing the Creek Bridge, between the two towns, I saw that the creek bed (under the bridge, and as far out into the West Port as I could see) was paved with cases of ammunition, hundreds of rifles, and hundreds of unexploded Russian shells.

It was said that the rifles and cases of ammunition were flung into the sea by disgusted soldiers, who later broke into a warehouse and pillaged a thousand cases of vodka.

The garrison, of course, cannot be held responsible for the disgraceful surrender, and that they were willing and able to fight ~~was~~ proved by their ability to tramp 18 miles, and their condition and morale at the time of the surrender.

Unfortunately the world, saturated with

"Stoessel telegrams to the Tzar" and concocted "Chefoo-leries," will never be altogether swayed from the first impressions formed about the heroic qualities of General Stoessel; that time alone will correct.


The battleships and cruisers were huddled together with destroyed upper-works, and presented a sorry sight; but they have been raised, and under Japanese names will again steam in and out of the narrow entrance. Truly, the more one thinks of the defence offered by General Stoessel for his disgraceful surrender, the more one is inclined to believe the unfortunate general's mind was temporarily unhinged by fear.


CHAPTER XX AND LAST

FÊTE IN HONOUR OF THE FALLEN HEROES OF THE BESIEGING ARMY

Tribute to General Nogi—General Nogi salutes the "spirits of the dead" at a shrine erected on consecrated ground—
Finis.

OUT of the gloomy tragedy one figure stands clearly isolated in picturesque sadness, pathetically robbed of all earthly happiness yet invested with a conqueror's mantle. During the many dark weeks of the long siege, silently wrestling in the despair of defeat, with the moanings of thousands of souls, passed away at his bidding, eternally tearing at his heart-strings—when others were at rest, and believing himself alone, Nogi would let the restrained tears flow unheeded from his bowed head, and pray that some sacrifice would be inflicted on him to atone for their sacrifice. One son had been taken from him, and during the blackest of the dark days, when all seemed hopeless, the second son perished at 203 Metre Hill. And when the bitter





X GENERAL NOGI AT THE OFFICERS' BANQUET ON THE 14TH OF JANUARY, 1905.

(Copyright Photo by J. Rosenthal, of the Charles Urban Trading Co., Ltd.)

news was told him he showed no passing shadow of the great cloud that had come over his life. He was now heirless, and his bereavement answered the clamouring souls of the departed men he had, by unhappy duty, sent to their death. And through the stress of those days he would always greet you with a smile, come into your humble bivouac, share your food, and offer you little pieces of chocolate he seemed always to carry in the breast-pocket of his uniform, would enquire about the water you had to drink, send you half of a basket of fruit sent to him by his wife, and never a passing word would betray the deep anguish of the father. His very presence seemed to raise you out of your sordid self and make you proud that you had followed the fortunes of the man Nogi. . . .

On the 14th of January the troops of the Third Army were massed in the Sueishi valley, midway between the Russian fortifications and the Japanese line of investment, forming a great hollow square around a shrine erected on a low hill north of the Erhlung lunette. An oblong pillar of wood had been erected over a foundation of sandbags (flanked by two great unexploded 28-centimetre Russian shells), in front of which was a Buddhist

altar heaped with offerings of bread and wine.

Here the priests conducted a memorial service in honour of the fallen heroes of the Third Japanese Army. During the morning a great heavy mist hung low over the valley, obscuring the entire line of fortifications ; and the great gloom added a significant solemnity to the service. General Nogi was the first to approach the shrine, and as he walked up to the altar the bugles rang out and the army presented arms. Saluting the shrine, the general thus addressed the departed spirits :—

“ On the 14th of January, in the 38th year of Meiji, I, Nogi Masaki, Commander-in-chief of the Third Japanese Army, have caused this fête to be celebrated with saké and many offerings, in honour of the officers and men who have fallen.

“ For over 210 days and nights you bravely battled, facing death by fire, sword, and disease, and you were killed ; but your efforts were not in vain, for the fleet of the enemy was destroyed and the fortress forced to surrender. This was but the reward of your sacrifice. But I and others swore death or victory, and I surviving have received the Imperial thanks, and now unworthily monopolise this glory ; and I beseech you who are gone to the hereafter, share with me this glory. Fate ordaining, sadly places me in command of these hills, streams, and forts, all so stained with your life's blood ;

here,¹ before this altar raised on consecrated ground, I invoke your spirits to partake of our humble offerings."

General Nogi then backed away from the altar and retired some distance. The officers of the army followed him and paid similar homage, being followed in turn by the foreign military attachés and war-correspondents. Then the short but impressive ceremony was over, the bugles rang out dismissing the troops, and at that moment the sun broke through the clouds, dispersing the gloomy mist, and flooding the valley with bright sunshine.



DIARY OF THE SIEGE

FEBRUARY 1904.

9th (night). First attack on Port Arthur by the Japanese torpedo boats. Battleships *Cæsarevitch*, *Retvisan*, and cruiser *Pallada* damaged.

9th. Attack by Japanese fleet. Battleship *Poltava*, cruisers *Askold*, *Diana*, and *Novik* damaged.

13th. Port Arthur fleet attacked in a snowstorm. Cruiser *Boyarin* sunk.

23rd. First attempt to block the harbour entrance.

MARCH.

10th. Fourth attack on Port Arthur by Japanese fleet.

22nd. Fifth attack on Port Arthur by Japanese fleet.

26th, 27th. Second attempt to block harbour entrance.

APRIL.

13th. Battleship *Petropavlovsk* blown up by Japanese mine; Admiral Makharoff and 700 crew lost.

24th. Russian mine transport *Amur* sunk in Port Arthur roadstead.

MAY.

3rd. Third attempt to block the harbour. Entrance sealed for battleships and cruisers.

15th. Japanese battleship *Hatsuse* sunk by Russian mine. Japanese cruiser *Yoshino* sunk by collision.

26th. Battle of Nanshan.

31st. Landing of Third Japanese Army at Kera Bay.

JUNE.

26th. Capture of Kenshan and Wai-tou-shan.

JULY.

3rd-5th. Russians attempt to recapture Kenshan.

26th-28th. Japanese attack Russian line of first defence.

30th. Russians retire into permanent defences at Port Arthur.

AUGUST.

9th. Capture of Ta-ku-shan.

10th. Sortie of Port Arthur squadron.

12th-15th. Preliminary siege operations.

19th-25th. First assault on Port Arthur fortifications.

SEPTEMBER.

1st-19th. Sapping operations.

20th. General attack on semi-permanent fortifications.

OCTOBER.

1st-25th. Sapping and mining.

26th-30th. Second assault on Port Arthur.

NOVEMBER.

- 1st-25th. Mining operations.
- 26th. Third assault on Port Arthur.
- 27th. Opening of attack on 203 Metre Hill.

DECEMBER.

- 5th. Capture of 203 Metre Hill.
 - 18th. Destruction and capture of North fort.
 - 28th. Destruction and capture of Erhlung fort.
 - 31st. Destruction and capture of Sungshu fort.
- Night attack.

JANUARY 1905.

- 1st. Capture of Wantai. General Stoessel sends in the white flag.
- 2nd. Capitulation of Port Arthur.



APPENDIX

REGULATIONS FOR FOREIGN WAR-CORRESPONDENTS ATTACHED TO THE BESIEGING ARMY

Article 1.—All the war-correspondents attached to this Army shall observe the following regulations, in addition to the Notification of the War Department issued in the 37th year of Meiji (No. 3 ; see Appendix I.).

Article 2.—Regarding the supervision of the war-correspondents, the Staff Department shall be in charge of all matters relating to their correspondence, the Commissariat Department of their quarters and supplies in the field, and the Adjutants' Department of all other matters relating to them.

Article 3.—They shall be careful not to interfere with the movements of the Army, and not to enter any office-room without permission.

Article 4.—The Army Authorities shall, if necessary, distribute them among the different bodies of troops under their command. In this case they shall follow the guidance and orders of the commanders or superintending officers of their respective bodies of troops.

Article 5.—In the field, they are not allowed to

move at any time from any place without the permission of the superintending officers or commanders.

Article 6.—All communications from them (including newspaper correspondence, private letters, telegrams, etc.) shall be presented by them to the superintending officers, for inspection, before they are sent off.

When the superintending officers shall have made their inspection, they shall not return the documents till they have sealed down the envelopes of newspaper correspondence and private letters and stamped them with the seal of "passed censor," or in the case of telegrams or post-cards not until they have stamped them on the front side with the same seal.

It is required that the names of their senders and of their newspapers shall be written on the envelopes and front sides of all correspondence.

Article 7.—All letters without the stamp above-mentioned, or all those in which codes or signs are used, shall not be allowed to be sent off.

Article 8.—A Japanese translation will sometimes be required to be sent in with any correspondence in a foreign language, and the languages in which they may be sent will sometimes be limited.

Article 9.—Correspondence shall not contain any facts on the following subjects:—

1. Anything that may disturb the public safety, or affect the morale of the Army;
2. The future movements of the Army and its supposed conduct;
3. The strength of our Army, the names of bodies of troops and their positions, the date when, and the name of place whence, they were written, unless such information be specially permitted by the superintending officers;

4. Besides the above-mentioned, any facts specially forbidden by the superintending officers.

Article 10.—The war-correspondents, both native and foreign, shall respectively select one delegate who shall act as an intermediary between the Headquarters and the war-correspondents for general affairs concerning them.

Article 11.—In sending telegraphic despatches they shall observe the procedure notified in No. 86 of the Instructions of the War Department, published in April of the 37th year of Meiji (see Appendix II.).

HEAD-QUARTERS OF THE THIRD ARMY CORPS.

APPENDIX I.—NOTIFICATION NO. 3 OF THE WAR DEPARTMENT, ISSUED FEB. 10, 1904.

Regulations for Military War-Correspondents.

Article 1.—Press correspondents who wish to follow the Army are required to make application to the Department of War, together with a sketch of their life record, and a document of personal guarantee signed by the proprietor of the newspaper to which they belong.

In case of foreign correspondents, their application shall be sent through their respective Minister or Consul, and also through the Department of Foreign Affairs.

Foreign correspondents need only mention in their application the name of the newspapers to which they belong, and dispense altogether with the presentation of their life record and testimonials.

Article 2.—Native applicants must have been

engaged in journalistic work for not less than a year as a member of a newspaper staff.

Article 3.—Foreign correspondents who cannot understand the Japanese language may take with them one interpreter each to the field.

Any correspondent requiring an interpreter may engage one himself, and present an application for such, accompanied by a testimonial for the proposed interpreter.

Article 4.—A foreign correspondent in addition to his interpreter may engage one more servant when circumstances demand it; the procedure of engagement shall be in accordance with the foregoing Article.

Article 5.—The authorities, when they consider it necessary, may have one person selected to act as joint-correspondent for several newspapers.

Article 6.—In case any person is allowed to accompany the Japanese forces, an official permit shall be given him.

Article 7.—The applicants accepted as stated in the previous Article shall be distributed among different bodies of troops at the discretion of the "Head-Quarters."

Article 8.—Correspondents shall always wear foreign clothes, and to their left arms shall be attached a white band measuring about two sun (2.4 in.) in width, on which the name of the newspaper which they represent shall be written in Japanese, with red ink.

Article 9.—Correspondents shall always have with them the official permit, and shall, when asked, show it to soldiers or officials belonging to the Japanese forces.

Article 10.—Correspondents shall always observe the rules and orders issued by the "Head-Quarters" so long as they remain with the Japanese forces. In case they disregard the above rules and orders, the

Authorities of the "Head-Quarters" may refuse to allow them to accompany the Japanese forces.

Article 11.—War-correspondents will not be permitted to despatch their communications (whether they be correspondence for publication, or private letters, or telegrams, etc.), until after their examination by the officers appointed for the purpose by the "Head-Quarters."

No communication containing private codes or symbols will be permitted to be despatched.

Article 12.—The Army and its officers will accord, as far as circumstances permit, to the war-correspondent suitable treatment and facilities; and when in the field, and in case of necessity, give him food, etc., or, at his request, give him transportation in vessels or vehicles.

Article 13.—In case the war-correspondent is guilty of a violation of the Criminal Law, Military Criminal Law, Law for the Preservation of Military Secrets, etc., he may be judged and punished by the Court-Martial, according to the Military Penal Code of Japan.

Article 14.—Articles 6-13 are applicable to interpreters and servants.

APPENDIX II.—No. 86, INSTRUCTIONS OF THE
WAR DEPARTMENT.

The procedure of managing newspaper despatches through the Military Telegraph Communication Offices is fixed as follows:

April 17th of the 37th year of Meiji,
TERAUCHI MASONORI, Minister of War.

*The Procedure of Managing Newspaper Despatches
through the Military Telegraph Communication
Offices.*

Article 1.—The war-correspondents who were permitted to go with Army to the field may send their despatches through the Military Telegraph Communication Offices in pursuance of this procedure.

Article 2.—The M.T.C.O. directed by the "Grand Head-Quarters" shall transmit newspaper telegrams, unless any obstruction occurs to prevent official military communication.

Article 3.—Newspaper despatches shall contain only those articles that will be published in the corresponding newspapers.

Article 4.—If newspaper despatches contain anything concerning business transactions between the sender and the receiver, they shall be refused transmittance.

Article 5.—Newspaper despatches shall be written in common Japanese or English, and only those on which the stamp of "passed censor" by the Headquarters of an Army Corps or a Division shall be accepted.

The newspaper despatches above-mentioned shall be sent from the M.T.C.O. to the P.O. that is directly

connected with the Military Telegraph Wire, after affixing the office code of "mu-fu."

Article 6.—The war-correspondents, both native and foreign, attached to one Army Corps will be allowed only to send five or less than five despatches both in Japanese and English respectively.

A Japanese despatch must contain not more than 150 letters and an English 50 words.

The number of the despatches above-mentioned shall be fixed and distributed among war-correspondents by an Army Corps Commander or an Independent Division Commander, and they must previously inform the M.T.C.O. of it.

Article 7.—If an Army or Independent Division Commander thinks it necessary, he shall diminish the number of letters or words still more, or may sometimes discontinue the telegraphic transmission partly or wholly.

Article 8.—If despatches through the M.T.C.O. are directed to any place outside of Japan, they must be those connected with such places as have received permission from the Department of Communications to pay their fees afterwards.

The names of the senders of the above-mentioned newspaper despatches, and the names of the newspapers, with their addresses, shall be reported at the Headquarters of an Army Corps or an Independent Division, by the "Grand Head-Quarters" beforehand.

Article 9.—Any sender of the newspaper despatches whose fees are paid afterwards must write his name at the end of the despatch, and inside of the margin of the telegram paper he must write the words "Press R.T.P."

The despatches above-mentioned shall be sent to the P.O. directly connected with the Military Telegraph Wire, with the office code of "Press R.T.P."

Article 10.—Regarding the transmission of newspaper telegrams through the Military Telegraph, the M.T.C.O. is not responsible to their senders for mistakes, delays, or non-delivery.

Article 11.—If the war-correspondents, both native and foreign, should act contrary to these regulations regarding the sending of the despatches, the Army Commander, or Commander of an Independent Division, shall refuse any transmission of newspaper despatches to them.

Article 12.—Respecting the matters not mentioned in these regulations for the management of newspaper despatches, information may be found in No. 58 Instructions of the War Department, issued in March 1904, regarding the regulations of the management of the "M.T.C.O." despatches in Korea, besides other general regulations.

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